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INTRODUCTION 
Selective federal preemption in a country’s securities regula-
tory framework is required to compete successfully in the global 
securities market.  It prevents balkanization of a country’s secu-
rities regulatory framework.  By definition, selective federal pre-
emption includes some preservation of state or local authority in 
the securities regulatory framework to address local issues, i.e., 
issues particular to each state.  At the local level, state securities 
regulatory authorities (SSRAs) have the power to bring, at a 
minimum, fraud actions that the federal regulator does not have 
the resources to address effectively.  SSRAs are the “local cops on 
the securities beat,”1 whose mission is to protect the small inves-
tor.2  Selective federal preemption is needed to “‘maintain uni-
formity and certainty’ in U.S. securities markets so that they re-
main ahead of markets ‘in London, Frankfurt, Tokyo or Hong 
Kong.’”3  When signing the National Securities Markets Im-
provement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), which contained critical selec-
tive federal preemption provisions, President Clinton asserted 
that it was needed to “enhance capital formation and the com-
 
 1 The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003: Hearing on 
H.R. 2179 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Spon-
sored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on House Financial Services, 108th Cong. 53 (2003) 
(testimony of Christine A. Bruenn, NASAA President and Maine Securities Administra-
tor). 
 2 The author defines small investors as individuals that invest relatively small 
amounts of money in the U.S. securities markets. 
 3 Rachel Witmer, Litigation Reform: Gramm, Domenici, Dodd Introduce Bill To 
Federalize Securities Class Actions, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1401, 1402 (1997) [here-
inafter Witmer, Litigation Reform]. 
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petitiveness of the American economy . . . .”4  The Securities In-
dustry Association (SIA) also agreed that NSMIA’s selective fed-
eral preemption provisions would “clear away some of the regula-
tory underbrush that adds to the cost of capital[,] without 
compromising investor protections.”5  Moreover, successful com-
petition in the global securities market means that a country 
must have a securities regulatory framework that promotes uni-
formity without stifling systemic risk; uniformity and an appro-
priate level of systemic risk are necessary components in a secu-
rities regulatory framework for successful competition and 
innovation in the global securities market.6 
A country’s securities regulatory framework is one of its 
most important competitive tools in the global securities market.  
A competitive securities regulatory framework promotes a large 
investor class, provides large pools of capital to encourage issuers 
and other market participants to take risk by expanding their 
businesses, and facilitates increased employment.7  Although 
some balkanization is necessary to combat local securities fraud, 
some level of federal preemption is required to avoid too much 
fragmentation in the securities regulatory framework.  Too much 
fragmentation will increase the cost of capital to unacceptable 
levels, sending issuers in search of less expensive capital in secu-
rities markets with more uniformity in their regulatory frame-
work. 
A globally competitive securities regulatory framework also 
requires flexibility.  It must be structured to respond quickly to 
constant change, one of the primary characteristics of the global 
securities market.  Only a regulatory authority at the federal 
level will have the requisite power to respond effectively in a con-
stantly changing global securities market.  A federal regulatory 
authority would regulate all securities markets in a country, 
making decisions that bind all securities markets and market 
participants.  In addition, the federal regulatory authority would 
have the power and the ability to craft a coherent policy for a 
country’s securities regulatory framework.  Coherent policy is 
more likely to lead to uniformity and lower costs of capital, i.e., 
the creation of a more competitive securities market in the global 
 
 4 Statement on Signing the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 
2 PUB. PAPERS 1812 (Oct. 11, 1996). 
 5 Rachel Witmer, Legislation: Congress Passes Major Securities Bill; Clinton Ex-
pected to Sign It OMB Says, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1211, 1212 (1996). 
 6 International Organization of Securities Commissions [IOSCO], Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation, at 7, IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154 (May 2003), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf. 
 7 See Clinton Signs Long-Awaited Securities Reform Bill, ON WALL STREET, Nov. 1, 
1996, at 32, 32. 
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securities market. 
The U.S. securities markets,8 recognized as the premier se-
curities market in the world, employs selective federal preemp-
tion in its securities regulatory framework.  The Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that the laws of the U.S. 
federal government shall be the supreme laws of the land.9  Ac-
cordingly, federal law displaces or preempts state law where it 
expressly states that state law is preempted, where it creates a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme which, de facto, preempts state 
law in the entire area of the law related to a particular subject 
matter, or where state law conflicts with federal law.  Currently, 
selective federal preemption in the U.S. securities regulatory 
framework does not preclude state jurisdiction over, among other 
areas, securities fraud.  “‘Congress has expressly preserved the 
role of the states in securities regulation’ in such areas as fraud 
in the sale of securities and investment advisory services.”10  
However, since the enactment of NSMIA, greater levels of federal 
preemption have been employed in the U.S. securities regulatory 
framework. 
Generally, selective federal preemption is used in the U.S. 
securities regulatory framework when a securities product or 
transaction will have a national impact on the U.S. securities 
markets, i.e., the effect of the product or transaction will not be 
confined to one state.  When a securities product or transaction 
has a national impact, selective federal preemption is needed to 
ensure uniformity of regulatory requirements, thus reducing 
regulatory costs borne by issuers and other market participants.  
Such uniformity minimizes regulatory fragmentation at the state 
level.  However, states retain power for securities products or 
transactions that do not have a significant impact in more than 
one state.11  Generally, this means that state regulatory authori-
 
 8 In this article the term “U.S. securities markets” only includes securities markets 
(and of course the types of securities traded on such markets) regulated by the U.S. Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (Commission).  The term does not include markets regu-
lated solely by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).  Commission regu-
lated securities markets includes exchanges, the over-the-counter (OTC) markets, 
electronic communications networks (ECN), and other alternative trading facilities (ATF).  
The types of securities traded on markets regulated by the Commission include equities, 
mutual funds, real estate investment trusts (REITS), unit investment trusts (UIT), and 
equity-based derivatives, options, and futures.  See generally U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission [SEC], http://www.sec.gov/index.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). 
 9 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl 2. 
 10 Jurisdiction And Procedure: Common Law Fraud Claims Not Preempted By Fed-
eral Securities Law, Court Concludes, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1634, 1635 (2001) 
(quoting Zuri-Invest AG v. NatWest Finance Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).  
 11 The author recognizes that the State of New York is an exception to this general 
rule.  See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing the impact of actions taken by the State of New 
York on the U.S. securities regulatory framework). 
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ties retain jurisdiction over securities fraud within their own ju-
risdictions. 
Failure to implement a securities regulatory framework in-
corporating selective federal preemption may result in a country 
losing control of its securities markets—one of the most impor-
tant components of its economy.  Canada is an example of what 
may happen when a country fails to establish a securities regula-
tory framework capable of competing in the global securities 
market, i.e., it fails to include selective federal preemption in its 
securities regulatory framework.  Canada’s securities regulatory 
framework does not include a federal securities regulator author-
ized to set policy, rules, and regulations for the securities mar-
kets in its thirteen provinces and territories.  The absence of se-
lective federal preemption means that each province has the 
ability to thwart any significant efforts to implement changes in 
Canada’s securities regulatory framework, which was designed to 
ensure that its securities markets remain competitive in the 
global securities market.  Canada’s fragmented regulatory 
framework has allowed the U.S. to assume regulatory authority 
over portions of Canada’s securities markets and market partici-
pants.  For example, NASDAQ Canada was established in 2000 
in the province of Quebec, and primary regulation of NASDAQ 
Canada was delegated to the U.S. by amending Quebec’s Securi-
ties Act.12 
Successful competition in the global securities market is es-
sential because having the premier securities market in the 
world generally means being the premier economic power in the 
world.  Moreover, successful competition in the global securities 
markets means greater pools of capital will be available to a 
country’s businesses than would otherwise exist with a less 
prominent global presence; this leads to economic growth and ex-
pansion, which, in turn, leads to increased levels of employment.  
A securities regulatory framework, which includes selective fed-
eral preemption, is more likely to facilitate fair, efficient, and liq-
uid markets and, at the very least, a perceived level playing field 
for investors.  Regulatory balkanization, the regulatory approach 
taken by Canada, is more likely to produce unfavorable conse-
quences, e.g., migration of market participants and investors to 
securities markets outside the country’s jurisdiction in search of 
transparent markets and better returns. 
This article does not endeavor to identify the appropriate 
 
 12 See The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., General Form for Registration of Securities 
Pursuant to Section 12(b) or 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10), 
Amendment No. 1 (May 14, 2001), available at http://www.shareholder.com/ 
common/edgar/1120193/950172-01-500184/01-00.pdf. 
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level of federal preemption required to compete successfully in 
the global securities market for each country.  It only seeks to 
point out that selective federal preemption is a necessary compo-
nent in a securities regulatory framework to compete successfully 
in the global securities market.  Moreover, the author contends 
that selective federal preemption has been recognized as a neces-
sary component for a globally competitive securities regulatory 
framework by a consensus of securities regulatory authorities in 
the global securities market.  This consensus is reflected in the 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, published by 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) in May 2003.13 
This article will first describe the significant characteristics 
of the global securities market.  Next, it will identify significant 
attributes of a securities regulatory framework that successfully 
includes selective federal preemption and a corresponding federal 
regulator, using the IOSCO Standard.  It will then compare the 
characteristics of the regulatory frameworks and corresponding 
securities regulators in the U.S. and Canada to the IOSCO Stan-
dard.  Next, it will describe and analyze what happens when a 
country fails to employ selective federal preemption in its securi-
ties regulatory framework, using Canada, our neighbor to the 
north, as an example. 
I. THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET 
  The financial crisis of other nations can no longer exist in a  
vacuum.  They affect every other nation as we move closer to a global  
economy.14 
The global securities market has arrived.  In the twenty-first 
century, securities markets are inextricably intertwined and ad-
vanced technology facilitates the interconnectivity of world secu-
rities markets allowing capital and information to move quickly 
anywhere in the world.  “During 1992, 94 foreign issuers ac-
cessed the U.S. public markets for the first time.  Registered of-
ferings by foreign issuers exceeded $33 billion . . . .” and 172 for-
eign issuers accessed the U.S. private markets for a cumulative 
total of $13 billion.15  From 1990 through 2002, the number of 
foreign issuers registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the Commission) tripled from 434 to over 1300 from 
 
 13 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 7.  The IOSCO is a key international stan-
dard-setting body in the global securities market; its members are securities regulatory 
authorities for the preeminent securities markets in the world.  See Section III of this ar-
ticle. 
 14 144 Cong. Rec. 3, 4401 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grams).   
 15 H.R. REP. NO. 103-179, at 12 (1993). 
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59 countries.16  Between 1986 and 1995, trading in foreign stocks 
in the U.S. increased from $100.2 billion to approximately $723.6 
billion, and trading by foreign investors in U.S. stocks alone in-
creased from $277.5 billion to $877.6 billion.17  In addition, do-
mestic securities markets increasingly are being integrated into 
the global securities market leading to “competing, international 
combinations of stock exchanges” allowing investors “to trade any 
stock, any time, anywhere in a linked forum.”18 
A. U.S. Recognition of the Global Securities Market 
1.  The Global Securities Market and the NASDAQ Stock 
Market, Inc. 
In June 2000, NASDAQ conducted a private placement to 
“allow [NASDAQ among other things] to respond to current and 
future competitive challenges caused by technological advances 
and the increasing globalization of financial markets.”19  The pro-
ceeds were used to increase its global preeminence by attempting 
to extend its trading platform throughout the world.20  The sec-
ond phase of NASDAQ’s private placement was completed in 
January 2001 and raised $180 million; the total amount raised in 
phases 1 and 2 was $326 million.21  From 2000 until 2001, NAS-
DAQ created stand-alone stock exchanges in Canada,22 Japan,23 
and Europe.24  NASDAQ asserted  
 
 16 See SEC, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT (GPRA) 2004 ANNUAL 
PERFORMANCE PLAN AND 2002 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 6 (2003) [hereinafter 
GPRA], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/gpra2004_2002.pdf. 
 17 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for 1997: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Departments of Commerce, 
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 104th Cong. 635 (1996) (Justification of the Budget Estimates, Securities and Ex-
change Commission). 
 18 3D HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL 
CORPORATE LAW § 23:34, at 23-73 (2d ed. 2006). 
 19 The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-7 (Mar. 28, 
2002). 
 20 The NASD sold 40% of NASDAQ during the first phase of its private placement 
that raised $260 million for NASDAQ and $74 million for the NASD.  Greg Ip, Nasdaq 
Looks to Europe: Are Preparations A Prelude to a Bid for London Exchange?  WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 1, 2000, at C1. 
 21 Press Release, The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., NASDAQ Completes Private Of-
fering and Expands Board (Jan. 25, 2001), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/ 
newsroom/news/pr2001/ne_section01_025.html. 
 22 “In April 2000, [NASDAQ] entered into a cooperative agreement with the Provin-
cial Government of Quebec for the development of a new securities market within Canada 
called [NASDAQ] Canada.”  The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., supra note 12, at 5. 
 23 NASDAQ Japan began operating on June 19, 2000.  Id..  
 24 Id. at 6. 
On March 20, 2001, NASDAQ entered into a non-binding letter of intent and is 
currently negotiating a definitive agreement with the London International 
Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) to create a new U.S. joint 
venture company that will list and trade single stock futures.  The products of 
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that the foundation to create a global exchange should be built on a 
strong regional presence in the dominant capital centers of the 
world. . . . [T]hose centers are the United States, Europe, and parts of 
Asia, particularly Japan.  By establishing centers for . . . trading in 
these key regions, the foundation [would] be developed for electroni-
cally linking these markets to establish a global platform.25   
However, the severe down-turn in the securities markets in 2000, 
combined with its poor performance through 2002, halted NAS-
DAQ’s expansion and ultimately led to retrenchment with the 
closing of trading markets established in all countries except 
Canada.  By 2003, NASDAQ’s strategy for achieving global pre-
eminence changed from creating standalone exchanges in other 
countries to becoming the premier market in the U.S. and being 
“a market the world’s investors could count on.”26 
2. The Global Securities Market and the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) 
The NYSE, in order to compete successfully in the global se-
curities market, has changed its business model.  On December 
6, 2005, NYSE members voted to merge with Archipelago Ex-
change, an open, fully electronic exchange.27  According to the 
NYSE’s CEO, John A. Thain, the combined entity “will create a 
strong, dynamic and innovative enterprise capable of meeting the 
demands of investors and issuers throughout the world in the 
decades ahead . . . . [in order to compete] globally in a high-speed 
electronically connected world.”28  NYSE’s CEO determined that 
the merger was necessary because publicly held exchanges in 
“London, Frankfurt, Toronto and Sydney are aggressively com-
peting to expand their reach.”29 and market share in the global 
securities market.  The SEC shares this view: “If the U.S. mar-
 
the new joint venture are expected to be traded through the LIFFE 
CONNECT™ electronic system.   
 25 Id. at 4–5. 
 26 NASDAQ, Inc., 2003 Annual Report, at 1 (Mar., 2004), available at 
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/AR2003/2003AR.pdf.  NASDAQ began to implement this 
strategy by purchasing electronic communications networks (ECN), which provided more 
routing capacity, connectivity, and increased market share.  Id. at 6.  NASDAQ Japan 
closed on August 16, 2002 due to insufficient business.  Nasdaq Japan Inc. to Go ‘Dor-
mant’; Board Finds No ‘Viable Path Forward’, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1382, 1382–
83 (2002). 
 27 1247 out of 1307 members voted in favor of the merger, i.e., approximately 95.4% 
of members eligible to vote on the transaction.  Press release, New York Stock Exchange, 
New York Stock Exchange Announces Certified Results of Dec. 6 Member Vote on Merger 
with Archipelago Holdings, Inc. (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.nyse.com/ 
press/1133956348217.html. 
 28 Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange and Archi-
pelago Exchange Agree to Merge—NYSE Group, Inc. Will Become a Publicly Held Com-
pany (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/joint_release.pdf. 
 29 Id. 
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kets fail to meet investor needs by offering the fairest and most 
efficient trading mechanisms possible, an increasingly competi-
tive international environment will be sure to offer alternatives 
for investors.”30 
B. Canada’s Recognition of the Global Securities Market 
Canada, in a report commissioned to study the need for regu-
latory change in its securities markets (The Wise Persons’ Com-
mittee Report), determined that: 
Technological changes have radically increased the mobility of capi-
tal. . . .   
  . . . . 
  Between 1980 and 2000, private capital flows (including gross 
bank flows, portfolio flows and foreign direct investment) increased 
more than six-fold to nearly US$4 trillion annually worldwide.  By 
2003, outstanding international debt securities worldwide totaled 
US$10.3 trillion, a ten-fold increase from 1987 levels.  
  Multinational securities firms now conduct business around the 
world and around the clock.  Exchanges and trading systems operate 
on a cross-border basis.31 
In particular, cross-border transactions in Canadian equities 
have increased from 5% of GDP in 1990 to 38% of GDP in 2002.  
Canadian issuers raised more debt capital internationally than 
domestically, with a significant number of Canadian issuers in-
ter-listed on foreign stock exchanges, including 78 on the NYSE 
and 81 on the NASDAQ.32  Moreover, there is a consensus among 
market participants in Canada’s securities markets that success-
ful competition means competing effectively in an environment 
characterized by increasing international competition for capi-
tal—a clear recognition of the global securities markets.33  The 
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), the largest provincial se-
curities markets regulator in Canada, contends that the exis-
tence of the global securities market is  
evidenced by a number of trends, including: 
• the growth of cross-border securities transactions; 
 
 30 Press Release, SEC, NYSE’s Rescission of Rule 390 and Commission’s Request for 
Comment on Market Fragmentation (Feb. 23, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2000-14.txt. 
 31 WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION IN CANADA, IT’S TIME—WPC FINAL REPORT 2 (2003) [hereinafter WISE 
PERSONS’ COMMITTEE]. 
 32 Id. at 6. 
 33 University of Toronto Capital Markets Institute, White Paper: A Symposium on 
Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmonization or Nationalization?, at Executive Sum-
mary-i  (Oct. 2002) (edited by James Baillie). 
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• an increasing number of additional listings of Canadian companies 
on foreign exchanges; 
• the emergence of multinational securities firms servicing busi-
nesses from offices around the world; and 
• an increasing number of strategic alliances and other connections 
between regulated financial markets in different parts of the 
world.34 
The Investment Dealers Association (IDA), Canada’s largest 
national securities self-regulatory organization (SRO) represent-
ing all investment dealers, also recognizes the existence of the 
global securities market.  The IDA agrees that “there is . . . only 
one world securities market.”35 
The Province of Quebec acknowledges the existence of the 
global securities market.36  It recommends further harmonization 
between Canada’s provinces with respect to each province’s secu-
rities laws.37 
C. Recognition of the Global Securities Market Beyond  
North America 
Recognition of the global securities market is not confined to 
the U.S.; The Federation of European Securities Exchanges 
(FESE)38 also recognizes the global securities market and asserts 
that it is “driven by advances in technology and telecommunica-
tions, is leading to a growing number of companies wishing to 
raise capital in more than one country [and that] [i]nvestors too 
are looking at integrated, or interconnected, international mar-
kets in order to maximise their return and spread their capital 
risk.”39  In February 2006, the Tokyo Stock Exchange decided to 
 
 34 ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION, FIVE YEAR REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL 
REPORT ~ REVIEWING THE SECURITIES ACT 42 (2003), available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/FiveYearReview/fyr_20030529_5yr-final-report.pdf 
[hereinafter FIVE YEAR REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT]. 
 35 Suitability Requirements, IDA REP. (Investment Dealers Association of Canada), 
Summer 2000, at 7. 
 36 See Harris, supra note 33, at 90. 
 37 Id. at app., at xiv. 
 38 Established in 1974, FESE represents the interests of European securities ex-
changes as regulated markets.  FESE has twenty-four full members representing ap-
proximately forty securities exchanges and clearing houses from all EU countries, and 
Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.  Federation of European Securities Exchanges, About 
Members, http://www.fese.be/en/?inc=cat&id=4 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).  Members in-
clude the Athens Exchange, Italian Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Budapest Stock 
Exchange, Euronext, Stockholm Stock Exchange, and Irish Stock Exchange.  Federation 
of European Securities Exchanges, Full Members, http://www.fese.be/en/?inc=page&id=7 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2007). 
 39 Federation of European Securities Exchanges, The Federation, 
http://www.fese.be/federation/index.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2006); see also Reena Ag-
garwal, Demutualization and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, 15 J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 105–13, (2002). 
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invest approximately $27 million to upgrade its trading sys-
tems.40  In addition, in 2002, “the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) ranked 12th in the world in terms of size and 16th in 
terms of turnover.”41 
D. The Importance of Domestic Stock Markets 
Securities markets are one of the most important tools that a 
country has for raising investment capital and efficiently allocat-
ing the country’s investment capital among competing busi-
nesses.  They enable businesses and governments to raise debt 
and equity capital from public investors in order to fund opera-
tions.  Accordingly, securities markets are vital to the growth, 
development and strength of market economies.  They also “sup-
port corporate initiatives, finance the exploitation of new ideas[,] 
facilitate the management of financial risk . . . [and] have become 
central to individual wealth and retirement planning.”42  More-
over, capital markets are among the key factors in promoting a 
country’s long-term economic growth.43  “Countries that are best 
able to channel savings into productive investments will register 
higher rates of growth and more rapid increases in living stan-
dards.”44 
In 1975, the U.S. Congress amended the federal securities 
laws because it recognized that “[t]he securities markets of the 
United States are indispensable to the growth and health of this 
country’s and the world’s economy.”45  The 1975 amendments 
were designed to assist U.S. securities markets in adapting and 
responding to changing economic and technological conditions 
domestically and beyond U.S. borders.  Without this flexibility, 
Congress believed that the U.S. might lose its status as an inter-
national financial center and that its economic, financial, and 
 
 40 Tokyo Stock Exchange Plans $27 Million in Upgrades, and More, WALL ST. & 
TECH., Feb. 23, 2006, http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID= 
180207050.   
 41 Sydney Media, Fact Sheet—Global Sydney, http://www.sydneymedia.com.au/html/ 
2291-global-sydney.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). 
 42 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 1.   
 43 WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 4. 
 44 Id. 
 45 The Structure of Securities Markets: Hearings on the Emerging Structure of U.S. 
Securities Markets and the Appropriate Role for Regulation Before the S. Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 217 (2001) (statement of Arthur Levitt, 
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).  $190 million was raised for the 
NASD.  Phases 1 and 2 of NASDAQ’s private placement reduced the NASD’s ownership 
significantly resulting in ownership by approximately 2,900 investors.  NASDAQ inves-
tors include NASDAQ-listed companies, dealer firms, and institutional investors.  Press 
Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ Completes Private Offering and Expands Board (Jan. 25, 
2001), available at 
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2001/ne_section01_025.html. 
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commercial interests would suffer. 
Like the U.S., Canada understands the importance of its se-
curities markets to the overall health of its economy.  Moreover, 
Canada’s securities markets “are especially important in financ-
ing emerging companies that have yet to display the financial 
track record of more established concerns.”46 
E. Regulatory Response to the Global Securities Market 
Securities markets are essential to the health of the econ-
omy47 and successful businesses.  They are also a key underlying 
component to the employment of individuals and their ability to 
save and invest for retirement, education, and other essential 
needs. Effective competition means that a country attracts for-
eign businesses seeking equity capital and maintains its own 
domestic businesses.  A sound, efficient securities regulatory 
framework is essential to having dynamic and fair capital mar-
kets.  A regulatory framework that is slow, rigid, complex, and 
that adapts poorly to the pace of change in the global securities 
market will not facilitate successful competition.   
An appropriate regulatory framework in the global securities 
market should be designed to compete effectively in a world of 
changing technology and fluid borders.  Accordingly, a competi-
tive securities regulatory framework must include a strong cen-
tral authority with a dual mission of protection of investors and 
consistent treatment for capital seekers.  “[R]egulators must 
strike a fine balance between ensuring efficient capital markets 
for issuers and maintaining adequate protection for investors.”48 
Conversely, poorly regulated markets inhibit capital formation 
and economic growth.  As early as 1993, the Commission realized 
that it would “need to devote even greater attention and more re-
sources to address issues raised by cross-border offerings and 
listings, without either disadvantaging U.S. companies vis-a-vis 
their international rivals or compromising investor protection.”49  
Accordingly, the Commission’s “mission is to administer and en-
force the federal securities laws in order to protect investors, and 
to maintain fair, honest, and efficient markets.”50 
 
 46 WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 4.  “In 2002, capital markets pro-
vided 88% of the long-term financing of Canadian firms, compared to only 73% in 1990.”  
Id.  Canada’s economy relies heavily on raw materials (e.g., lumber and ores), not finished 
products.  Only the largest of such companies qualify for listing on U.S. securities mar-
kets. 
 47 “A sound and progressive financial system, of which capital markets are a critical 
component, is a key driver of long-term economic growth.” Id.   
 48 Id. at 3.   
 49 H.R. REP. NO. 103-179, at 12–13 (1993). 
 50 GPRA, supra note 16, at 16. 
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Among the regulators of the world’s largest securities mar-
kets, there seems to be a loose consensus of the nuts and bolts of 
an appropriate regulatory framework, i.e., one that is designed to 
compete effectively in the global securities market.  This consen-
sus is reflected in the Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation published by the IOSCO.51 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF  
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS 
 IOSCO is one of the “world’s key international standard set-
ting bodies”52 in the global securities market.  IOSCO’s mission is 
to promote cooperation and provide expertise to set standards for 
securities regulatory frameworks. Accordingly, its members have 
agreed to: (1) “cooperate together to promote high standards of 
regulation in order to maintain just, efficient and sound mar-
kets;” (2) “exchange information on their respective experiences 
in order to promote the development of domestic markets;” (3) 
“unite their efforts to establish standards and an effective sur-
veillance of international securities transactions;” and 
(4) “provide mutual assistance to promote the integrity of the 
markets by a rigorous application of the standards and by effec-
tive enforcement against offenses.”53 
IOSCO members are Securities Regulatory Authorities 
(SRAs) for the preeminent securities markets in the world, in-
cluding the United States, Germany, Japan, China, Great Brit-
ain, and Canada.54  IOSCO has approximately 180 members that 
regulate more than ninety percent of the world’s securities mar-
kets.55  Members are classified as ordinary,56 associate,57 and af-
 
 51 See IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 1. 
 52 Securities and Futures Commission, IOSCO, http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/html/EN/ 
iosco/iosco.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2006); see also Jane Diplock, Chairman, Executive 
Committee of IOSCO & Securities Commission, New Zealand, Is Regulation Keeping Up 
With Or Fettering Cross-Border Developments?, (Feb. 17, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec-com.govt.nz/speeches/jds170206.shtml).  IOSCO began in 1983 to replace 
its predecessor, the Inter-American Regional Association (IARA).  IARA, created in 1974, 
was composed of Securities Regulatory Authorities from North and South America. 
IOSCO, Historical Background, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2006). 
 53 IOSCO, General Information, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 6, 
2006). 
 54 Because there is no single securities regulatory entity authorized to bind the Ca-
nadian securities markets, only certain Canadian provincial securities regulators are 
members of IOSCO—Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia.  See IOSCO, Mem-
bership and Committees Lists: Active Member Organizations and Contacts, 
http://www.iosco.org/lists/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). 
 55 See id.; IOSCO, Historical Background, http://www.iosco.org/about/ 
index.cfm?section=history (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). 
 56 Ordinary members include: Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
China Securities Regulatory Commission, France—Autorité des marchés financiers, Ger-
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filiate.58  Ordinary members are voting members, while associate 
members are not allowed to vote.59  Affiliate members are SROs, 
have no vote, and are ineligible for membership in the Executive 
Committee and the Presidents’ Committee.60  Affiliate members 
are eligible for membership in the SRO Consultative Committee. 
IOSCO is administered by a General Secretariat, but per-
forms its regulatory standard setting responsibilities through 
committees.  IOSCO’s committees include a Presidents’ Commit-
tee, an Executive Committee, a SRO Consultative Committee, 
and various Regional Committees.  The Presidents’ Committee 
consists of all the presidents of member agencies and is author-
ized to achieve IOSCO’s mission.  The Executive Committee con-
sists of two sub-committees: The Technical Committee and the 
Emerging Markets Committee.  The Executive Committee has 
nineteen members, including the chairpersons of its sub-
committees and each regional committee,61 one ordinary member 
elected by each regional committee, and nine ordinary members 
elected by the Presidents’ Committee.  Members of the Technical 
Committee include the Ontario Securities Commission, Quebec—
Autorité des marchés financiers, the Commission, and the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission; essentially, Technical 
Committee members include SRAs from the world’s larger and 
more developed securities markets.62  The SRO Consultative 
Committee (SROCC) was established to provide information to 
 
many—Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Japan—Financial Services 
Agency, Canada—Ontario Securities Commission, Canada—Quebec Autorité des marchés 
financiers, Russia—Federal Service for Financial Markets of Russia, and U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission.  IOSCO, Ordinary Members, http://www.iosco.org/lists/ 
display_members.cfm?memID=1&orderBy=none (last visited Oct. 24, 2006). 
 57 Although not eligible to vote or to be elected to the Executive Committee, associate 
members are members of the Presidents’ Committee.  IOSCO, Categories of Members, 
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=categories (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).  Asso-
ciate members include the British Columbia Securities Commission (Canada), Alberta 
Securities Commission (Canada), U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the 
North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA).  IOSCO, Associate 
Members, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members_print.cfm?memid=2 (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2006). 
 58 IOSCO, Membership and Committees Lists: Active Member Organizations and 
Contacts, http://www.iosco.org/lists/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). 
 59 IOSCO, Categories of Members, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section= 
categories (last visited Oct. 9, 2006). 
 60 Id. 
 61 IOSCO, Structure of the Organization, http://www.iosco.org/about/ 
index.cfm?section=structure (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).  Regional committees include Asia-
Pacific Regional Committee, Inter-American Regional Committee, Africa/Middle-East Re-
gional Committee, and European Committee.  Id. 
 62 IOSCO, Members of the Technical Committee, 
http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=3 (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).  
Other members of the Technical Committee are: Australia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and The United Kingdom.  
Id.. 
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assist those considering foreign business operations and invest-
ment in the global securities market; specifically, it provides in-
formation about the rules and requirements for membership in 
SROs of IOSCO member countries.  SROCC also provides inves-
tor education information, including broker-dealer and invest-
ment adviser registration status and dispute resolution proce-
dures.  SROCC has sixty-one IOSCO affiliate members; SROCC 
members include the Montreal Exchange in Quebec; the Mutual 
Fund Dealers Association of Canada; the Market Regulation Ser-
vices Inc. in Ontario, Canada; and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the NYSE in the U.S.63  Re-
gional Standing Committees were established to address prob-
lems specific to regions in which certain IOSCO members are lo-
cated.  There are four Regional Standing Committees: (1) the 
Africa/Middle-East Regional Committee,64 (2) the Asia-Pacific 
Regional Committee,65 (3) the European Regional Committee,66 
and (4) the Inter-American Regional Committee.67 
IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
(OPSR) represents a consensus among SRAs regarding the goals 
and infrastructure of an effective securities regulatory frame-
work in the global securities market.68  IOSCO members are 
 
 63 IOSCO, SRO Consultative Committee (SROCC), http://www.iosco.org/ 
committees/srocc/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2006). 
 64 Africa/Middle-East Regional Committee members include Nigeria, Algeria, King-
dom of Bahrain, Dubai, Egypt, Ghana, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Republic of Mauri-
tius, Morocco, Sultanate of Oman, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab 
Emirates, West African Monetary Union, and Zambia.  IOSCO,  Members of Af-
rica/Middle-East Regional Committee, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees. 
cfm?cmtid=7 (last visited Oct. 8, 2006). 
 65 Asia-Pacific Regional Committee Members include Thailand, Australia, Bangla-
desh, Brunei, People’s Republic of China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.  IOSCO, Members of the Asia-
Pacific Regional Committee, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=6 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2006). 
 66 European Regional Committee members include Belgium, Albania, Armenia, Aus-
tria, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Republic of Croatia, Republic of 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hungary, Ireland, Isle of Man, It-
aly, Jersey, Republic of Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Malta, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Republic of Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Republic of Srpska, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United 
Kingdom.  IOSCO, Members of the European Regional Committee, http://www.iosco.org/ 
lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=4 (last visited Oct. 8, 2006). 
 67 Inter-American Regional Committee members include Brazil, Argentina, the Ba-
hamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Ontario, Republic of Panama, Peru, 
Quebec, Trinidad and Tobago, U.S., Uruguay, and Venezuela.  Associate Members (non-
voting) include Alberta and British Columbia.  IOSCO, Members of the Inter-American 
Regional Committee, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=9 (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2006). 
 68 Initially, the OPSR was adopted in 1998 and updated most recently in May 2003.  
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committed to the objectives and principles enumerated in the 
OPSR and “intend to use their best endeavors within their juris-
diction[s] to ensure adherence to [the] principles [stated in the 
OPSR].”69  Although compliance with the regulatory framework 
set out in the OPSR is not mandatory, it may be used by SRAs to 
determine whether their domestic regulatory frameworks facili-
tate fair, efficient, and transparent markets within the global se-
curities market.  Such regulatory frameworks are more likely to 
protect investors and attract issuers and other market partici-
pants.  “IOSCO recognizes . . . that domestic securities markets 
are increasingly being integrated into a global market.”70  More-
over, a globally competitive securities market requires a flexible 
regulatory framework which can respond swiftly to a global secu-
rities market in a constant state of development.  Accordingly, 
the objectives and principles enumerated in the OPSR are 
deemed, for the purpose of this article, to facilitate effective, and 
therefore competitive, regulation in the global securities market. 
A. The IOSCO Standard 
IOSCO asserts that, in the global securities market, competi-
tive securities markets require a regulatory framework that fos-
ters capital formation and economic growth, with an emphasis on 
competition.71  Such a regulatory framework would be based on 
three objectives implemented by adhering to thirty principles of 
securities regulation, which have been grouped into eight catego-
ries in its OPSR.72  The three objectives are: (1) the protection of 
investors; (2) ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and trans-
parent; and (3) the reduction of systemic risk.73 
Under IOSCO’s regulatory framework, effective investor pro-
tection requires issuers and other market participants to disclose 
material information to investors (both retail and institutional 
investors), prohibits manipulative or fraudulent practices in the 
securities markets, mandates supervision of market intermediar-
ies or operators of exchanges that provide investment services, 
 
IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6.  
 69 Id. at 3.  IOSCO members intend to seek changes in their jurisdictions to the ex-
tent implementation of IOSCO objectives and principles with respect to securities regula-
tion are impeded by a members’ policies or legislation.  Id. 
 70 Id. at 1.   
 71 Id. at 8. 
 72 The categories are principles relating to the regulator, for self-regulation, for the 
enforcement of securities regulation, for cooperation in regulation, for issuers, for collec-
tive investment schemes (e.g., mutual funds), for market intermediaries (e.g., brokers and 
dealers), and for the secondary market (e.g., exchanges, alternative trading systems 
(ATSs), and clearing and settlement systems).  Id. at i–iii. 
 73 Id. at i.   
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and prescribes minimum standards for market participants.74  
IOSCO’s regulatory framework also includes the notion that in-
vestors must perceive that they have fair access to material in-
formation75 before and after trading, and during market opera-
tion hours.  Moreover, the regulatory framework must not favor 
some investors over others, and must punish effectively any in-
vestor who attempts to manipulate securities markets or to en-
gage in other unfair and fraudulent behavior.76 
Under the IOSCO Standard, investor protection requires, 
among other things, that investors receive full disclosure of ma-
terial information to facilitate informed investment decisions.  At 
a minimum, full disclosure of material information includes ac-
curate and complete financial statements.77  Under the IOSCO, 
financial statements are “key components of disclosure require-
ments . . . [and] accounting and auditing standards . . . should be 
of high and internationally acceptable quality.”78  The notion that 
full and accurate disclosure of all material information about a 
particular security results in informed investment decisions rests 
on the basic assumption that investors receiving full disclosure 
have the knowledge and skill to understand, analyze, and act 
reasonably based on the information provided.  Finally, investor 
protection also requires consistent enforcement of securities laws 
as well as an effective, relatively inexpensive, neutral mechanism 
in which investors can resolve disputes with market partici-
pants.79 
The IOSCO Standard mandates a regulatory framework ca-
pable of establishing and maintaining fair, efficient, and trans-
parent securities markets.80  This means that the regulatory 
framework must ensure that all market participants (including 
brokers, dealers, and exchanges) perceive that they are compet-
ing on a level playing field.  The regulatory framework must re-
quire, at the very least, the imposition of licensing and initial and 
ongoing minimal capital requirements.  Capital requirements 
should be set at levels designed to ensure that market intermedi-
aries have sufficient capital to meet the requirements of their 
customers (investors), counterparties, or the dissolution of their 
 
 74 Id. at 6–7, 12. 
 75  Id. at 12.  Material information is information that a reasonable investor requires 
to make an informed investment decision.  See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 
U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, Inc., 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 76 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 6. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 5.   
 79 Id. at 6. 
 80 Id. 
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business without loss to their customers.81  The regulatory 
framework must also include “a comprehensive system of inspec-
tion, surveillance and compliance programs.”82 
The IOSCO Standard also requires the reduction of systemic 
risk, i.e., the risk that market intermediaries (e.g., brokers and 
dealers) will fail or cease to be going concerns and adversely im-
pact securities markets.83  Implementation of this objective re-
quires laws and procedures specifying minimum capital require-
ments and adequate operational controls.  When a market 
intermediary ceases to be an ongoing concern, the regulatory 
framework must include rules and procedures to facilitate the 
orderly winding down of the market intermediary’s business and, 
most importantly, attempt to confine the effect of its failure so 
that it does not affect adversely other market intermediaries.84  
The IOSCO Standard also states that the establishment of effi-
cient and accurate procedures for clearing and settling securities 
transactions reduces systemic risk.85  However, the IOSCO Stan-
dard cautions against eliminating systemic risk in the regulatory 
framework because risk-taking by market intermediaries is es-
sential to success in the global securities market.86 
The IOSCO Standard also describes the attributes of the en-
tity or entities charged with implementing a country’s securities 
regulatory framework.87  These attributes are of particular im-
portance because the author contends that the securities regula-
tor described in the IOSCO Standard should be established at 
the federal level and must be authorized to impose some level of 
federal preemption in order to compete successfully in the global 
securities market. 
1. Regulator Attributes Under the IOSCO Standard 
Under the IOSCO Standard, a globally competitive securities 
regulatory framework requires an independent and accountable 
regulator with responsibilities and authority enumerated clearly 
in the applicable law.88  However, the IOSCO Standard does not 
require the establishment of a single regulatory entity; the term 
 
 81 Id. at 5. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 6–7. 
 84 Id.  IOSCO recognizes that such an orderly winding down may include laws other 
than the regulator’s securities laws.  Id. at 7.    Perhaps the country’s securities regulator 
might do well to have a department that reviews bankruptcy proceedings to ensure that 
investors and market intermediaries are treated fairly. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 7.   
 87 Id. at 9–11. 
 88 Id. at  9. 
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regulator may include sharing the regulator responsibilities and 
authority with two or more government or quasi-government 
agencies.89  The regulator must be operationally independent to 
avoid influence from political entities and the securities industry.  
Moreover, regulator independence requires sufficient and stable 
funding, i.e., funds to both hire and to retain skilled and qualified 
staff.  Accountability requires public monitoring of the regulator 
and judicial review of orders issued in connection with its regula-
tory activities.  The regulator must have these attributes along 
with a steady source of funds to perform its responsibilities. 
The regulator must be clear and consistent in the exercise of 
its authority and in the formulation of policy.  Under the IOSCO 
Standard, this means that in performing its responsibilities, the 
regulator must be consistent, comprehensive, transparent, fair, 
and equitable.90  In promulgating rules to effect policy, the regu-
lator should use a process that allows for participation and con-
sultation by the public, including market participants and inves-
tors, and others affected by regulator rulemaking and underlying 
policy.  Moreover, the IOSCO Standard requires procedural fair-
ness and an analysis of whether specific rules and their underly-
ing policies unnecessarily burden capital formation.91 
The regulator must actively promote the education of inves-
tors and market participants.  A regulatory framework based on 
disclosure requires that both investors and market participants 
possess the financial knowledge and skills to understand and act 
upon the information disclosed by issuers.  Market participants 
must also receive continuing education regarding securities 
products and applicable securities laws, rules, and regulations.  
In essence, the regulator “should . . . play an active role in the 
education of investors and other participants in capital mar-
kets.”92 
Under the IOSCO Standard, the regulator uses the assis-
tance of SROs to fulfill its regulatory functions and responsibili-
ties.93  Although not a requirement under the IOSCO Standard, 
it is recommended that the regulator oversee SROs.94  Specifi-
cally, an SRO should be required to “meet appropriate standards 
before . . . exercis[ing] its authority. . . . [and o]versight of the 
SRO should be ongoing.”95  SROs are useful in the regulatory 
 
 89 Id. at 9 n.11. 
 90 Id. at 10. 
 91 Id. at 11. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 12–13. 
 94 See id. at 12. 
 95 Id. at 19. 
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framework because they have expertise about market operations 
and practices and, generally, have a greater ability to respond 
quickly to changes in the securities markets.  Most importantly, 
SROs are more likely to spot a violation of securities laws before 
the regulator.  In addition, the IOSCO Standard presumes that, 
with respect to policy and rulemaking, SROs are likely to be in a 
better position to determine whether a particular rule or regula-
tion will impose too great a burden on the securities industry 
even though it achieves a laudable goal, such as investor protec-
tion.96  Finally, the IOSCO Standard presumes that the regulator 
will delegate duties to the SRO that the SRO has the “incentive[] 
to perform most efficiently.”97 Despite the usefulness of SROs in 
the regulatory framework, the IOSCO Standard requires that 
SROs be monitored closely, at all times, by the regulator.98  This 
means that the regulator must approve SRO rules before they 
are implemented, i.e., before they are required to be followed by 
the SROs’ members.  The regulator must ensure that SRO rules, 
and the manner in which they are implemented by the SRO, are 
fair and enforced consistently in accordance with applicable secu-
rities laws and regulations.99 
The IOSCO Standard recognizes that a significant drawback 
in the delegation of authority by the regulator to an SRO is that 
there is a prima facie conflict of interest when the SRO is respon-
sible for the regulation of its members and the operation and 
regulation of a securities market100 simultaneously.101  When the 
regulation of members and market centers are combined, there 
may be pressure from the SRO’s members to favor the market 
center, which is a profit center, over the regulation of member 
compliance, which is always a cost center.  Accordingly, the regu-
lator must monitor the SRO to whom it has delegated regulatory 
authority closely and must intervene when needed; the regulator 
must also retain the authority to investigate, inspect, and enforce 
securities laws in circumstances under which it has delegated 
such authority to an SRO.102  Under the IOSCO regulatory 
 
 96 See id. at 12–13. 
 97 Id. at 12. 
 98 Id. at 12–13. 
 99 Id. at 12. 
 100 For example, this conflict was recognized and eliminated when the Commission 
approved NASDAQ’s application to become a registered exchange, thus elevating it to 
SRO status and relieving the NASD of this responsibility.  Press Release, NASDAQ, SEC 
Approves NASDAQ’s Exchange Registration Application (Jan. 16, 2006), available at 
http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=184424.  Prior to January 1996, the 
NASD was also the primary regulator or SRO for NASDAQ and other trading systems 
that compete with NASDAQ such as electronic communication networks or ECNs.   
 101  IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 13.   
 102 Id. 
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model, effective delegation of certain regulatory responsibilities 
and functions by the regulator to an SRO include drafting rules, 
which must be approved by the regulator prior to implementa-
tion, designed to assure member compliance with applicable se-
curities laws and SRO rules;103 assuring fair and consistent 
treatment of SRO members and prospective members; establish-
ing member conduct standards to promote investor protection;104 
enforcing SRO rules and imposing appropriate sanctions as well 
as cooperating with regulator-initiated investigations and en-
forcement actions; and assuring fair representation of the SRO’s 
members on its board of directors.105 
 The IOSCO Standard requires a regulator with compre-
hensive enforcement powers, including inspection, investigation 
and surveillance powers.106  At a minimum, the regulator must 
have sufficient power to obtain data, documents and other re-
cords from individuals and/or firms that the regulator determines 
may have violated applicable securities laws, or that may have 
relevant information.  The regulator’s power should include the 
authority to impose administrative sanctions, and/or to seek or-
ders from courts or tribunals, and, where appropriate, to enter 
into enforceable settlements and to accept binding undertak-
ings.107 
Effective implementation of a regulator’s enforcement pow-
ers under the IOSCO Standard requires a regulatory framework 
that routinely uses inspection and surveillance.  For example, the 
regulator’s inspection and surveillance powers should be routine, 
not in response to a suspicion of violations of applicable securities 
laws.  Acknowledging that regulator resources may be limited, 
inspections by the regulator should be prioritized beginning with 
areas “of high risk to investors or which threaten systemic stabil-
ity.”108  Again, the regulator may delegate its power of inspection 
to SROs or other third parties under proper supervision.109 
Effective enforcement in the global securities market may 
require crossing jurisdictional lines.110  Specifically, regulators 
 
 103 Id.  This includes avoiding the promulgation of rules that may create uncompeti-
tive situations and prohibiting rules that allow members and/or market participants to 
gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members and/or market participants.   
 104 Id.  The regulator, along with the SRO, must ensure that the SRO’s rules do not 
conflict with public policy established by the regulator.  
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 14–15. 
 107 Id. at 15. 
 108 Id at 14–15. 
 109 IOSCO recommends that SROs or other third parties conducting inspections on 
behalf of the regulator should be “subject[ed] to disclosure and confidentiality require-
ments.”  Id. at 14. 
 110 IOSCO Standard also recognizes the need for domestic cooperation in an effective 
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must have the power and the resources to handle cases involving 
cross-border misconduct.  Accordingly,  
the regulator [must have] authority to obtain information . . . that 
may be relevant to investigating and prosecuting potential viola-
tions . . . relating to securities transactions, and that such information 
can be shared directly with other regulators or indirectly through au-
thorities in their jurisdictions for use in investigations and prosecu-
tions of securities violations.111 
This principle is crucial to effective implementation of the 
IOSCO Standard, which states that “[d]omestic laws need to re-
move impediments to international cooperation [between securi-
ties regulators]. . . . The inability to provide regulatory assistance 
can seriously compromise efforts towards effective securities 
regulation.”112  Regulators must provide regulatory assistance to 
their regulatory counterparts in other countries.113  Providing 
such regulatory assistance requires establishing cooperative ar-
rangements that allow information sharing across country bor-
ders.  Moreover, regulators must determine whether such infor-
mation sharing arrangements sufficiently identify systemic 
threats to the stability of their domestic securities markets.  For 
example, will the financial failure of a market intermediary in 
the U.S. cause the financial failure of a market intermediary in 
Canada?  Another benefit of cross-border informational sharing 
arrangements is that “a significant part of an issuer’s commercial 
activity [may] take place in a country other than the one in which 
its stock is listed.”114  This is certainly the case in large, well-
developed securities markets such as the U.S.  “Fraud, market 
manipulation, insider trading and other illegal conduct that 
crosses jurisdictional boundaries can and does occur more and 
more frequently in a global market aided by modern telecommu-
nications.”115  Accordingly, IOSCO recommends that its members 
 
regulatory framework.  Id. at 15–16. 
 111 Id. at 16. 
 112 Id at 17. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 18. 
 115 Id.  “It is also common for scheme promoters, managers and custodians to be lo-
cated in several different jurisdictions and they may not be in the same jurisdiction as 
investors to whom the scheme is promoted.”  In addition, “[s]imilar financial products may 
be traded on various markets in several countries. . . . [T]here are many derivatives in 
which the underlying product or reference price is traded, produced or derived on foreign 
markets.”  Id.  IOSCO lists several examples of violations of securities laws that might 
necessitate cooperation between international regulators:   
[1] shifting the proceeds of crime [from domestic] to foreign jurisdictions; [2] 
wrongdoers fleeing to a foreign country; [3] routing [fraudulent] transactions 
through foreign jurisdictions to disguise the identity of parties or the flow of 
funds; [3] the use of foreign accounts to hide beneficial ownership of shares; 
and [4] the facilitation of cross-border breaches through the use of interna-
tional communications media, including the Internet. 
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memorialize information sharing arrangements in the form of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).116  Although the form 
and content of MOUs will necessarily differ in light of the par-
ticular facts and circumstances, IOSCO recommends that MOUs 
should, at a minimum, identify: (1) the circumstances in which 
assistance may be requested; (2) the type of information that may 
be shared; (3) procedures to maintain the confidentiality of in-
formation provided; and (4) how the shared information may be 
used.117 
“IOSCO recognizes that sound domestic markets are neces-
sary to the strength of a developed domestic economy and that 
domestic securities markets are increasingly being integrated 
into a global [securities] market.”118  Accordingly, successful com-
petition in the global securities market means that the regula-
tory frameworks of the U.S. and Canadian securities markets 
must closely resemble the IOSCO Standard. 
III. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS 
A. Background 
Prior to 1996, responsibility for regulating the U.S. securities 
markets was more evenly shared between federal and state regu-
latory authorities.  In fact, state regulation of U.S. securities 
markets began before federal securities laws were enacted.  In 
1911, Kansas was the first state to enact securities laws, followed 
by New York in 1921.  State securities regulatory authorities 
(SSRAs) were considered the local cops on the beat, the front 
lines in the war against securities fraud in their respective juris-
dictions.  However, the stock market crash in October 1929 and 
its fallout was a cataclysm that facilitated acceptance of federal 
regulation of U.S. securities markets.119  Beginning in 1933, Con-
 
Id. 
 116 Id. at 19. 
 117 Id.  Information may also be required concerning financial and other supervisory 
information, technical expertise, surveillance and enforcement techniques along with in-
vestor education information.  Id.  IOSCO also recommends including a public policy ex-
ception to the provision of information in MOUs.  Id. at 20. 
 118 Id. at 1. 
 119 Before the stock market crashed in October 1929, there was negligible support for 
regulation of the U.S. securities markets by the federal government.  However, it is esti-
mated that “of the $50 billion in new securities . . . half became worthless.”  SEC, The In-
vestor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Fa-
cilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Sept. 
6, 2006) [hereinafter SEC, Investor’s Advocate].  Banks also lost significant sums of money 
during the period, which spurred an economic crisis, subsequently leading to demand for 
federal regulation of the U.S. securities markets by key market participants.  It was be-
lieved that the public’s faith in the stock market must be restored in order for the econ-
omy to recover.  Id. 
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gress passed federal statutes to regulate U.S. securities mar-
kets.120 
1. Federal Regulation in the U.S. Securities Markets 
Federal regulation of U.S. securities markets began in 1933 
with the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) 
and was quickly followed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the Exchange Act).  The Exchange Act created the Commission, 
a single federal regulatory authority to regulate U.S. securities 
markets.121  The Commission’s mandate is to regulate U.S. secu-
rities markets by administering and enforcing federal securities 
laws and by promulgating rules that implement the regulatory 
framework prescribed in federal securities laws.122  At the time of 
the passage of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, there 
was a consensus that the maintenance of fair, efficient, and or-
derly securities markets facilitates greater investor participation, 
liquidity, and efficient capital formation in U.S. securities mar-
kets. 
The federal securities laws consist of the Securities Act of 
1933,123 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,124 the Trust Inden-
 
 120 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.. §§ 77a–77bbbb (2000); Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (2000); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-
1–80b-21 (2000); and Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2000). 
 121 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78d (2000).  The Commission consists 
of five commissioners, four Divisions and eighteen Offices.  Although headquartered in 
Washington, D.C., the Commission has eleven regional and district Offices throughout the 
U.S.  Commissioners are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.  The President also designates one of the Commissioners as Chairperson.  Each 
Commissioner is appointed to a five-year term ending on June 5 of each year.  The terms 
of each Commissioner are staggered so that only one Commissioner’s term ends each year 
on June 4.  No more than three Commissioners may belong to the same political party.  
SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
 122 The Commission is only authorized to bring civil actions in federal court and ad-
ministrative proceedings internally.  Although criminal actions may be initiated under 
federal securities laws, only the Office of the U.S. Attorney is authorized to bring such 
actions.  Commissioners meet to conduct activities authorized under federal securities 
laws.  Commission meetings are open to the public unless confidential matters are dis-
cussed, for instance whether to issue a formal order of investigation.  A formal order of 
investigation is an order issued by the Commission authorizing its staff to issue subpoe-
nas to compel documents and testimony.  Formal orders of investigation and information 
obtained pursuant to such orders are non-public.  SEC, About the Division of Enforce-
ment, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2006); SEC, 
Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119; 17 C.F.R. § 203.5 (2005). 
 123 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000).  The Securities Act prohibits fraud in the offer and 
sale of securities and requires disclosure of material information to investors to facilitate 
an informed investment decision.  See SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.  When 
enacted, the Securities Act “specifically preserved the right of each of the states to regu-
late the offering of securities in that state.”  SEC, REPORT ON THE UNIFORMITY OF STATE 
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES THAT ARE NOT “COVERED 
SECURITIES” 1 (1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/uniformy.htm [herein-
after SEC, REPORT ON UNIFORMITY OF 1997]. 
 124 §§ 78a–78nn.  The Securities Exchange Act prohibits fraud in the purchase and 
391- 500 NICHOLS.DOC 5/16/2007 1:51:13 AM 
2006] Federal Preemption in U.S. Securities Regulatory Framework 417 
ture Act of 1939,125 the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,126 and 
the Investment Company Act of 1940,127 and are based on the 
principle of full disclosure of information required by a reason-
able investor to make an informed investment decision.  Accord-
ing to the Commission: 
The main purposes of [the federal securities laws] can be reduced to 
two common-sense notions: 
  Companies publicly offering securities for investment dollars must 
tell the public the truth about their businesses, the securities they are 
selling, and the risks involved in investing. 
  People who sell and trade securities—brokers, dealers, and ex-
changes—must treat investors fairly and honestly, putting investors’ 
interests first.128 
The Commission promotes full disclosure in U.S. securities 
markets by requiring issuers and other market participants to 
provide comprehensive and accurate information to investors 
with respect to: 1) the offer, sale, and purchase of securities; 2) 
the efficient and fair operation of securities exchanges and the 
over-the-counter market (OTC); and 3) the operations and sales 
practices of market participants.129  Section 5 of the Securities 
Act prohibits the offer and sale of securities through interstate 
commerce unless the issuer registers its securities with the 
Commission.130  Registration with the Commission requires the 
 
sale of securities in the secondary market and authorizes the Commission to register, 
regulate, and oversee market participants, including broker-dealers, securities self-
regulatory organizations (SROs), such as the NYSE and the NASD.  SEC, The Laws that 
Govern the Securities Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 
20, 2006) [hereinafter The Laws that Govern]. 
 125 §§ 77aaa–77bbbb.  The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 prescribes the content of trust 
indenture agreements between issuers and their respective bondholders.  SEC, The Laws 
that Govern, supra note 124. 
 126 §§ 80b-1–80b-21.  The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires registration of 
investment advisers—firms or individuals compensated for providing investment advice 
to investors—with assets under management of $25 million dollars or more in order to 
protect investors.  SEC, The Laws that Govern, supra note 124. 
 127 §§ 80a-1–80a-64.  The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates the operation 
and sales practices of investment companies, i.e., companies, including mutual funds, that 
primarily invest, reinvest, and trade in securities and offer their own securities to inves-
tors.  The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 is no longer under the jurisdiction 
of the Commission.  SEC, The Laws that Govern, supra note 124. 
 128  See SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
 129 This principle of adequate disclosure assumes, of course, that those receiving the 
disclosure have the ability to comprehend such information and have the investment 
skills and/or knowledge to use the information to make sound investment decisions.  The 
jury is still out on whether this is actually the case, despite the Commission’s efforts to-
wards investor education.  The Commission offers educational information on its website 
including, but not limited to, the EDGAR database, which contains disclosure documents 
that issuers whose securities are publicly traded must file with Commission.  See gener-
ally SEC, Filings & Forms (EDGAR), http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Sept. 
20, 2006). 
 130 15 U.S.C. § 77e. 
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issuer to make disclosures of material facts—information re-
quired by a reasonable investor to make an informed investment 
decision.131  Accordingly, issuers must file a registration state-
ment with the Commission, which contains, among other things, 
a prospectus.132 
An issuer may avoid registration of its securities by qualify-
ing for a specific exemption from the registration requirement 
under § 5 of the Securities Act.  Generally, an exemption is based 
on the type of security being offered and sold or the type of secu-
rities transaction.  For example, securities issued by banks, mu-
nicipal authorities, charitable and/or religious entities, and cer-
tain employee benefit plans are exempt from the registration 
requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act.133  Transactions that 
are exempt from the registration requirements of § 5 of the Secu-
rities Act include secondary market transactions by persons 
other than the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer, non-public of-
ferings by the issuer, and sales by brokers or dealers.134  Section 
3(b) of the Securities Act authorizes the Commission to create ex-
emptions from the registration requirements of § 5 of the Securi-
ties Act.135  For example, a limited offering authority is available 
for offerings of less than $5 million136 and is expressed in Securi-
ties Act Rules 504 (limited to $1 million or less),137  505,138 701,139 
 
 131 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (holding an omitted fact is material 
if there is a substantial likelihood a reasonable investor would have considered the matter 
significant). 
 132 A prospectus includes, among other things, a description of the issuer, its organi-
zation and financial condition, the terms of the prospective offering, and independently 
audited financial statements.  After the issuer files the appropriate registration statement 
with the Commission, the appropriate division of the Commission determines whether to 
review the issuer’s registration statement based on non-public criteria.  The Commission 
must promptly tell the issuer whether its registration statement will be reviewed prior to 
becoming effective.  Generally, if the Commission decides to review the issuer’s registra-
tion statement, it must provide comments to the issuer within thirty days of the date that 
the issuer filed its registration statement with the Commission.  When the Commission 
completes its review process and the issuer has supplied any additional information re-
quests by the Commission, the issuer requests the Commission to declare its registration 
statement effective so that it may offer and sell its securities to public investors.  See SEC, 
REPORT ON UNIFORMITY OF 1997, supra note 123, at 1–2. 
 133 15 U.S.C. § 77c. 
 134 15 U.S.C. § 77d. 
 135 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b). 
 136 This exempting authority is granted to the Commission in § 3(b) of the Securities 
Act, id., and to define the phrase “not involving any public offering” in § 4(2) of the Securi-
ties Act.  15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). 
 137 Under Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2006), exemption is limited to $1 mil-
lion or less and does not require specific disclosures or filings except as required under the 
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.  However, Regulation D of the Securi-
ties Act requires issuers using the Rule 504 exemption to file notice with the Commission 
within fifteen days after the first sale of securities.  § 230.503(a). 
 138 Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505, provides an exemption from registration for speci-
fied purchasers.  Rule 505 does not require specific disclosures for sales of securities to 
“accredited investors,” but certain disclosures must be made to non-accredited investors.  
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1001,140 Regulation A (mini-registration),141 and § 4(2) of the Se-
curities Act, which exempts transactions “not involving a public 
offering” from the registration requirements of § 5 of the Securi-
ties Act.  Rule 506 describes transactions that are not considered 
to involve a public offering of securities, i.e., that are private 
placements.  The type of disclosures, if any, required in private 
placements depends upon the circumstances of the particular 
transaction.142 
The Commission also regulates key market participants in 
the U.S. securities markets including securities exchanges, OTC 
markets, brokers, dealers, investment advisers, and investment 
companies (e.g., mutual funds).143  There were approximately 
5191 broker-dealers,144 15,300 investment companies,145 and 
8302 investment advisers146 participating in U.S. securities mar-
kets in 2004. 
a. How the Commission Performs its Regulatory  
Duties in the U.S. Securities Markets 
The Commission performs many of its regulatory responsi-
bilities through its staff.  Focusing on selective federal preemp-
tion, the primary divisions of the Commission include the Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance (CorpFin), the Division of Market 
Regulation (MarketReg), the Division of Investment Manage-
 
§ 230.502(b).  Offerings using the Rule 505 exemption are subject to the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws. 
 139 Rule 701, 17 C.F.R. § 230.701, provides an exemption from § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, 
which lists registration requirements for employee compensation plans by non-public 
companies.  Although there are no specific disclosure requirements, offerings made pur-
suant to Rule 701 are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 
 140 Rule 1001, 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001, provides an exemption from registration, which 
is coordinated with the exemption from registration with California. 
 141 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).  The Regulation A exemption, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263, re-
quires the issuer to file an offering statement containing required disclosures including, 
but not limited to, unaudited financial statements.  Securities may not be sold under this 
exemption until the Commission has qualified the issuer’s offering statement. 
 142 Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.  However, the Rule 506 exemption does require the 
issuer to file a notice with the Commission within fifteen days after the first sale of secu-
rities.  § 230.503(a). 
 143 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119; SEC, Over-the-Counter Markets, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrotc.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2006). 
 144 THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., 2004 YEAR IN REVIEW 
at Our 2004 Performance (2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/ 
corp_comm/documents/home_page/nasdw_014279.pdf. 
 145 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 9 (45th 
ed. 2005), available at http://www.ici.org/factbook/05_fb_sec1.html#fund_sponsors.  This 
number is for the period 2004 and includes mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-
traded funds, and unit investment trusts.   
 146 INVESTMENT ADVISOR ASSOCIATION, EVOLUTION RESOLUTION: A PROFILE OF THE 
INVESTMENT ADVISORY PROFESSION 3 (2005), available at http://www.icaa.org/ 
public/evolution_revolution-2005.pdf This number is for the period 2004; in 2005, invest-
ment advisers registered with the Commission totaled 8,614.   
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ment (IM), the Division of Enforcement (Enforcement), the Office 
of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), the Office of the Chief Ac-
countant (Chief Accountant), the Office of Compliance Inspec-
tions and Examinations (OCIE), and the Office of International 
Affairs (OIA).147  CorpFin reviews disclosure documents required 
under the federal securities laws in the primary securities mar-
ket148 including registration statements filed in connection with 
new issues and follow-on offerings, annual (10-K) and quarterly 
(10-Q) filings, proxy materials, tender offers, and mergers and 
acquisitions.  It also prepares administrative interpretations of 
the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Trust Indenture 
Act of 1939 (Trust Indenture Act) regarding securities traded in 
the primary securities market.  With respect to rules and regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to federal securities laws, CorpFin 
drafts and recommends rules and regulations to implement the 
Securities Act, the Exchange Act and the Trust Indenture Act.149  
In addition, CorpFin, in cooperation with the Chief Accountant, 
monitors the accounting profession with an emphasis on stan-
dards promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB),150 one of several entities responsible for developing Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).151 
MarketReg regulates and establishes standards for key mar-
ket participants in the U.S. securities markets, including SROs, 
 
 147 See the Commission’s website for a listing of all offices and divisions along with a 
discussion of their responsibilities. SEC, supra note 8. 
 148 See generally SEC, Division of Corporation Finance, http://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/corpfin.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).  The primary securities market is regu-
lated under the Securities Act, which governs activities related to new issues, including 
initial public offerings or IPOs.   
 149 Administrative interpretations are sometimes issued in the form of no-action let-
ters, which are letters issued in response to public requests of whether a particular course 
of action or transaction would violate the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, or the Trust 
Indenture Act.  Specifically, the CorpFin staff writes a letter stating whether it would or 
would not recommend that the Commission take action against the issuer for engaging in 
the practice and/or transaction.  CorpFin also provides informal guidance by giving its 
interpretation of applicable securities regulations and advice on compliance with applica-
ble disclosure requirements to registrants, prospective registrants and the public.  SEC, 
Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
 150 Id.  FASB was established in 1973 and is a private organization that establishes 
standards of financial accounting and reporting in the U.S.  FASB standards are recog-
nized by the Commission and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FACTS ABOUT FASB 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/facts/facts_about_fasb.pdf. 
 151 GAAP represents uniform minimum standards of, and guidelines for, financial 
accounting and reporting.  American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Glossary of 
Terms, Acronyms, and Abbreviations, http://www.aicpa.org/members/glossary/g.htm (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2006).  It is comprised of standards, interpretations, opinions and bulletins 
used to prepare financial statements for companies whose securities are publicly-traded 
in U.S. securities markets.  Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles, http://www.fasab.gov/accepted.html (last visited Oct. 3, 
2006). 
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brokers, and dealers.  Its duties include reviewing SRO proposed 
new rules or changes to existing SRO rules submitted to the 
Commission for approval.  MarketReg is also responsible for im-
plementing and monitoring the Commission’s financial integrity 
program for brokers and dealers.152  Like CorpFin, MarketReg is-
sues no-action letters in response to public requests about 
whether a particular course of action or transaction would violate 
federal securities laws.  Unlike CorpFin, MarketReg is responsi-
ble for surveillance of the actual trading of securities in U.S. se-
curities markets. It also monitors the activities of the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a non-profit, private cor-
poration that insures customer accounts of broker-dealers in the 
event of insolvency.153 
IM monitors the activities of entities and individuals regu-
lated under the Investment Advisers Act and the Investment 
Company Act, including mutual funds, UITs,154 ETFs,155 variable 
insurance products,156 and federally registered investment advis-
ers.157  IM regulatory activities include interpreting the laws and 
 
 152 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.  The financial integrity program re-
quires broker-dealers to make and keep certain books and records, which allow the Com-
mission to determine, among other things, whether brokers/dealers have sufficient net 
capital to avoid insolvency.  Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R.  § 240.17a-3 (2005). 
 153 SEC, No Action Letters, http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2006); SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
 154 A UIT is:  
[a] trust, registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
in which a fixed portfolio of income-producing securities are purchased and 
held to maturity.  This type of investment vehicle is commonly used with mu-
nicipal bonds.  Each unit usually costs $1,000 and is sold by brokers to inves-
tors for an average load of 4% which is included in the per share price.   
TIAA-CREF Brokerage Services, Investment Glossary, http://www.tiaa-
crefbrokerage.com/invest_glosry_UUnd.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).  
 155 ETFs  
are open-ended registered investment companies under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, which have received certain exemptive relief from the SEC to 
allow secondary market trading in the ETF shares. ETFs are index-based 
products, in that each ETF holds a portfolio of securities that is intended to 
provide investment results that, before fees and expenses, generally correspond 
to the price and yield performance of the underlying benchmark index.  
American Stock Exchange, ETFs Glossary, http://www.amex.com/etf/Glossary/Gloss.htm. 
 156 For example, variable annuities and variable life insurance—variable annuities 
are life insurance annuity contracts that consist of an underlying securities portfolio that 
fluctuates based on the value of the securities.  The goal is to provide periodic payments 
at a specified time (usually retirement).  Accordingly, it is important that the value of the 
annuity is preserved to meet periodic payment requirements.  Periodic payments may 
change based on the market value of the underlying securities portfolio, or may be fixed at 
some minimum level based on portfolio appreciation.  TIAA-CREF Brokerage Services, 
Investment Glossary, http://www.tiaa-crefbrokerage.com/invest_glosry_V.htm (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2006).   
 157 SEC, Division of Investment Management, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
investment.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).  Federal Registration requires that the in-
vestment adviser have assets under management in excess of $25 million.  Investment 
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regulations under the Investment Advisers Act and the Invest-
ment Company Act for the public and for divisions within the 
Commission (e.g., Enforcement).  IM is also responsible for draft-
ing new rules and amendments to existing rules on behalf of the 
Commission pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act and the 
Investment Company Act.  Like CorpFin and MarketReg, IM is-
sues no-action letters in response to requests from regulated in-
dividuals, entities, and the public about the Investment Advisers 
Act and the Investment Company Act.158  In addition, IM partici-
pates in audits of registered individuals and entities and the ex-
amination of annual and periodic reports of persons and entities 
regulated under the Investment Advisers Act and the Investment 
Company Act, reviews reports such persons and entities must file 
with the Commission, and proposes new rules and amends exist-
ing rules, which it must submit to the Commission for approval. 
Enforcement investigates159 possible violations of federal se-
curities and recommends to the Commission whether those in-
vestigated should be prosecuted civilly in federal courts and/or 
administrative proceedings.160  Investigatory and prosecutorial 
activities also include settlement negotiations on behalf of the 
Commission.161  If those prosecuted are found to have violated 
federal securities laws, available remedies in the federal courts 
 
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (2000). 
 158 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119; SEC, Division of Investment Manage-
ment, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). 
 159 Investigations conducted by Enforcement are private.  This means that the Com-
mission is prohibited from disclosing that an investigation has commenced.  It is the job of 
Enforcement to collect sufficient information during an investigation to recommend to the 
Commission that it initiate a civil action or an administrative proceeding.  Enforcement 
obtains information by, among other things, interviewing witnesses, examining the books 
and records of regulated entities, and reviewing trading data.  Enforcement, acting on be-
half of the Commission, may compel regulated individuals and entities to produce infor-
mation it requires to conduct its investigation.  However, the Commission must issue a 
formal order of investigation to obtain such information from non-regulated individuals, 
including officers and directors of companies whose securities are publicly traded.  SEC, 
Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
 160 Administrative proceedings initiated by the staff on behalf of the Commission be-
gin with the issuance of an Order Instituting Proceedings (OIP) issued by the Secretary of 
the Commission.  17 C.F.R. § 201.141 (2005).  An administrative law judge (ALJ), com-
pensated by, but not appointed by, the Commission presides over the hearing and evalu-
ates evidence presented by Enforcement and respondents.  The ALJ issues an initial deci-
sion subsequent to the hearing that contains findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommended sanctions.  Both Enforcement and respondents have a right to appeal the 
ALJ’s decision, or a portion thereof, to the full Commission.  The Commission’s review of 
the ALJ’s decision is de novo, and it may affirm, reverse, or remand the ALJ’s decision in 
full or in part.  Administrative sanctions include cease and desist orders, suspension or 
revocation of broker-dealer and investment adviser registrations, censures, bars from as-
sociation with the securities industry, payment of civil monetary penalties, and disgorge-
ment (return of ill-gotten gains).  Both Enforcement and respondent have a right to ap-
peal the Commission’s final order to the appropriate U.S. District Court of Appeals.  SEC, 
Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
 161 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
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include injunctions, civil penalties, disgorgement of illegal prof-
its, or barring or suspending individuals from acting as corporate 
officers of companies whose securities are publicly-traded.162  
Available sanctions in administrative proceedings include cease 
and desist orders, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains,163 civil penal-
ties, and the revocation or suspension of the licenses authorizing 
regulated entities and their employees to participate in the U.S. 
securities industry. 
The Commission determines whether to authorize Enforce-
ment to bring a civil action, an administrative proceeding, or 
both, based on several factors.  These factors include “the seri-
ousness of the wrongdoing, the technical nature of the [case], tac-
tical considerations, and the type of sanction or relief [sought].”164 
For example, only the Commission is authorized to bar regu-
lated entities such as brokerage firms from participating in the 
securities industry.  Accordingly, the Commission might initiate 
an administrative proceeding to revoke the registration of the 
brokerage firm, which means the firm can no longer engage in a 
securities business in the U.S. securities markets. 
Although the Commission only has civil enforcement author-
ity, it may, and frequently does, make referrals and provide as-
sistance to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and state securities en-
forcement authorities that do have criminal enforcement 
authority under federal and state securities laws, respectively,165 
against those serving as directors and officers for companies 
whose securities are publicly traded.166  In 2002, the Commission, 
through its Enforcement staff, brought 598 enforcement ac-
tions.167 
The Chief Accountant advises the Commission about ac-
counting and auditing matters and collaborates with domestic 
and international accounting and auditing standards-setting pri-
vate sector entities, e.g., the American Institute of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants (AICPA).  It also cooperates closely with the Pub-
 
 162 SEC, About the Division of Enforcement, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
enforce/about.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). 
 163 When the Commission obtains disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, i.e., money ob-
tained by defendants from their illegal conduct, this does not mean that such funds are 
automatically returned to individual investors who have been defrauded.  “The Commis-
sion’s mandate is to protect investors,” not to act on behalf of individual investors.  Id.  
 164 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
 165 Id. 
 166 The Commission may bar a person from acting as an officer or director by filing an 
action in federal district court.  Id. 
 167  GPRA, supra note 16, at 26.  Typical actions included insider trading, accounting 
fraud, and providing false or misleading information about securities and/or securities 
transactions.  SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
391- 500 NICHOLS.DOC 5/16/2007 1:51:13 AM 
424 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:391 
lic Company Accounting Oversight Board.168  In addition, the 
Chief Accountant consults with Commission staff (e.g., CorpFin 
staff), registrants, and others about the application of accounting 
standards and financial disclosure requirements under federal 
securities laws.  It may also refer matters to Enforcement if it ob-
tains information indicating possible violations of federal securi-
ties laws. 
OCIE is responsible for the Commission’s examination pro-
gram for registered SROs, broker-dealers, transfer agents, clear-
ing agencies, investment companies, and investment advisers.  
The Commission’s examination program consists of inspections 
designed to assess compliance with federal securities laws, to de-
tect violations of federal securities laws, and to inform the Com-
mission of new developments, including products and technolo-
gies, in the securities industry.169 
OIA’s primary purpose is to reach out to members of the 
global securities market “to promote cooperation and assistance 
and to encourage the adoption of high regulatory standards 
worldwide.”170  According to the Commission, OIA’s activities are 
essential to furthering its interests in the global securities mar-
ket,171 and include negotiating information-sharing protocols in 
connection with enforcement cases, providing technical assis-
tance concerning the operation and regulation of securities mar-
kets to various countries, and participating in international or-
ganizations (e.g., IOSCO) and meetings.172  For example, OIA 
assists Enforcement in obtaining and evaluating information 
needed from other countries to prosecute violations of the U.S. 
securities laws. 
As currently staffed and funded, it would be impossible for 
the Commission to perform its regulatory responsibilities for the 
U.S. securities markets single-handedly.  Accordingly, the Ex-
change Act authorizes the Commission, as primary regulator, to 
delegate the performance of certain of its regulatory responsibili-
ties to SROs.  SROs must register with the Commission under §§ 
6 and 19(a) of the Exchange Act173 and are subject to oversight by 
the Commission.  To qualify for registration with the Commis-
 
 168 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.  More detailed information is available 
at Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), http://www.pcaob.org (last vis-
ited Oct. 6, 2006). 
 169 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (2000).  Section 78s(a) authorizes the Commission to effectively 
shut down an aberrant registered national securities exchange by revoking its registra-
tion with the Commission. 
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sion, the SRO must evidence that it has the capacity to regulate 
its members and their associated persons with a view towards 
ensuring compliance with applicable securities laws and the 
rules promulgated hereunder, as well as ensuring compliance 
with its own rules.174  SROs are statutorily required to police 
their members by conditioning membership on compliance with 
applicable securities laws (including state securities laws);175 
SRO policing efforts must include the imposition of sanctions on 
its members for violations of applicable securities laws (federal 
and state) and its own rules.  The largest and the most active 
SROs are the NASD and the NYSE.176  Specifically, the Commis-
sion delegates much of its responsibility for performing examina-
tions of market participants’ books and records to SROs which 
have more resources to perform such examinations on a regular 
basis (once per year).  Generally, examinations of books and re-
cords are conducted to ensure that market participants are com-
plying with federal securities laws and to protect investors by de-
termining whether market participants have sufficient capital to 
support their activities in the marketplace.  Examinations of the 
sales practices of market participants facilitates investor protec-
tion by determining whether market participants are making 
misrepresentations of, and/or omitting to state, material facts in 
connection with the offer, sale, and purchase of securities in U.S. 
securities markets.  However, despite delegation of certain of its 
regulatory duties to SROs, the Commission remains ultimately 
responsible for ensuring that market participants comply with 
federal securities laws. 
 
 174 § 78f(b)(1). 
 175 Section 78f(c)(1) provides that only registered broker-dealers and their associated 
persons may be members of a national securities exchange, such as the NYSE.  See § 
78f(c)(2) for a description of factors national securities exchanges consider in denying 
membership to broker-dealers.  Institutional investor membership is prohibited. 
 176 FITCH RISK MANAGEMENT, REVIEW OF SIPC RISK PROFILE AND PRACTICES: THE 
MJK CLEARING EVENT, THE SECURITIES LENDING EXPOSURE, RISK MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 24 (2003) (“The two most prominent SROs are 
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE).”).  NASD Member Firms totaled 5111 in 2005.  NASD, NASD Statistics, 
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_0109
90 (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).  NASDAQ and NYSE are exchanges.  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) 
(2000), defines an exchange as  
[A]ny organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or 
unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or fa-
cilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for other-
wise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed 
by a stock exchange as that term is generally understood, and includes the 
market place and the market facilities maintained by such exchange.   
For a list of securities exchanges currently registered with the Commission, see SEC, Self-
Regulatory Organization (SRO) Rulemaking and National Market System (NMS), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). 
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2. State Regulation of U.S. Securities Markets 
The state regulatory framework, like the federal regulatory 
framework, is comprised of a state securities regulatory authority 
(SSRA)177 that regulates, within its borders, the issuance and 
trading of securities; the activities of market participants; and, 
until 1996, the financial integrity (operations and capital re-
quirements) and sales practices of brokers, dealers, investment 
advisers, and investment companies.  SSRAs are responsible for 
enforcing state securities laws passed by state legislatures.  
SSRA regulatory activities include licensing investment profes-
sionals and securities firms within their respective jurisdictions, 
examining broker-dealer and investment adviser firms to confirm 
compliance with state securities laws, reviewing state offerings 
not subject to federal securities laws, and educating investors. 
The state securities registration process differs from the fed-
eral securities registration process because a majority of states 
regulate securities offerings based on merit reviews rather than, 
or along with, full disclosure; only a minority of states include 
full disclosure in their securities registration process.  Registra-
tion based on merit review means that SSRAs must determine 
the fairness of prospective offerings to investors.  The definition 
of fairness varies from state to state.  The merit review process is 
designed to “prevent promotion of fraudulent or inequitable” se-
curities offerings.178 
Like federal securities laws, state securities laws include ex-
emptions from registration requirements based on the type of se-
curities and the securities transaction.  Types of securities that 
are exempt from state registration requirements include securi-
ties issued by banks or savings institutions and by certain reli-
 
 177 Eleven SSRAs are appointed by their respective Secretaries of State, others by 
their respective Governors, five are under the jurisdiction of their state’s Attorney Gen-
eral, and the remaining SSRAs operate under the auspices of their respective state bank-
ing or financial institutions, or commerce departments.  The Role of State Securities Regu-
lators in Protecting Investors: Hearing on Efforts to Enforce Securities Laws, Investment 
Adviser Registration and Licensing, State Investigations into Mutual Fund Industry 
Abuses, and Investor Education Programs Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 34 (2005) [hereinafter Role of State Securities Regulators] 
(statement of Ralph A. Lambiase, Director, Division of Securities Connecticut Depart-
ment of Banking; President, NASAA). 
 178 In merit reviews, SSRAs determine the fairness of the offering by considering, 
among other factors, whether the offering: (1)  limits sales of stock to insiders and pro-
moters and at a significantly discounted price; (2) Requires repayment of insider loans 
before the offering is conducted; (3) Ensures that material transactions are from unaffili-
ated third parties and are ratified by a majority of the issuer’s independent board mem-
bers; (4) Demonstrates that the issuer’s net income in the past fiscal year is sufficient to 
cover fixed charges, preferred stock dividends, and redemption requirements of any pre-
ferred stock being offered; and (5) Prohibits unequal voting rights without allowing pref-
erential dividends or liquidation provisions in exchange for accepting unequal voting 
rights. SEC, REPORT ON UNIFORMITY OF 1997, supra note 123, at 7–8. 
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gious and charitable organizations.  Securities transactions that 
are exempt from state registration requirements include the offer 
or sale of a security issued to specified purchasers;179 any trans-
action in which there is an offer to not more than ten persons in 
the state during any twelve month period under certain condi-
tions; and any transaction in which there is an offer to existing 
security holders of the issuer, if certain conditions are met.180  
Moreover, most states have limited offering exemptions from 
their registration requirements based on such factors as the 
number of offerees or purchasers, the dollar amount of the offer-
ing, or a combination of the two.181 
State securities laws, although closely following the regula-
tory framework set out in federal securities laws, are tailored to 
fit the requirements of the local marketplace.  State securities 
laws were, and continue to be, different in each state.182  To ad-
dress the issue of uniformity, or lack thereof, in the state regis-
tration process, forty-eight states have adopted (with modifica-
tions) the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 (Uniform Act)183 drafted 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL).184  SSRAs have attempted to decrease the cost 
 
 179 Specified purchasers include banks, savings institutions, and institutional buyers.  
Id. at 9. 
 180 Required conditions include advance notice to the state securities commission.  Id. 
at 9–10. 
 181 Id. at 10. 
 182 Prior to 1996, all issuers were required to comply with state securities laws of all 
states.  Id. at 1.  Inevitably, this process raised the cost of capital unnecessarily. 
 183 New York and California have not adopted the Uniform Act.  Uniform Law Com-
missioners, A Few Facts About the Uniform Securities Act (2002), 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-usa.asp (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2007).  Originally, the Uniform Act was drafted in 1956 and was adopted, with 
modifications, in 37 jurisdictions.  It was revised in 1985 and 2002; the Uniform Act of 
2002 does not conflict with current federal securities laws and has been adopted by Ha-
waii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Vermont, and the U.S. Virgin Islands; it has been endorsed by NASAA, the Secu-
rities Industry Association, the NYSE, the NASD, and the Investment Counsel Associa-
tion of America, and is approved by the American Bar Association.  Uniform Securities 
Act Organization, http://www.uniformsecuritiesact.org/usa/DesktopDefault.aspx (last vis-
ited Oct. 11, 2006).  Regarding registration, the Uniform Act provides for registration of 
state offerings by notification, coordination and qualification.  Registration by notification 
requires the issuer to make only a notice filing with the SSRA.  UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
§ 302, 7C U.L.A. 74 (2006).  Registration by coordination enables the issuer’s state regis-
tration statement to become effective when its federal registration statement is declared 
effective by the Commission.  § 303, 7C U.L.A. 81.  Registration by qualification means 
that the state securities authority will conduct a full review of the issuer’s prospective of-
fering within its jurisdiction.  Generally, registration by qualification is used when the 
issuer is exempt from registration under the Securities Act but not under state securities 
laws.  § 304, 7C U.L.A. 84.  
 184 Uniform Law Commissioners, Frequently Asked Questions about NCCUSL, 
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=5&tabid=61 (last visited Oct. 
11, 2006).  The NCCUSL consists of lawyers, judges and law professors, who are ap-
pointed by states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  It 
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of capital by adopting the Uniform Act and working together to 
regulate multi-state offerings under the auspices of the North 
American Securities Administrators Association. 
a. North American Securities Administrators Associa-
tion (NASAA) 
The North American Securities Administrators Association 
(NASAA) is a voluntary umbrella organization representing state 
and provincial securities regulators in North America.  Estab-
lished in 1919, NASAA consists of the SRAs in the U.S., Canada, 
and Mexico.185  NASAA’s organizational structure includes a 
board of directors, standing committees, an executive director, 
and staff responsible for daily operations.186  Similar to the 
Commission, NASAA’s standing committees187 are comprised of 
five sections—Broker-Dealer,188 Corporation Finance,189 En-
forcement,190 Investment Adviser,191 and Investor Education.192 
 
drafts uniform and model laws in topical areas of the law which would benefit from uni-
formity.  Uniform Law Commissioners, About NCCUSL, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/ 
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=9 (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). 
 185 North American Securities Administrators Association [NASAA], About NASAA, 
http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).  Canadian membership 
includes its thirteen provinces and territories of British Columbia, Yukon, Northwest Ter-
ritories, Nunavut, Quebec, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, On-
tario, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta.  Canada does not 
have a federal securities regulator.  NASAA, Director of Securities Laws & Regulations, 
http://www.nasaa.org/industry___regulatory_resources/Directory_of_Securities_Laws___R
egulations/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).  
 186 NASAA is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and its departments include legal, 
finance, government affairs, communications, investor education, and membership ser-
vices.  See generally NASAA, About NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA/ (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2006). 
 187 NASAA, Sections & Project Groups, http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA_ 
Sections__Project_Groups/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). 
 188 Project groups of the Broker-Dealer Section include Continuing Education, Exams 
Advisory, Market and Regulatory Policy and Review, Operations, Arbitration, and Vari-
able Annuities.  NASAA, Sections & Project Groups: Broker-Dealer Section, 
http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/nasaa_sections__project_groups/345.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2006). 
 189 Project groups in the Corporation Finance section include Corporation Finance 
Policy, Direct Participation Programs Policy (e.g., limited partnerships), Franchise and 
Business Opportunities, Shareholder Rights, Small Business/Limited Offerings, Small 
Business Capital Formation, and Coordinated Interpretations.  NASAA, Sections & Pro-
ject Groups: Corporation Finance Section, http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/ 
nasaa_sections__project_groups/346.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). 
 190 Project groups in the Enforcement section include Attorney/Investigator Training, 
Enforcement Technology, Enforcement Trends, Litigation Forum, Special Project Devel-
opment & Coordination, and Viaticals & Life Settlements.  NASAA, Securities & Project 
Groups, Enforcement Section, http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/nasaa_sections__ 
project_groups/347.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). 
 191 Project groups in the Investment Adviser section include Operations, Regulatory 
Policy & Review, Training, and Zones.  NASAA, Securities & Project Groups, Investment 
Adviser Section, http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/nasaa_sections__project_groups/ 
348.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). 
 192 Project groups in the Investor Education section include affinity and ethnic-based 
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NASAA’s Enforcement committee coordinates enforcement 
efforts for multi-state or multi-jurisdictional frauds by facilitat-
ing information sharing and attempting to allocate efficiently the 
enforcement efforts of its membership.  The Enforcement com-
mittee serves as a liaison, on behalf of NASAA membership, to 
federal agencies (particularly the Commission) and SROs.  The 
Enforcement committee also attempts to identify fraud and en-
forcement trends in the various jurisdictions of its members.  For 
the reporting period 2002–2003, SSRAs “filed a total of 2,964 
administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement actions; assessed 
$822,315,470 of monetary fines or penalties; collected 
$660,109,508 in restitution, rescission, and disgorgement and 
sentenced criminals to over 717 years of incarceration.”193 
NASAA has adopted several programs over the years in an 
attempt to harmonize state securities laws.  These efforts include 
the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE) in 1983 to fa-
cilitate uniformity regarding registering securities offerings; the 
Coordinated Equity Review (CER) program; and the Small Com-
pany Offering Registration (SCOR) program.  However, compli-
ance with such programs is strictly voluntary.  ULOE provides a 
state exemption for offerings that are exempt under Rules 505 
and 506 of Regulation D of the Securities Act.194  SCOR provides 
a lead state examiner for multi-state offerings required by rela-
tively smaller issuers, such as microbreweries, small banks, and 
technology startups.195  CER targets relatively larger multi-state 
offerings, e.g., securities that trade on the NASDAQ Smallcap 
market or the OTC Bulletin Board. 
Most importantly, NASAA members have additional respon-
sibilities other than securities regulation within their jurisdic-
tions.  For example, the responsibility for enforcing the securities 
laws of the State of New York resides with its State Attorney 
 
outreach, online trading awareness, senior outreach, and youth outreach.  NASAA, Secu-
rities & Project Groups, Investor Education Section, http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/ 
nasaa_sections___project_groups/349.cfm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006). 
 193 These statistics were compiled by NASAA with over 70 percent of its 52 members 
responding.  Role of State Securities Regulators, supra note 177, at 40 (prepared state-
ment of Joseph P. Borg, Director, Alabama Securities Commission & Chairman of the En-
forcement Section of NASAA). 
 194 See ROSA MARIA MOLLER, SECURITIES REGULATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON 
SMALL BUSINESSES 32 (2000) available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/00/04/00-005.pdf; 
NASAA, Statement on Public Offerings, http://www.nasaa.org/Issues___Answers/ 
Legislative_Activity/Testimony/684.cfm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).  Offerings under Regu-
lation D of the Securities Act are limited offerings that are exempt from the registration 
requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act.  Regulation D exemption requirements are con-
tained in Rules 501–08, which contain requirements to qualify for Regulation D’s limited 
offering exemptions from registration.  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.508 (2006). 
 195 See NASAA, Statement on Public Offerings, http://www.nasaa.org/ 
Issues___Answers/Legislative_Activity/Testimony/684.cfm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006). 
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General (AG).  However, the AG is divided into five major divi-
sions with corresponding bureaus.  There are four case-specific 
divisions: Appeals and Opinions,196 Criminal Prosecutions,197 
State Counsel,198 and Public Advocacy; plus a separate Regional 
Offices Division.199  There is also a Division of Administration 
that provides budget, personnel, operations, and technology ser-
vices for the Attorney General.200  The Investor Protection Bu-
reau is responsible for enforcing and administering the State of 
New York’s securities laws and operates under the auspices of 
the Division of Public Advocacy (Public Advocacy).  Public Advo-
cacy was established to defend and protect the public interest in 
New York courts.  Public Advocacy is comprised of ten bureaus, 
and in addition to enforcing the State of New York’s securities 
laws, it also enforces its health care laws, environmental laws, 
laws that prevent trade restraint, laws that protect charitable 
donors and beneficiaries, and laws that prohibit discrimination.  
Moreover, the AG’s recommended budget for the fiscal year 
2005–06 of $214 million must be shared by all divisions and the 
corresponding bureaus.201  Unlike the Commission, SSRAs rarely 
have the luxury of focusing exclusively on monitoring and enforc-
ing state securities laws. 
As a member of IOSCO, NASAA also participates in the 
global securities market by exchanging views with international 
criminal law and regulatory sectors focused on combating in-
vestment fraud, and by identifying ways of coordinating enforce-
ment efforts when investigating and prosecuting securities fraud 
that has crossed international borders.202 
Finally, cooperation between the Commission and SSRAs is 
mandated under § 19(d) of the Exchange Act.  Accordingly, 
 
 196 The Division of Appeals and Opinions handles appellate litigation in both the 
State of New York and Federal courts.  In addition, it drafts opinions which interpret 
State of New York laws for New York State agencies and municipalities.  Office of NYS 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Tour the Attorney General’s Office, 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/tour/tour.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). 
 197 The Criminal Prosecutions Division investigates and prosecutes criminal cases 
including, but not limited to, Medicaid fraud, auto insurance fraud, white collar and or-
ganized crime occurring in New York State.  Id. 
 198 The Division of State Counsel provides counsel and representation in legal pro-
ceedings involving New York State agencies, the Governor, other New York State officials 
and the New York State Legislature.  Id. 
 199 The Regional Offices program provides mini-satellite offices in New York State to 
provide access to the programs and services of the AG and to provide cost-effective repre-
sentation for New York agencies in all New York State and Federal courts.  See id. 
 200 NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LAW, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2002). 
 201 Assemb. B. 550, 2005 Leg., 228th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2005), available at 
http://www.budget.state.ny.us/archive/fy0506archive/fy0506appropbills/ppgg.pdf. 
 202 Role of State Securities Regulators, supra note 177, at 37 (statement of Ralph A. 
Lambiase, Director, Division of Securities Connecticut Department of Banking; President, 
NASAA). 
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NASAA and the Commission co-sponsor an annual Conference on 
Federal-State Securities Regulation (Conference).  At the Confer-
ence, participants in working groups focus on regulatory topics 
such as corporation finance, broker-dealer sales practices, in-
vestment advisers, investor education, and enforcement.203 
Against this setting, a movement towards federal preemp-
tion in the U.S. securities markets began, in earnest, with the 
passage of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 
1996 (NSMIA).204 
3. Selective Federal Preemption in the Securities 
Regulatory Framework 
This section identifies significant legislative action endorsing 
selective federal preemption from 1996 to the present.  1996 was 
chosen because Congress passed legislation that clearly demon-
strated its support for selective federal preemption in the securi-
ties regulatory framework.  The chart below summarizes legisla-
tion signifying Congress’s intent to use selective federal 
preemption in the securities regulatory framework. 
 
 
 203 Press Release, SEC, SEC, NASAA to Co-Sponsor Conference on Federal-State Se-
curities Regulation (Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-
46.htm. 
 204 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.) (1996). 
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Name Purpose Citation 
National Securi-
ties Markets Im-
provement Act of 
1996  
Oct. 11, 1996 
To modernize and rational-
ize the regulatory frame-
work of the U.S. Securities 
Markets including, but not 
limited to, the respective re-
sponsibilities of Federal and 
State governmental authori-
ties 
Pub. L. No. 104-
290, 110 Stat. 
3416 (codified as 
amended in scat-
tered sections of 
15 U.S.C.) (1996). 
Securities Litiga-
tion Uniform 
Standards Act of 
1998 
Nov. 3, 1998 
To prevent certain state pri-
vate securities class action 
lawsuits alleging fraud from 
being used to frustrate the 
objectives of the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 
Pub. L. No. 105-
353, § 1, 112 Stat. 
3227 (1998). 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002  
Jul. 30, 2002 
“To protect investors by im-
proving the accuracy and re-
liability of corporate disclo-
sures made pursuant to the 
securities laws, and for 
other purposes.” 
Pub. L. No. 107-
204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002). 
The Securities 
Fraud Deterrence 
and Investor Res-
titution Act of 
2004 
 
Although never passed, this 
was an attempt to further 
curtail state regulatory au-
thority in the U.S. securities 
markets and was described 
as a bill “[t]o enhance the 
authority of the [Commis-
sion] to investigate, punish, 
and deter securities laws 
violations, and to improve 
its ability to return funds to 
defrauded investors, and for 
other purposes.” 
 
H.R. 2179, 108th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 
2004); H.R. REP. 
NO. 108-475, pt. 1 
(2004).  
 
 
a. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act 
of 1996 
According to President Clinton, the NSMIA represented the 
most significant overhaul of the regulatory framework for the 
U.S. securities markets in decades.  NSMIA would 
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enhance capital formation and the competitiveness of the American 
economy by eliminating regulatory overlap between the States and 
the Federal Government. . . . [The] bill achieve[d] the difficult task of 
improving the efficiency of the financial markets without compromis-
ing investor protections. . . . [It] will more efficiently divide responsi-
bility for regulation between the Federal and State governments.  The 
[Commission] will be charged with responsibility for activities in the 
national markets, such as regulation of securities listed on the na-
tional exchanges and mutual funds, as well as large investment advi-
sors.205  States will have responsibility for smaller issues and invest-
ment advisors206 with smaller portfolios, while retaining their 
authority to take enforcement actions against fraudulent conduct in 
all situations. . . . These changes will all enhance our national capital 
markets, helping to create and nurture new businesses and new jobs, 
and enhancing the returns of both businesses and investors.207 
NSMIA was designed to facilitate the development of na-
tional securities markets and to reduce the costs and burdens of 
duplicative regulation.  NSMIA increased the use of selective 
federal preemption by 
designating the Federal government as the exclusive regulator of na-
tional offerings of securities[;] repealing anti-competitive restrictions 
on entities from whom brokers may borrow; requiring the considera-
tion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation whenever the 
[Commission] makes a public interest determination in its rulemak-
ing; providing for streamlining and coordinating of examinations of 
broker-dealers by [SROs]; significantly reducing regulatory burdens 
on the mutual fund industry; [and] simplifying and reducing ineffec-
tive and anticompetitive restrictions imposed by the Investment Com-
pany Act.208 
NSMIA also empowered the Commission to exercise wide-
ranging, exemptive authority.  The Commission’s exemptive au-
thority allows it, by rule or regulation, to exempt any person, se-
curity, or transaction from any requirement under federal securi-
ties laws.209  Congress contended that such exemptive authority 
was needed to ensure sufficient flexibility to respond quickly to 
changes in the U.S. securities industry.210  However, the Com-
mission’s exemptive authority must be exercised to promote effi-
 
 205 Large investment advisers are investment advisers with more than $25 million in 
assets under management.  SEC, Investment Advisors: What You Need to Know Before 
Choosing One, http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/invadvisors.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). 
 206 Smaller investment advisers are investment advisers with $25 million or less un-
der management.  Id. 
 207 Statement on Signing the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 
2 PUB. PAPERS 1812 (Oct. 11, 1996). 
 208 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (1996). 
 209 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2000).  The Commission may exercise its exemptive authority 
conditionally or unconditionally.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 58 (1996). 
 210 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 38 (1996). 
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ciency, competition, and capital formation as well as the public 
interest and investor protection.211  Accordingly, the Commission 
must analyze the potential costs and benefits of a particular pro-
posed rule.212 
(1) Increased Use of Selective Federal Preemption 
in Securities Registration 
NSMIA facilitates the creation of national securities markets 
and the reduction of the cost of regulation by prohibiting state 
regulation of offerings of “covered securities” or “conditionally 
covered securities.”  Covered securities213 include the following:  
1. Securities listed, including securities authorized for listing, on 
the NYSE, the AMEX, and the NASDAQ-NMS;214  
2. Securities of the same issuer that are equal in seniority or senior 
to the security listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ-NMS;215  
3. Securities issued by investment companies registered with the 
Commission;216  
4. Sales of securities in items 1 and 2 to qualified purchasers;217  
 
 211 Id. Congress also intended that the Commission raise the permissible amount of 
offering exemptions under § 3(b) of the Securities Act from $5 million to $10 million, in-
cluding, but not limited to, increasing the exemption amount under offerings for certain 
employee benefit plans, and small public offerings under Regulation A of the Securities 
Act.  Id.  However, this broad grant of exemptive authority is not valid with respect to § 
15C of the Exchange Act and to the definitions listed in § 3(a)(42)–(45) of the Exchange 
Act, which govern government securities dealers.  Section 105(b) of NSMIA allows the 
Commission to act by issuing an order with respect to the Exchange Act to facilitate indi-
vidual exemptive requests; the Commission is authorized to establish procedures and cir-
cumstances that determine whether it will issue an exemptive order.  Id. 
 212 In addition, Congress requires a rigorous cost and benefits analysis in connection 
with its review of major rules promulgated by the Commission under the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.  Id. at 39. 
 213 The Securities Amendments Act of 1996 generally exempts from state registration 
requirements those securities listed on major stock exchanges, e.g., NASDAQ (National 
Market System only) or NYSE.  Id. at 57–58. 
 214 This includes discretionary authority for the Commission to identify securities 
listed on other exchanges or trading systems that are similar to the NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ-NMS.  Congress’s intent is to require the Commission to monitor listing re-
quirements of exchanges on which covered securities are listed to ensure compliance with 
applicable federal securities laws.  Id. at 30. 
 215 This provision covers securities other than equities, for example, the issuer’s debt 
securities.  Id. 
 216 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2000).  The NASD also conducts examinations of investment 
companies registered with the Commission that are also its members; this includes ap-
proximately ninety percent of investment companies.  The NASD’s examination includes, 
but is not limited to, a review of the sales literature and advertising materials.  H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-622, at 31 (1996). 
 217 § 77r(b)(3).  This section contemplates that the Commission will define a “qualified 
purchaser,” which would include purchasers of mortgaged-backed securities, asset-backed 
securities, other structured securities, and securities issued in connection with project fi-
nancings.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 31.  Generally, Congress believes that “‘qualified’ 
purchasers are sophisticated investors, capable of protecting themselves in a manner that 
renders regulation by State authorities unnecessary.”  Id.  Congress’s intent was that 
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5. Secondary market trading transactions that are exempt from the 
registration requirements under §§ 4(1), 4(3) and 4(4) of the Se-
curities Act;218  
6. Securities exempt from registration pursuant to § 3(a) of the Se-
curities Act;219  
7. Securities sold in private transactions pursuant to § 4(2) of the 
Securities Act, if offered or sold in accordance with a rule or regu-
lation promulgated by the Commission in accordance with  § 4(2) 
of the Securities Act.220 
Conditionally covered securities221 include registered securi-
ties offerings by issuers with total assets exceeding $10 million222 
with two years of audited financial statements ending before the 
filing of a registration statement with the Commission.  How-
ever, securities offerings in which a person223 has been statutorily 
disqualified224 are subject to both federal and state regulation.  
The effect of NSMIA’s increased use of selective federal preemp-
tion is to impose one set of rules for securities that are, or will be, 
traded on a national basis.225  For example, SSRAs may not per-
form merit reviews of offerings involving covered or conditionally 
covered securities. 
The states’ authority to bring enforcement actions under 
their securities laws prohibiting fraud and deceit in connection 
with any securities offering and securities transaction is specifi-
cally preserved under NSMIA.226  Such enforcement actions 
 
these types of structured offerings be regulated exclusively by the Federal government 
and apply to all offerings, both registered or exempt from registration under the Securi-
ties Act.  Id. at 32. 
 218 § 77r(b)(4).  The issuer must be reporting under the Exchange Act, or is exempt 
from the reporting requirements under the Exchange Act. H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 32. 
 219 Section 3(a) exempts securities if they are: a) securities of non-profit and similar 
entities described in § 3(a)(4); b) intrastate offerings under § 3(a)(11)(i); and c) municipal 
securities as defined in § 3(a)(2).  H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 32. 
 220 Id. 
 221 A conditionally covered security also includes a security that will be a covered se-
curity upon completion of the transaction.  Offerings involving securities that have been 
plagued by high levels of fraud will continue to be regulated by state securities authori-
ties, i.e., regulation of such securities is not preempted under federal securities laws.  
These securities offerings include securities issued by blank check companies, partner-
ships, limited liability companies, direct participation investment programs, penny stock 
companies, and roll-up transactions.  Id. at 32–33. 
 222 Total assets may be measured after the transaction is completed.  Id. at 32. 
 223 Person includes associated persons of broker-dealers.  Id. at 33. 
 224 A person is statutorily disqualified when she is barred from associating with a 
broker-dealer and/or an investment adviser or investment company.  Such a person is ef-
fectively excluded from participating in the U.S. securities industry.  Section 39(a)(39) of 
the Exchange Act authorizes the Commission to exempt statutorily disqualified persons, 
thus exempting the securities offering from state regulation.  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, 
at 33. 
 225 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2000). 
 226 § 77r(c)(1). 
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would include cases involving broker-dealer sales practices in 
which misrepresentations and/or omissions of material facts oc-
cur.  However, Congress asserted that “[NSMIA] preempts au-
thority that would allow the States to employ the regulatory au-
thority they retain to reconstruct in a different form the 
regulatory regime for covered securities that Section 18 [of 
NSMIA] has preempted.”227  Moreover, NSMIA did not reduce the 
revenue stream to states by eliminating state registration re-
quirements for securities offerings and transactions involving 
covered or conditionally covered securities; states may still re-
quire notice filings and fees in connection with securities offer-
ings and securities transactions made within their borders.228  
They may suspend securities offerings and securities transac-
tions within their borders if the issuer fails to make a filing 
and/or pay a fee required under state law.229 
(2) Selective Federal Preemption and Broker-
Dealer Financial Responsibility 
NSMIA preempts state laws imposing financial responsibil-
ity and reporting requirements on broker-dealers and associated 
persons of broker-dealers.  Specifically, selective federal preemp-
tion applies to regulation of capital, margin, books and records, 
bonding, and recordkeeping requirements.230  However, state se-
curities laws continue to apply to broker-dealer sales practices 
involving fraud in the offer, sale, and purchase of securities 
traded within the jurisdiction of each state; accordingly, SSRAs 
maintain the ability to initiate enforcement actions involving 
fraud.  In addition, broker-dealers and their associated persons 
must still register and pay filing fees in each state.  Again, al-
though some state regulatory powers have been preempted by 
federal securities laws, states continue to receive revenue from 
 
 227 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 34. 
 228 § 77r(c)(2)(B). 
 229 § 77r(c)(3).  States also have the authority to request any registration documents 
filed with the Commission in order to compute the required fee.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 
35.  Offering documents “include any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or 
communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or con-
firms the sale of any security.”  Id. 
 230 Associated persons may effect transactions for existing customers in states in 
which they are not registered.  This exemption from state registration requires that the 
associated person “must not be ineligible to register in the [state in which the transaction 
occurs] for any reason[; ]must be registered with the NASD and with at least one [state; ] 
must be associated with a broker-dealer that is registered in the [state] in which the 
transaction is effected”; permissible transactions are those executed for an “existing cus-
tomer . . . while that customer is temporarily away from home”; and transactions executed 
for an existing customer while the associated person is awaiting a response to his/her ap-
plication for licensing in the state.  However, the associated person cannot execute more 
than ten transactions under this provision in states in which the associated person is not 
licensed.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 36–37. 
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state filing and registration fees. 
(3) Selective Federal Preemption and the  
Regulation of Investment Companies and In-
vestment Advisers 
NSMIA imposed selective federal preemption by amending 
the registration provisions of the Investment Company Act (ICA) 
with a view towards reducing unnecessary regulatory costs and 
procedural burdens.  Investment companies (e.g., mutual funds) 
were permitted to register an indefinite number of securities on 
an annual basis.  Regulatory costs were reduced significantly be-
cause investment companies were permitted to file one registra-
tion per year rather than filing a registration statement for each 
offering of its securities within a one-year period.231 
NSMIA authorized the Commission to require investment 
companies to make and keep certain books and records in addi-
tion to those necessary to prepare their financial statements.232  
This expansion of the Commission’s authority was designed to fa-
cilitate examinations to determine whether investment compa-
nies and related entities were complying with federal securities 
laws.  The Commission’s expanded authority does not extend to 
an investment company adviser, unless it is a majority-owned 
subsidiary of a registered investment company.233  Finally, 
NSMIA left to the states the job of regulating investment advis-
ers with assets of less than or equal to $25 million; however, in-
vestment advisers with less than or equal to $25 million under 
management may continue to register with the Commission if 
they so choose. 
b.   The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards  
Act of 1998 Increased the Use of Selective  
Federal Preemption 
Selective federal preemption in the regulatory framework of 
U.S. securities markets continued with the passage of the Securi-
ties Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).234  
SLUSA established uniform national rules for securities class ac-
 
 231 Fees for such registration statements are based on the aggregate sales price of se-
curities sold during the investment company’s fiscal year.  Failure to meet the annual fil-
ing deadline and to pay the requisite fee subjects the investment company to the payment 
of interest based on the amount due at a rate established by the Secretary of Treasury 
under the Debt Collection Act of 1982.  Id. at 44; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(f). 
 232 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 47.  Previously, the Commission could only require in-
vestment companies to make and keep records necessary to prepare their financial state-
ments.  Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 H.R. REP. NO. 1689, at 4–5 (1997).  SLUSA amended § 28(b) of the Exchange Act. 
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tion lawsuits involving covered securities.235  Its effect was to re-
quire class action lawsuits alleging certain categories of securi-
ties fraud236 and involving covered securities to be filed in federal 
court under federal securities laws.237  According to Congress, 
SLUSA was needed to close a loophole used by the private securi-
ties bar to avoid the provisions of the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).238  PSLRA was passed to 
eliminate “vexatious litigation that was draining value from the 
shareholders and employees of public companies.”239  However, 
according to a report and statistical analysis of securities class 
actions lawsuits (Report)240 commissioned by Congress to assess 
the effectiveness of the implementation of the PSLRA, the pri-
vate securities bar seemingly avoided the more stringent re-
quirements of securities fraud cases under federal securities laws 
by filing class actions in state courts under state securities laws.  
The Report suggested 
that the level of class action securities fraud litigation has declined by 
about a third in federal courts, but that there has been an almost 
equal increase in the level of state court activity, largely as a result of 
a “substitution effect” whereby plaintiffs resort to state court to avoid 
the new, more stringent requirements of federal cases.  There has also 
been an increase in parallel litigation between state and federal courts 
in an apparent effort to avoid the federal discovery stay or other pro-
visions of [PSLRA].  This increase in state activity has the potential 
not only to undermine the intent of [PSLRA], but to increase the over-
all cost of litigation to the extent that [PSLRA] encourages the filing of 
 
 235 H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (noting class actions relating to a 
covered security are“defined by section 18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, which was 
added” with the passage of NSMIA).  Again, selective federal preemption focuses on secu-
rities that are traded nationally in the U.S. securities markets. 
 236 Specifically, securities fraud consists of misrepresentations, omissions, deception, 
or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.  Id. at 7. 
 237 SLUSA amended § 16 of the Securities Act and § 28 of the Exchange Act to limit 
class actions involving covered securities, i.e., covered class actions.  Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (1998). 
 238 H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13–15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).  See also, e.g., Michael A. 
Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Ac-
tion, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 290–91 (1998).  PSLRA was passed despite being vetoed by 
President Clinton.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 9 (1998). 
 239 H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 9 (1998); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 
(1995) (Conf. Rep.).  Unfortunately, under the PSLRA, the private securities bar could 
still determine and select the most favorable state forum in which to file a securities class 
action.  Because the issuer’s security was traded nationally, the plaintiff’s attorney’s se-
lection could result in forcing shareholders and defendants to travel great distances in 
order to litigate securities class actions.  Moreover, different plaintiffs and classes could 
file competing securities class actions in the same or different states forcing the issuer to 
litigate more than one securities class action case simultaneously.  Most of these issues 
were resolved under SLUSA.   
 240 See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The 
First Year’s Experience (John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 140, 
1997). 
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parallel claims. 
  . . . . 
  . . . [The Commission] called the shift of securities fraud cases 
from Federal to State court “potentially the most significant develop-
ment in securities litigation” since passage of [PSLRA]. 
  . . . [P]laintiffs’ lawyers have sought to circumvent [PSLRA’s] pro-
visions by exploiting differences between Federal and State laws by 
filing frivolous and speculative lawsuits in State court, where essen-
tially none of [PSLRA’s] procedural or substantive protections against 
abusive suits are available.241 
Specifically, SLUSA prohibited securities class actions in-
volving covered or conditionally covered securities (covered class 
actions) from being filed in state courts by defining covered class 
actions as: 
• any single lawsuit in which damages are sought on behalf of more 
than fifty persons242 or prospective class members with common 
questions of law or fact;243 or 
• any single lawsuit brought on behalf of one or more unnamed par-
ties seeking to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf 
of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated; and 
• any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court, involv-
ing common questions of law or fact, brought on behalf of more 
than fifty persons, which are joined, consolidated, or otherwise pro-
ceed as a single action.244 
SLUSA was drafted to include mass actions245 and to author-
ize federal courts “to stay discovery in any state court action if 
deemed to aid in the federal court’s jurisdiction.”246 
 
 241 H.R.Rep. No. 105-640, at 10 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (quoting Grundfest & Perino, su-
pra note 240).  PSLRA contained a heightened pleading standard, which required plain-
tiffs’ complaints to state specific grounds for their claims.  In addition, all motions had to 
be resolved before conducting discovery.  Id. at 45. 
 242 Corporations, investment companies, pension plans, partnerships, or other enti-
ties are treated as one person, if the entity was not organized solely for the purpose of 
participating in a class action involving covered securities.  9 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4169 (3d ed. 2004). 
 243 Id. at 4168.  Common questions of law or fact must predominate over any ques-
tions affecting only individual persons or members.  However, it is not necessary under 
SLUSA to prove individual reliance of all class members on the common questions of fact.  
See id. 
 244 Id. at 4168–69.  Individual plaintiffs bringing bona fide actions will not be prohib-
ited solely because more than fifty persons commence actions in the same state court 
against a single defendant or issuer.  Id. at 4170. 
 245 Mass actions involve many plaintiffs, have high settlement value, and “may be 
abused by lawyers who seek to evade [SLUSA].”  Id. 
 246 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 85–86 (2d ed. 2003).  See, e.g., In 
re Bankamerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (staying state 
court class action that “threaten[ed] the orderly conduct of the federal case,” which repre-
sented more than twenty-six times the dollar amount in claims than the state court pro-
ceeding that was stayed). 
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SLUSA prohibits securities class actions based on state 
statutory or common law in any state or federal court, if it alleges 
misrepresentations and/or omissions of material facts or the use 
of any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the of-
fer, sale, or purchase of a covered, or conditionally covered, secu-
rity.  Such securities class actions could not be filed in state court 
under state or federal securities laws.247  In this case, the use of 
selective federal preemption means that nationally traded securi-
ties can only be subject to federal securities laws, not varying 
state securities laws; such uniformity facilitates a reduction in 
the cost of regulation. 
c. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and Selective  
Federal Preemption 
SOX increased the use of selective federal preemption in the 
regulatory framework of the U.S. securities markets.  Areas tra-
ditionally regulated by states were now partially regulated under 
federal securities laws.  Specifically, SOX set (1) minimum stan-
dards of professional conduct, including non-industry regulation, 
for accountants performing audits of companies whose securities 
are publicly traded; and (2) more stringent Commission regula-
tion of the corporate governance of companies whose securities 
are publicly traded. 
(1) Regulation of Accountant Conduct and Selective 
Federal Preemption 
SOX uses selective federal preemption to establish a regula-
tory framework for accounting firms that conduct audits of com-
panies’ required filings with the Commission.  Prior to the en-
actment of SOX, the fragmentation of the regulatory framework 
governing the accounting profession conducting audits of such 
companies adversely impacted effective regulation of the account-
ing profession and the usefulness of information obtained from 
such audits.  Accordingly, a reliable regulatory framework for the 
accounting firms, who are responsible for ensuring that material 
information provided by such companies is correct, is an essential 
component of competing successfully in the global securities 
 
 247 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)–(e).  SLUSA excludes certain types of class actions and state 
court actions.  State jurisdiction is preserved with respect to actions brought pursuant to 
the law of the state where the issuer is incorporated, and actions brought by a state, or on 
behalf of a state, in which the plaintiffs are named and are authorized by a state to par-
ticipate in the class action.  Essentially, SLUSA preserves SSRA power to continue inves-
tigatory and enforcement activities.  Shareholder derivative class actions brought on be-
half of a corporation or issuer are also excluded under SLUSA.  Certain state law 
fiduciary claims against officers, directors, or control persons primarily based on misrep-
resentations in connection with tender offers, mergers, and other such transactions are 
not precluded by SLUSA.  See id. 
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market.  In congressional hearings conducted by the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to consider 
“the effectiveness of the accounting regulatory oversight system,” 
it was determined that 
  The profession’s combination of public oversight and voluntary 
self-regulation is extensive, Byzantine, and insufficient.  The Panel 
found that the current system of governance lacks sufficient public 
representation, suffers from divergent views among its members as to 
the profession’s priorities, implements a disciplinary system that is 
slow and ineffective, lacks efficient communication among its various 
entities and with the [Commission], and lacks unified leadership and 
oversight.248 
Under SOX, companies filing with the Commission can only 
retain accounting firms registered with the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board (PCAOB)249 to conduct audits of their 
financial statements.250  PCAOB, subject to Commission over-
sight,251 has broad power to establish and adopt standards for 
auditing, quality control, and ethics for accounting firms conduct-
ing audits for companies whose securities are publicly traded.252  
PCAOB’s powers include the authority to conduct inspections 
and investigations and to impose sanctions.253  All final decisions 
 
 248 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 2, 5 (2002) (quoting testimony of Shaun O’Malley, Chair-
man, 2000 Public Oversight Board Panel on Audit Effectiveness and former Chairman, 
Price Waterhouse LLP, before the Committee on Mar. 6, 2002). 
 249 15 U.S.C.A. § 7212(a) (2006).  PCAOB has authority only with respect to audits of 
companies whose securities are publicly traded.  It has no jurisdiction over the work of 
accountants auditing other companies, i.e., companies whose securities are not publicly 
traded.  § 7211(a). 
 250 Registered accounting firms must also file a report annually to update all required 
information.  In addition, registration and annual fees are assessed to cover the cost of 
processing and reviewing applications and annual reports.  S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 8.  Ac-
counting firms must register with PCAOB in order to be eligible to conduct audits of pub-
lic companies. Accordingly, suspension or revocation of an accounting firm’s registration 
means that it can no longer engage in the practice of auditing publicly traded companies.  
Id. at 7. 
 251 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 107(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(a) (2006).  PCAOB 
has rulemaking authority, but all rules, auditing standards, and its budget must be sub-
mitted to the Commission before becoming effective.  § 7217(b).  The Commission must 
also hear appeals of PCAOB’s disciplinary actions and negative inspection reports.  
§ 7217(c). 
 252 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 8.  However, SOX authorizes PCAOB to rely on profes-
sional groups of accountants or one or more advisory groups of practicing accountants or 
other interested parties as long as such parties meet SOX’s statutory tests.  Id. 
 253 Id. at 9–11.  PCAOB final inspection reports are sent to the Commission and ap-
plicable accountancy boards routinely.  They are also made public.  Accounting firms are 
allowed twelve months to correct problems uncovered during PCAOB inspections.  Sanc-
tions available for violations of applicable provisions of SOX include revoking or suspend-
ing the accounting firm’s registration, barring individuals associated with registered ac-
counting firms from association with their current firm as well as any other accounting 
firm, imposing civil monetary penalties, mandatory participation in professional educa-
tion or training programs, and censure.  Revoking an accounting firm’s registration with 
PCAOB or barring an individual from association with a registered accounting firm may 
only be imposed if the violation was committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or 
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issued and sanctions imposed by PCAOB may be appealed to the 
Commission. 
Most importantly with respect to the global securities mar-
ket, PCAOB also has jurisdiction over public accounting firms or-
ganized outside of the U.S. that prepare audited financial state-
ments for issuers trading in the U.S. securities markets.254  
However, PCAOB has exemptive authority, i.e., it may determine 
that the role of the foreign accounting firm is sufficiently de 
minimis to avoid SOX’s registration requirement.255  Whether 
this requirement diminishes the competitiveness of the U.S. se-
curities markets in the global securities market remains to be 
seen. 
(2) Corporate Governance and Selective Federal 
Preemption 
SOX, using selective federal preemption, regulates in an 
area of corporate law traditionally reserved to state incorporation 
laws—corporate governance.  Among other things, SOX places 
particular emphasis on issuer audit committees.  Under SOX, 
audit committees are directly responsible for the oversight, com-
pensation, and appointment of the accounting firm hired to con-
duct an audit of the issuer’s books, records, and procedures.  In 
addition, auditors are required to report directly to the audit 
committee.256  SOX was designed to increase the independence of 
the audit committee, given its importance as the first line of de-
fense for ensuring the accuracy of financial disclosures required 
under federal securities laws.257  Accordingly, SOX prohibits the 
payment of consulting fees to audit committee members by the 
issuer, and prevents audit committee members from being affili-
ated persons of the issuer or its subsidiaries.258  SOX also re-
 
repeated negligence.  PCAOB is authorized to impose sanctions for failure reasonably to 
supervise a partner or employee.  Liability for failure to reasonably supervise a partner or 
employee is based on similar standards used with respect to broker-dealer under § 
15(b)(4) of the Exchange Act.  SOX also contains a similar safe harbor, i.e., the accounting 
firm may avoid liability by showing that it has written internal control procedures de-
signed with a view towards preventing violations of applicable provisions of SOX and that 
its internal control procedures were implemented and monitored for effectiveness.  Id. 
 254 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7216(a).  Congress “believes that there should be no difference in 
treatment of a public company’s auditors under [SOX] simply because of a particular 
auditor’s place of operation.  Otherwise, a significant loophole in the protection offered 
U.S. investors would be built into the statutory system.”  S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 11. 
 255 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7216(c). 
 256 §§ 78j-1(k)(1), (m)(2). 
 257 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 14. 
 258 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(3).  See also S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 24 (“Former SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt testified that ‘as a listing condition, stock exchanges should re-
quire at least a majority of company boards to meet a strict definition of independence,’ 
including barring audit committee members from accepting consulting fees from the com-
pany.”). 
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quires the audit committee to establish and implement proce-
dures for protecting whistleblowers, including allowing employ-
ees to anonymously report concerns about accounting or auditing 
matters.259  Finally, the issuer must pay for independent counsel 
and/or other advisers that audit committee members determine 
are needed to perform their responsibilities as audit committee 
members.260 
Corporate governance reforms under SOX include additional 
inroads on state preeminence in matters of corporate governance.  
Section 302 of SOX requires the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to certify that the informa-
tion contained in annual and quarterly reports filed with the 
Commission is accurate.  Accordingly, the signatures of the CEO 
and the CFO are required on such reports to evidence certifica-
tion.  Section 303 of SOX prohibits any officer or director from 
taking any action to fraudulently influence accounting firms en-
gaged in conducting audits of companies required to file with the 
Commission.261  Finally, § 404 of SOX requires that each annual 
report contain a written assessment of a company’s internal con-
trols for ensuring accurate financial reporting. 
d. H.R. 2179 and Selective Federal Preemption 
The most recent significant attempt to increase selective fed-
eral preemption in the U.S. securities markets regulatory 
framework is The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Res-
titution Act of 2004 (H.R. 2179).262  H.R. 2179 was designed in 
part to preempt state laws that interfered with the Commission’s 
ability “to investigate and deter fraud, levy and collect fines and 
disgorgement [sic] funds, and provide for a significant increase in 
money available for return to injured investors.”263  Introduced 
on May 21, 2003, H.R. 2179264 proposed to preempt state securi-
ties laws by, among other things,  
• Allowing states to place funds obtained from successfully prose-
cuted fraud cases in an investor restitution fund administered and 
distributed by the Commission, even if the Commission was not a 
party to the agreement or settlement which was the source of such 
 
 259 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(4). 
 260 § 78j-1(m)(5)–(6).  See also S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 25. 
 261 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7241–42.  SOX also mandates the adoption of codes of conduct for 
an issuer’s senior officials and disclosure of the terms of such codes of conduct on Form 
8K.  Any change in, or waiver of, the provisions of such codes must be disclosed to the 
public immediately.  § 7264; see also § 7262. 
 262 H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004).  H.R. 2179 expressly preserves the right of 
states’ securities regulations to bring fraud cases in their respective jurisdictions.  H.R. 
REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 50 (2004). 
 263 H.R. REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 12. 
 264 H.R. 2179 was introduced by Representatives Baker, Oxley, Tiberi, Ose and Kelly.   
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funds.265 
• Continuing the Commission’s prohibition of state regulation of capi-
tal, margin, books and records, disclosure, and disclosure of conflict 
of interest requirements for brokers, dealers, municipal securities 
dealers, government securities brokers or government securities 
dealers.266 
• Preempting state or local laws exempting property from foreclosure 
or forced sale to satisfy judgments obtained by the Commission in 
connection with its enforcement activities.267  It would preempt 
state laws that allow properties otherwise covered by state home-
stead exemptions to be seized by the Commission. 
• Establishing that the Central Registration Depository (CRD) and 
the Investment Adviser Registration Depository (IARD) are oper-
ated on behalf of the Commission.268 
However, it is clear that H.R. 2179 was not designed to com-
pletely eliminate SSRAs in the securities regulatory framework.  
Its purpose seems to be to increase selective federal preemption 
in an area Congress deemed to be “weak areas” in the securities 
regulatory framework.  Also, H.R. 2179 requires the Commission 
to cooperate with NASAA “to produce . . . a joint study on 
strengthening the working relationship between State and Fed-
eral securities regulators.”269 
 
 265 H.R. REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 8.  The Congressional Committee stresses that 
states are not required to deposit disgorgement and/or civil penalties in the Commission 
controlled fund.  In addition, this fund would be used only for the purpose of making resti-
tution payments to investors.  Id.  However, such funds are, in many cases, used to cover 
the costs of state enforcement actions. 
 266 Proposed Amendment to H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2003) (offered by Rep. Baker).  
However, this section of H.R. 2179 requires the Commission to consult with SSRAs in or-
der to evaluate whether requirements established under this section of H.R. 2179 are 
adequate.  Id. 
 267 H.R. REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 2.  However, Representative Harris offered an 
amendment that would exempt such property from a judgment or order obtained by the 
Commission if its aggregate value did not exceed $125,000 and it was acquired more than 
1215 days prior to the Commission’s judgment or order.  See Proposed Amendment to 
H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2003) (offered by Rep. Harris).  Subsequently, Representative 
Harris offered an amendment to her amendment that would require that such property 
“constitutes or is derived from” proceeds obtained in violation of securities laws and after 
“payment of debts.”  Proposed Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substi-
tute to H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2003) (offered by Rep. Harris).  Representative Hensarling 
also offered an amendment that would limit waiver of state homestead exemptions sub-
ject to Commission judgments or orders to an aggregate value of $125,000 after the pay-
ment of debts.  Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2179, 
108th Cong. (2003) (offered by Rep. Hensarling). 
 268 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 30.  There is an ongoing dispute as to the 
ownership of the CRD.  This section states that such public disclosure programs are under 
the authority of the Commission, not the states.  NASAA, representing the SSRAs, also 
asserts ownership of the CRD.  NASAA, CRD & IARD, http://www.nasaa.org/ 
Industry___Regulatory_Resources/CRD___IARD/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2006). 
 269 H.R. REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 28. 
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IV. CANADIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
A. Overview 
Unlike the U.S., Canada does not, nor is it able to, use selec-
tive federal preemption in its securities regulatory framework.  
Canada does not have federal securities laws directly regulating 
securities markets throughout the country.  Moreover, it does not 
have any entity at the federal level whose sole mission is to en-
sure a uniform securities regulatory framework, require provin-
cial compliance with such a securities regulatory framework, and 
represent Canada in the global securities market.  Instead, Can-
ada’s securities regulatory framework consists of thirteen provin-
cial270 securities regulators and several SROs.  Each province has 
its own SRA, whose jurisdiction does not extend beyond its bor-
ders.271  Furthermore, although provincial securities laws are 
based on similar principles and objectives, the implementation of 
provincial securities laws, inevitably, is inconsistent.272 
The only organization charged with harmonizing the various 
provincial securities laws and their implementation is the Cana-
dian Securities Administrators (CSA).  This is problematic be-
cause, like NASAA, the CSA is a voluntary membership organi-
zation.  Accordingly, provincial compliance with CSA initiatives 
and policy recommendations is not statutorily mandated.  SRAs 
may choose to follow all, a portion, or none of CSA’s harmoniza-
tion recommendations. 
1. Canadian Securities Administrators  
The CSA was established in an attempt to bring some uni-
formity to a very fragmented regulatory framework.  Like its 
counterpart in the U.S.—NASAA—CSA members are the thir-
teen SRAs responsible for securities regulation in Canada’s prov-
inces and territories.  The CSA “is an informal body that func-
tions through meetings among its members. . . . [and does not 
 
 270 The term province in this article is meant to include Canada’s territories, the 
Yukon Territory, Northwest Territories, and Government of Nunavut. 
 271 The provincial securities regulators are: British Columbia Securities Commission 
(BCSC); Alberta Securities Commission (ASC); Saskatchewan Financial Services Com-
mission (SFSC); Manitoba Securities Commission (MSC); Ontario Securities Commission 
(OSC); Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec (CVMQ); New Brunswick Securi-
ties Administration Branch (NBSAB); Nova Scotia Securities Commission (NSSC); Prince 
Edward Island Securities Office (Office of the Attorney General) (PEISO); Securities 
Commission of Newfoundland and Labrador (SCNL); Registrar of Securities (Community 
Services), Government of the Yukon Territory (RSYT); Registrar of Securities (Depart-
ment of Justice), Government of the Northwest Territories (RSNT); and Registrar of Se-
curities (Department of Justice), Government of Nunavut (RSN).  WISE PERSONS’ 
COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 15. 
 272 Id. 
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have] binding authority over the securities regulators regarding 
policy development or enforcement activities, and is funded by 
each of its members on a voluntary basis.”273  Although created in 
1937, it was not until 2003 that the CSA created a Policy Coordi-
nation Committee (PCC) to “oversee the implementation of the 
CSA’s strategic plan274 and ongoing policy and rule develop-
ment.”275  Despite its limitations, the CSA has focused on harmo-
nizing the various securities laws of its members.  Some of its ini-
tiatives include: 
• National instruments and national policies—The development and 
implementation of 25 national instruments and 24 national policies 
covering key areas such as prospectus requirements, mutual funds 
regulation, rights offerings, take-over bids, registration issues and 
marketplace operations. 
• Mutual Reliance Review System (MRRS)276—A system in which 
one securities regulator is designated as the “principal regulator” 
on which other jurisdictions rely for analysis and review of filings 
and exemptive relief applications. 
• System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR)—
A web-based system that facilitates the electronic filing of securi-
ties information as required by provincial and territorial regulators 
and that provides public access to most disclosure documents filed 
by reporting issuers.  [SEDAR was established in 1997.] 
• System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI)—A web-based 
system that facilitates the filing and public viewing of reports on 
 
 273 Id. (emphasis added). 
 274 Canadian Securities Administrators, CSA Structure, http://www.csa-
acvm.ca/html_CSA/about.html#structure (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).  CSA’s strategic plan 
includes focusing on three areas to make Canada’s securities regulatory framework glob-
ally competitive: “[1.] innovative, responsive and flexible policy-making, focused on sig-
nificant threats to investors and market integrity; [2.] coordinated and streamlined ad-
ministrative and regulatory operations; and [3.] strategic, firm and fair enforcement.”  
CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES at 2, 4 (2005), available 
at http://www.csa-acvm.ca/pdfs/CSA_Strategic_Objectives_Feb2005_ENG.pdf. 
 275 WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 16.  PCC has six members appointed 
for two-year terms.  The first members are the chairs of the BSC, ASC, MSC, OSC, CVMQ 
and NSSC.  The CSA also elects its chair and vice-chair for two-year terms.  Id. 
 276 Id. at 17. 
[I]f an issuer wishes to issue securities by way of a prospectus in more than one 
jurisdiction in Canada, the MRRS allows the issuer to deal with one principal 
regulator (usually the regulator in the jurisdiction where the issuer’s head office 
is located) rather than with each of the regulators in the jurisdictions in which 
the securities are being offered.  Staff of the principal regulator provide com-
ments to the issuer on behalf of all of the commissions and make recommenda-
tions.  The issuer then receives a single decision document from the principal 
regulator. 
However, because participation in MRRS is voluntary, SRAs are free to withdraw from 
the system at any time and to deal directly with the issuer.  Accordingly, market partici-
pants must be prepared to deal with the individual SRA securities acts and regulations at 
all times and there is no reduction in filing fees nor in fees paid to attorneys, accountants, 
and investment bankers.  Id. 
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securities trading by insiders of reporting issuers. 
• National Registration Database (NRD)—A web-based system that 
permits dealers and advisers to file registration forms electroni-
cally.277 
• USL Project—A project with the goal of developing uniform securi-
ties legislation and uniform rules for adoption by each jurisdiction 
in Canada.278 
However, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that compli-
ance with CSA initiatives is entirely voluntary.  There are no 
federal or provincial securities laws that require SRAs to comply 
with CSA initiatives.  Like Canada’s securities regulatory 
framework, the level of participation in CSA initiatives is quite 
fragmented.  SEDAR, created in 1997, enjoys the highest level of 
participation by the thirteen SRAs.  All Canadian public compa-
nies and mutual funds are generally required to file their docu-
ments in SEDAR.  However, filing requirements differ based on 
which SRA has primary jurisdiction.279  SEDAR is operated by 
CDS Limited,280 which is regulated by the SRAs in Ontario and 
Quebec along with the Bank of Canada.  SEDAR maintains 
working and reporting relationships with Canada’s remaining 
SRAs. 281 
Moreover, Canada’s attempts at facilitating a uniform secu-
 
 277 The NRD was launched by the CSA and the Investment Dealers Association of 
Canada on March 31, 2003.  “Generally, an individual or company whose business is trad-
ing, underwriting or advising with respect to securities is required to register annually 
with one or more provincial securities regulators.”  Currently, all thirteen SRAs partici-
pate in NRD.  However, Quebec did not participate until January 2005.  See generally Na-
tional Registration Database Information, http://www.nrd-info.ca/home_index.jsp (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2006). 
 278 WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 16. 
 279 Id. at 35.  System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval, Background on 
SEDAR, http://www.sedar.com/sedar/background_on_sedar_en.htm.  See also National 
Instrument 13-101 System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) 
(2004) (Can.), available at http://ftp.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/scripts/ssc/files/nat-inst/13-
101niamendedasof-mar30-04.pdf. 
 280 System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval, Background on SEDAR, 
http://www.sedar.com/sedar/background_on_sedar_en.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).  
CDS Limited is owned by certain Canadian chartered banks, the Toronto Exchange, and 
the Investment Dealers Association of Canada.  Canadian Depository for Securities Lim-
ited, CDS Is …, http://www.cds.ca/cdshome.nsf/Main-E?OpenFrameSet (last visited Oct. 
26, 2006).  The IDA regulates its members based on authority delegated by Canada’s thir-
teen provinces and territories.   
 281 The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) is also actively 
involved in the Canadian regulatory structure.  OSFI supervises and regulates all Cana-
dian banks, federally incorporated or registered trust and loan companies, insurance 
companies, cooperative credit associations, fraternal benefit societies and pension plans.  
OSFI has offices in Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver.  See Treasury Board of 
Canada Secretariat, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada: DPR 
2000–2001 § 2.3 Role, Responsibilities, and Organization, http://www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/rma/dpr/00-01/OSFI00dpr/osfi0001dpr01_e.asp (follow “2.3 Role, Responsibilities, 
and Organization” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 14, 2006). 
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rities regulatory framework may be undermined at any time if an 
SRA decides that it is no longer in its best interest to participate 
in the CSA or to comply with CSA initiatives.  The CSA is also 
subject to an interruption of funding since contributions by its 
members are voluntary and are taken from the individual SRA 
budgets of its members. 
Like the U.S., Canada’s securities regulatory framework in-
cludes a fund to protect investors in the event that an investment 
dealer becomes insolvent.  The Canadian Investor Protection 
Fund (CIPF) is sponsored by the Investment Dealers Association, 
the Montreal Exchange, and the TSX Group of Companies.282  In-
vestment dealers are automatically enrolled in CIPF if they are 
members of one of CIPF’s sponsoring SROs.  The CSA and spon-
soring SROs supervise the activities of the CIPF with respect to 
the financial condition of its members.283  Although the applica-
ble SRO is responsible for conducting examinations of investment 
dealers operating within its jurisdiction, CIPF is authorized to 
conduct annual reviews and evaluations of each SRO’s examina-
tion activities to ensure compliance with CIPF Minimum Stan-
dards.  Eligible customer accounts are covered up to a maximum 
of $1 million for losses of securities, commodity and futures con-
tracts, segregated insurance funds and cash.284 
2. Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA) 
The IDA is Canada’s largest SRO and is authorized under 
the securities acts of all thirteen SRAs to regulate the activities 
of Canadian investment dealers.  The IDA also serves as an in-
dustry representative for its members.285  In its representative 
role, the IDA is responsible for ensuring that its members’ per-
spectives are considered in the formulation of national policies, 
 
 282 See Canadian Investor Protection Fund, Welcome to CIPF: About CIPF, 
http://www.cipf.ca/c_home.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2006). 
 283 CIPF activities include, among other things, establishing and reviewing national 
standards for capital adequacy and liquidity, financial reporting, accounting records, in-
ternal control, segregation of customers’ fully and partly paid securities, and insurance.  
CANADIAN INVESTOR PROTECTION FUND ANNUAL REPORT TO INVESTORS 2 (2003), available 
at http://www.cipf.ca/look_images/03reportsumm/cipf%20ar03.pdf. 
 284 Id.; Canadian Investor Protection Fund, Explore CIPF Coverage: Coverage Limits 
and Policies, http://www.cipf.ca/c_explore_coverage.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).  The 
maximum amount of customer loss due to an insolvent member firm is calculated by “tak-
ing into account both the delivery of any available securities, commodity and futures con-
tracts, segregated insurance funds and cash to which the customer is entitled and the dis-
tribution of any assets of the insolvent Member firm, less any amounts owed by the 
customer to the Member.”  Most investors will have two accounts eligible for coverage—a 
general account and a retirement account; each is eligible for $1 million coverage.  If there 
is more than one general account, they are combined into one account for coverage pur-
poses.  Retirement accounts are treated similarly.  See id. 
 285 Investment Dealers Association of Canada, About the IDA: Roles and Responsi-
bilities, http://www.ida.ca/About/Roles_en.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2006). 
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rules, practices and standards governing Canada’s  securities in-
dustry.286  The IDA is overseen or supervised by SRAs and the 
CIPF.287  SRAs delegate their supervisory responsibilities of the 
IDA to the CSA.  CSA performs its oversight responsibilities 
through its regulatory oversight group by reviewing and/or ap-
proving all rule changes proposed by the IDA and conducting pe-
riodic operational reviews.  As previously noted, CIPF reviews 
and evaluates the IDA’s regulatory activities to ensure compli-
ance with CIPF Minimum Standards.288 
The IDA conducts inspections and audits of its members289 
and requires all members to maintain risk adjusted capital 
greater than zero at all times; if risk adjusted capital falls below 
zero, the member must notify the IDA’s senior vice president of 
member regulation.290  However, similar to the NASD in the 
U.S., the IDA requires varying levels of risk adjusted capital 
above zero based on the type of business activities conducted by 
the member firm.291 
Similar to the NASD, the IDA mandates the education of its 
members’ employees, investor education, and cooperation with 
governments in developing financial legislation in the public in-
terest.292  The education of its members’ employees includes ad-
ministering exams for licensing to demonstrate proficiency re-
quirements to carry on certain types of securities activities.  IDA 
membership requires members (and their employees) to submit 
to IDA examinations and investigations to ensure compliance 
with its bylaws, regulations, rulings or policies; any applicable 
securities laws of provincial and territorial securities commis-
 
 286 Id. 
 287 Investment Dealers Association of Canada, Membership: Member Regulatory 
Process, http://www.ida.ca/Membership/MembRegProc_en.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).  
Many member firms are members of more than one SRO and, to prevent duplication, each 
firm selects one particular SRO for audit purposes.  See CANADIAN INVESTOR PROTECTION 
FUND ANNUAL REPORT TO INVESTORS, supra note 283, at 2.  The IDA has recently taken 
over the audit jurisdictions of The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the Canadian Ven-
ture Exchange.  Press Release, Investment Dealers Association of Canada & Canadian 
Venture Exchange, IDA and CDNX Announce Member Regulation Transfer to the IDA 
(Jan. 4, 2000), available at  http://www.ida.ca/Files/Media/MediaRelease/General/ 
MRG200001040_en.pdf. 
 288 Investment Dealers Association of Canada, Membership: Member Regulatory 
Process, supra note 287.  The CIPF review includes receipt of all Monthly Financial Re-
ports, Joint Regulatory Financial Questionnaires, and field examinations. 
 289 IDA’s inspections and audits include, but are not limited to, the financial status of 
the firm, an annual audit by external auditors, a sales and compliance review, and a 
credit practices review.  Id. 
 290 IDA By-Law 17.1 Minimum Capital, Conduct of Business and Insurance, in IDA 
RULE BOOK, http://www.ida.ca (follow “English” hyperlink; then follow “Rule Book” hyper-
link) [hereinafter IDA RULE BOOK]. 
 291 Id. 
 292 See, e.g., IDA Policy 6 Proficiency and Education, in IDA RULE BOOK, supra note 
290. 
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sions; and the bylaws, rules, regulations and policies of any 
SRO.293  Examinations and investigations may be initiated by 
complaints to the IDA, at the direction of the IDA’s board of di-
rectors, the request of an SRA, or by any information the IDA re-
ceives about a member’s and/or its employee’s conduct, business, 
or affairs.294  In addition, the IDA requires its members to dis-
close their financial condition and other information to their cli-
ents295 upon request.296 
IDA members, similar to their U.S. NASD counterparts, 
must participate in or become a member of an arbitration pro-
gram or organization to resolve disputes between its members 
and their clients.297  At the request of a client, IDA members 
must agree to submit the dispute to binding arbitration.298  
Moreover, the arbitration program is separate and independent 
of the securities industry.  In addition, each IDA member must 
participate in an ombudsperson service approved by the IDA’s 
board of directors.299  Upon request by a client, any dispute with 
an IDA member must be submitted to the ombudsperson ser-
vice.300  The ombudsperson service determines whether the dis-
pute is eligible for resolution using its services.  IDA members 
are bound by the rules, procedures and standards of the ombuds-
person service, but the ombudsperson’s recommendations are 
non-binding on each participant.301  Finally, all decisions made 
by the IDA in performing its regulatory functions may be re-
viewed, upon request, by any SRA with jurisdiction.302 
3. The Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada 
(MFDA) 
The MFDA303 was established as a not-for-profit federal cor-
 
 293 Id. at By-Law 19.1 Examinations and Investigations. 
 294 Id. at By-Law 19.2 Examinations and Investigations. 
 295 The term “client” is defined as any person “who has had a transaction with a 
Member within one year of the day on which a request for a statement of financial condi-
tion is made.”  Id. at IDA Regulation 1400.1 Disclosure to Clients of Members’ Financial 
Condition and Other Information. 
 296 The required disclosure of the member’s financial condition generally contains the 
member’s balance sheet and income statement; disclosure of notes to member’s financial 
statements (if applicable) is not required.  Id. 
 297 The arbitration program or organization must be approved by the IDA’s board of 
directors.  Id. at By-Law 37.1 Alternative Dispute Resolution. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. at By-Law 37.2 Alternative Dispute Resolution. 
 300 Id. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Id. at By-Law 33.1 Review by Securities Commissions. 
 303 The MFDA is governed by a board of directors currently with twelve members; the 
board members are from the public and the industry, such as the IFIC.  Mutual Fund 
Dealers Association of Canada [MFDA], Board of Directors, http://www.mfda.ca/about/ 
boardOfDirectors.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2006). 
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poration in June 1998 to act as an SRO for the distribution side 
of Canada’s mutual fund industry,304 i.e., it is responsible for 
regulating all sales of mutual funds by its members.  Specifically, 
MFDA’s regulatory activities include monitoring the operations, 
standards of practice, and business conduct of its members.305  In 
addition, the MFDA is not responsible for regulating the activi-
ties of Canadian mutual fund dealers who are already members 
of an SRO, e.g., IDA mutual fund dealers will continue to be 
regulated by the IDA.306  The MFDA is authorized to conduct dis-
ciplinary proceedings and to impose fines, suspensions or loss of 
registration.307  MFDA’s rules and bylaws are based on provincial 
and territorial statutory requirements, recommendations of the 
MFDA board of directors and industry committees,308 current in-
dustry practices, standards of similar SROs, and requirements of 
SRAs.309  However, MFDA membership is only required in five of 
Canada’s thirteen provinces: Ontario,310 British Columbia,311 
 
 304 MFDA, Our Role, http://www.mfda.ca/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2006).  Participants in 
Canada’s mutual fund industry include independent dealers, fund companies, banks/trust 
companies, and insurance companies.  See Profile of the Mutual Fund Dealer Industry, 
MFDA IN TRANSITION (MFDA, Toronto, Ontario), Aug. 1999, at 2. 
 305 MFDA, About the MFDA, http://www.mfda.ca/about/aboutMFDA.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 8, 2006).  The MFDA regulates the operations, standards of practice and busi-
ness conduct of its members.  Id.  It has 176 members and over 69,000 mutual fund sales-
persons.  Id.  It does not regulate mutual funds or mutual fund manufacturers.  Brochure 
from MFDA of Canada, Information for Investors, available at http://www.mfda.ca/ 
investors/brochure/MFDA_brochure.pdf.  The term “mutual fund manufacturers” is used 
to describe the entity that actually creates the mutual fund itself; this entity is separate 
from an entity involved exclusively in the distribution of mutual funds.  Provincial and 
territorial securities commissions regulate mutual funds and mutual fund manufacturers.  
Finally, Some Mutual Fund Investor Protectiom [sic], THE FUND OBSERVER (Canadian-
FundWatch.com), Nov. 2004, at 3, available at http://www.canadianfundwatch.com/ 
modules.pdf?noredirect=1&name=News&file=article&sid=88. 
 306 You were asking…, MFDA IN TRANSITION (MFDA, Toronto, Ontario), Dec. 1998, at 
8. 
 307 Id. 
 308 The five industry committees were comprised of volunteers from the mutual fund 
industry, the staff of the MFDA, the Investment Funds Institute of Canada (IFIC), the 
IDA, and the OSC.  MFDA Applies for Recognition as SRO, MFDA IN TRANSITION (MFDA, 
Toronto, Ontario), Jan. 2000, at 1. 
 309 The MFDA performs its regulatory responsibilities through five policy committees: 
(1) the Distribution Structures Committee; (2) the Sales Compliance and Practices Com-
mittee; (3) the Proficiency and Continuing Education Committee; (4) the Capital, Insur-
ance and Investor Protection Fund Committee; and (5) the Books, Records, and Admini-
stration Committee.  Id.   
 310 Ontario recognized the MFDA as an SRO in February, 2001.  MFDA, SRO Recog-
nition, http://www.mfda.ca/about/recognition.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).  The OSC 
did not initiate compliance examinations of mutual fund dealers until 1996.  See Mutual 
Fund Dealer Compliance Issues: a Regulatory Perspective, MFDA IN TRANSITION (MFDA, 
Toronto, Ontario), Apr. 1999, at 2; Canada Department of Finance, Canada’s Securities 
Industry at 9, http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2005/cansec05_e.html (follow “Adobe Acrobat Ver-
sion” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Canada Dep’t of Fin.]. 
 311 British Columbia recognized the MFDA as an SRO in February, 2001.  Canada 
Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 9; MFDA, SRO Recognition, supra note 309. 
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Saskatchewan,312 Alberta,313 and Nova Scotia.314 
4. Market Regulation Services, Inc. (RS) 
RS, a joint initiative of the TSX Group315 and the IDA, is the 
independent regulation services provider for Canadian equity 
markets.316  However, it is only recognized in five of Canada’s 
thirteen provinces: Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, Manitoba, and Brit-
ish Columbia.  RS monitors real-time trading operations and 
market-related activities of market participants in Canadian eq-
uity markets only in provinces in which SRAs have recognized it 
as an SRO.  Accordingly, RS acts as an SRO only for the follow-
ing trading systems and exchanges: TSX, TSX Venture Exchange 
(TSX V), Bloomberg Tradebook Canada Company (Bloomberg), 
Canadian Trading and Quotation System (CNQ), Liquidnet Can-
ada Inc. (Liquidnet), and Market Securities, Inc. (BlockBook).317 
As an SRO, RS implements and administers Canada’s Uni-
versal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR).  UMIR and its companion 
policies were designed to facilitate universal rules for regulating 
equities trading on exchanges.318  They were written by securities 
 
 312 Saskatchewan recognized the MFDA as an SRO on February 13, 2001.  Id. 
 313 Alberta recognized the MFDA as an SRO on April 10, 2001.  Id. 
 314 Canada Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 9.  Nova Scotia recognized the MFDA as 
an SRO in November, 2001.  Id.; MFDA,  SRO Recognition, supra note 309. 
 315 The TSX Group includes the TSX and the TSX V.  The TSX and TSX V out-
sourced its compliance responsibilities when the TSX demutualized to compete with ATSs 
entering the Canadian securities markets.  Market Regulation Services Inc., Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://www.rs.ca (follow “About RS” hyperlink; then follow “Frequently 
Asked Questions” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 316 Id.  RS was formed on March 1, 2002, by combining the previous in-house surveil-
lance, trade desk compliance, investigation and enforcement functions of the TSX and the 
TSX V.  Market Regulation Services Inc., Our History, http://www.rs.ca (follow “About 
RS” hyperlink; then follow “Our History” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).  RS rec-
ognizes the importance of the global securities market and is a member of the Intermar-
ket Surveillance Group (ISG).  ISG is an international committee of representatives from 
thirty-one exchanges around the world.  Market Regulation Services Inc., Special Initia-
tives, http://www.rs.ca (follow “About RS” hyperlink; then follow “Special Initiatives” hy-
perlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).  See also Market Regulation Services Inc., Recogni-
tion Orders, http://www.rs.ca (follow “Market Policy” hyperlink; then follow “Recognition 
Orders” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
 317 Market Regulation Services Inc., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 315.  
TSX is Canada’s senior equities market and consists of a broad cross-section of Canadian 
issuers.  TSX V is Canada’s public venture equity market.  CNQ is Canada’s small cap 
market.  Bloomberg Tradebook is an ATS that facilitates Canadian institution investors’ 
trading in equity and fixed income securities domestically and internationally.  Liquidnet 
Canada Inc. allows Canadian institutional investors to trade U.S. stocks directly and 
anonymously with other U.S. and European institutional investors; it bypasses both ex-
changes and brokers.  BlockBook is a block trading network for equities traded in the Ca-
nadian securities markets.  It also provides anonymous size and value while monitoring 
trading on the network.  Market Regulation Services Inc., The Marketplaces We Regulate, 
http://www.rs.ca (follow “About RS” hyperlink; then follow “The Marketplaces We Regu-
late” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 318 Prior to the creation of RS, each exchange regulated equities trading using its own 
set of trading rules.  Generally, each exchange’s trading rules were different.  RS uses 
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industry representatives, legal and compliance officers, ex-
changes, trade association representatives, and provincial 
SRAs.319 
RS is also charged with market surveillance, with a view to-
ward preventing violations of applicable securities laws and SRO 
rules and regulations.  This includes the authority to issue trad-
ing halts.320  RS may initiate preliminary investigations based on 
its market surveillance activities.  If, during a preliminary inves-
tigation, RS determines that wrongful conduct has been commit-
ted by an entity over which it has no jurisdiction, it may forward 
information from its preliminary investigation to the appropriate 
provincial SRA.  If RS does have jurisdiction over the prospective 
wrongdoer, the matter is referred to its Investigations & En-
forcement staff for possible enforcement321 action.322  If RS de-
termines that violations have occurred that warrant disciplinary 
action, the action may be settled or referred to a hearing panel 
for a contested hearing.323  A Disciplinary Notice is issued and 
published if the hearing panel determines that a violation has oc-
curred.324  Final RS decisions may be appealed to the appropriate 
 
UMIR to regulate various trading practices including manipulative or deceptive methods 
of trading, short selling, front running, best execution obligations, order entry, and order 
exposure.  UMIR “[1] applies equally to each class of marketplace participants[; 2]  cannot 
be circumvented by directing trading activity to another marketplace[; 3] applies to trad-
ing of all forms of listed or quoted securities[; and 4] incorporates exceptions to the rules 
to accommodate the workings of an individual marketplace or ATS.”  Market Regulation 
Services Inc., Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR), http://www.rs.ca (follow “Market 
Policy” hyperlink; then follow “Universal Market Integrity Rules” hyperlink) (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2006). 
 319 UMIR is updated by its Rules Advisory Committee comprised of representatives 
from the following entities: Barristers and Solicitors, Billy de Lavery; National Bank Fi-
nancial; RBC Dominion Securities, Inc.; RS; BMO Nesbitt Burns, Inc.; Investors Groups; 
TSX Group Inc.; Bloomberg Tradebook Canada Company; Canaccord Capital; TD Securi-
ties Inc.; and CNQ.  Market Regulation Services Inc., Board & Advisory Committees, 
http://www.rs.ca (follow “About RS” hyperlink; then follow “Board & Advisory Commit-
tees” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 320 Generally trading halts are issued “in anticipation of a material news announce-
ment by [a particular] company.”  Trading halts may also be initiated by a listed company 
or SRA.  Market Regulation Services Inc., Timely Disclosure, http://www.rs.ca/ (follow 
“Surveillance” hyperlink; then follow “Timely Disclosure” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 
2006). 
 321 Enforcement is the process used by RS to determine whether to proceed with dis-
ciplinary action against regulated persons.  Market Regulation Services Inc., Our Role, 
http://www.rs.ca/ (follow “Enforcement” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 322 Market Regulation Services Inc., Trading Analysis, http://www.rs.ca/ (follow “Sur-
veillance” hyperlink; then follow “Trading Analysis” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 
2006). 
 323 Hearing panels consist of at least one member in good standing of Canada’s na-
tional bar association (the Law Society), two members of the securities industry, and a 
current or former director, officer, or employee of an investment dealer or trading organi-
zation.  Market Regulation Services Inc., Contested Hearing Decisions, http://www.rs.ca 
(follow “Enforcement” hyperlink; then follow “Contested Hearing Decisions” hyperlink) 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 324 The hearing panel’s decision is also made public and such decisions may be re-
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SRA.325 
SRAs using RS’s services oversee its self-regulatory activi-
ties.  While some SRAs may perform adequate oversight, others 
may not have the resources and/or political will to conduct ade-
quate oversight of RS.326 
5. The Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) 
Canada’s fragmented regulatory framework limits the effi-
cacy of the CPAB, which was established in July 2002 to oversee 
accounting firms auditing Canadian issuers.327  CSA Rule 52-108 
requires accounting firms that conduct audits of reporting issuers 
to register with the CPAB.328  However, compliance with CSA 
rules is strictly voluntary.  Accordingly, the requirement to regis-
ter with the CPAB in accordance with CSA Rule 52-108 does not 
apply to accounting firms in Alberta, British Columbia, and 
Manitoba.329  In addition, any provincial regulator or regulatory 
authority may grant an exemption to the requirements of CSA 
Rule 52-108.330  Registered firms are subject to the CPAB’s in-
spection, investigation, and disciplinary procedures.331  Lastly, 
CPAB also has rulemaking authority which is subject to SRA re-
view prior to implementation.332 
6. Canadian Securities Industry Reorganizes in 1999 to 
Enhance Global Competitiveness 
The Canadian securities markets were reorganized in late 
1999 in order to become more competitive in the global securities 
market.  Canada’s major exchanges agreed to restructure along 
 
viewed on RS’s website.  Id. 
 325 Id. 
 326   Market Regulation Services Inc., About RS, http://www.rs.ca (follow “About RS” 
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).  Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Over-
sight of Market Regulations Inc. (Feb. 15, 2002), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/ 
MarketRegulation/SRO/rs/mou/smou-rs_25-OSCB-896.pdf.  See also WISE PERSONS’ 
COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 25. 
 327 Canadian Public Accountability Board [CPAB], Background, http:www.cpab-
ccrc.ca/ (follow “Who We Are” hyperlink; then follow “Background” hyperlink) (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2006).  The CPAB is organized as a non-profit corporation with an eleven-
member board of directors and two member categories—the Council of Governors and the 
Industry Members.  CPAB, Structure, http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca/ (follow “Who We Are” hy-
perlink; then follow “Structure” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 328 CPAB, Background, supra note 327. 
 329 See National Instrument 52-108 Auditor Oversight § 1.2(2) (2004) (Can.), avail-
able at http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca/412b56fd5a8ab.pdf. 
 330 Id. § 4.1. 
 331 Id. §§ 1.1, 3.3(1). 
 332 CPAB Article 11 Participating Audit Firms § 11.3 Rules, in BY-LAW NO.1—
AMENDED AND RESTATED, http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca (follow “By-Laws” hyperlink; then fol-
low “CPAB By-Law No. 1” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
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lines of market specialization.333   The reorganization was: 
intended to enhance the efficiency of the trading facilities and services 
of [Canadian] Exchanges, create new opportunities for the Canadian 
market-place and improve the competitive position of the Canadian 
securities industry in the context of the globalization of the securi-
ties . . . markets and technological developments . . . [and] to eliminate 
fragmentation of the Canadian market for exchange-traded securi-
ties . . . , avoid duplication of services and leverage the strengths of 
each Exchange through specialization.334 
After the 1999 reorganization, the TSE (now the TSX and 
part of the TSX Group) became the only exchange for trading 
senior equities.  The CDN, which became the CDNX,335 was 
solely responsible for trading junior equities, and was merged 
into the TSX Group in 2001.  It was then renamed the TSX Ven-
ture Exchange (TSX V).  In 2002, the TSX demutualized and be-
came the first exchange in North America whose shares were 
publicly traded.336  The ME took over all Canadian trading in de-
rivatives.337  The Table below highlights the changes brought 
about as a result of the reorganization338: 
 
 
 333 At that time, Canada’s major exchanges included the Alberta Stock Exchange 
(ASE), the Montreal Exchange (ME), the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), the Canadian 
Venture Exchange (CDNX), and the Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE).  Canada Dep’t of 
Fin., supra note 310, at 1.  
 334 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Alberta Stock Exchange, the Montreal 
Exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange (both for itself and on behalf of the Canadian 
Dealing Network Inc.) and Vancouver Stock Exchange §§ 1.2.–1.3. (Mar. 15, 1999), avail-
able at http://www.m-x.ca/f_publications_en/restructuring.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum 
of Agreement]. 
 335 CDNX was created through a merger of the VSE (Vancouver) and ASE (Alberta), 
and later Winnipeg stock exchanges.  Canada Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 1; see also 
Market Regulation Services Inc., The Marketplaces We Regulate, supra note 317. 
 336 Canada Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 5. 
 337 Id. at 1. 
 338 Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 334. 
391- 500 NICHOLS.DOC 5/16/2007 1:51:13 AM 
456 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:391 
Exchange Activities After 1999 Activities Be-fore 1999 
Montreal Ex-
change (ME) 
All exchange-traded derivative prod-
ucts, comprising (without limitation) 
any type of option and futures con-
tracts, including options and futures 
on index participation units. 
Derivatives and 
equities, includ-
ing equities inter-
listed with the 
TSX. 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) 
(renamed TSX) 
All senior securities, other than ex-
change-traded derivatives products 
including (without limitation) stocks, 
rights, convertible debentures, trust 
and limited partnership units, war-
rants, bonds and mutual fund securi-
ties and other products commonly 
traded on the cash market, including 
index participation units.  Senior se-
curities means the securities of all is-
suers that qualify for listing on the 
TSX.  
Equities, junior 
and senior, in-
cluding equities 
inter-listed with 
ME. 
Alberta Stock 
Exchange (ASE) 
and the Vancou-
ver Stock Ex-
change (VSE) 
All junior securities, other than ex-
change-traded derivatives products, 
defined as the securities of all other 
issuers, including (without limitation) 
stocks, rights, convertible debentures, 
trust and limited partnership units, 
warrants, bonds and mutual fund se-
curities and other products commonly 
traded on the cash market, including 
junior securities under participation 
units.  For greater clarity, current ME 
issuers that do not qualify for transfer 
to the TSX will be transferred to the 
ASE/VSE (and not Canadian Dealing 
Network, Inc. (CDN)). 
Equities, junior 
and senior, some 
inter-listing be-
tween the VSE 
and the ASE. 
Transfers TSX will transfer CDN to the VSE 
and the ASE; TSX will transfer OM 
(the Nordic Exchange) to the ME; TSX 
will transfer to ME the shares held by 
TSX in Canadian Derivatives Clear-
ing Corporation; ME will transfer to 
TSX the shares held by ME in the 
Canadian Depository for Securities 
Ltd. 
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7. Organization of the Canadian Securities Industry After 
1999 
Currently, Canada’s major exchanges are TSX in the prov-
ince of Ontario, and ME (listing primarily derivatives) in the 
province of Quebec.  TSX, although ranked among the top seven 
exchanges in the world, measured by market capitalization of 
domestic issuers, still remains significantly below those ex-
changes ranked above it.339  However, many Canadian businesses 
list on U.S. securities markets.340 
Interlistings generally raise the profile of issuers in the global market, 
and trading volumes for these issuers’ shares often increase across all 
markets. . . . To capture a greater proportion of trading in securities of 
issuers that are listed on other markets, particularly those in the U.S., 
the TSX Group recently extended trading in U.S. dollars to 16 securi-
ties listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, with additional securities 
to be added in the future.    [Moreover, t]o address changes brought on 
by technology and globalization, the [Canadian] securities industry 
has been taking steps to improve foreign market access for Canadian 
issuers and investors.  A number of Canadian securities firms, par-
ticularly those owned by banks, are building a global platform through 
the acquisition of foreign businesses operating in niche markets such 
as discount brokerages, wealth management and investment bank-
ing.341 
To increase global competitiveness, Canada’s federal gov-
ernment “announced a coordinated national enforcement ap-
proach to strengthen the investigation and prosecution of serious 
corporate fraud and market illegality” in 2003.342  In support of 
this initiative, the provinces of Ontario and Quebec enhanced en-
forcement in their securities regulatory frameworks.  Each prov-
ince passed legislation that increased penalties and expanded the 
investigative powers of their respective SRAs.  This coordinated 
national enforcement approach was designed to develop “a pro-
posed regime that will give investors in the secondary market a 
simpler procedure to sue companies, directors, officers, under-
writers and experts that make misleading or untrue statements, 
or fail to give full and timely information.”343 
 
 339 Market capitalization of domestic companies at the end of 2003 for the top ex-
changes in the global securities market are, in billions of U.S. dollars: (1) NYSE $11,329; 
(2) Tokyo Stock Exchange $2,953; (3) The NASDAQ Stock Market $2,844; (4) London 
Stock Exchange $2,460; (5) Euronext $2,076; (6) Deutsche Börse (German Exchange) 
$1,079; and (7) TSX Group $889.  The ME is also a member of the GLOBEX Alliance 
(GLOBEX).  GLOBEX is an international electronic trading network for derivatives prod-
ucts.  The ME’s membership in GLOBEX “provides Canadian derivatives investors access 
to international markets.”  Id. at 6–7. 
 340 In 2003, 184 Canadian issuers were interlisted on U.S. exchanges.  Id. at 8. 
 341 Id. 
 342 Id. at 9. 
 343 Id. 
391- 500 NICHOLS.DOC 5/16/2007 1:51:13 AM 
458 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:391 
Other initiatives designed to strengthen Canada’s securities 
regulatory framework include the IDA’s new rules to promote the 
independence of research analysts employed by securities 
firms.344  In addition, the Canadian securities regulatory frame-
work includes the Canadian Depository for Securities Limited 
(CDS), which acts as a securities depository, clearing, and set-
tlement mechanism for Canada’s securities markets.345  CDS also 
facilitates access to the global securities market; it settles cross-
border transactions with the U.S. securities markets and has 
custodial relationships with, among others, the Depository Trust 
Company in the U.S., Japan Securities Settlement & Custody, 
Inc., and Euroclear France.346  CDS is regulated by the SRAs in 
Ontario and Quebec along with the Bank of Canada; CDS also 
works with the CSA and the Office of the Superintendent of Fi-
nancial Institutions.  For example, CDS operates SEDAR on be-
half of the CSA.347 
8. The Securities Regulatory Framework in Quebec 
a. Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec 
(CVMQ)/Autorite des marches financiers (AMF) 
On February 1, 2004, Quebec reorganized its securities regu-
latory framework.  The purpose of the reorganization was to 
separate the administrative functions from the quasi-tribunal 
functions of Quebec’s existing SRA.348  Market participants in 
Quebec’s securities industry “complained that the hearings of 
commissions do not have the appearance of fairness because, 
from the outside, the commissioners seem to be passing judgment 
on their own decisions.”349  The AMF, the entity emerging after 
the combination, is authorized to regulate the securities markets 
in Quebec by, among other activities, ensuring that issuers and 
other financial sector market participants meet their obligations, 
protecting investors, regulating the information that issuers 
must disclose to investors, and supervising the regulation of se-
 
 344 The CSA has proposed corporate governance guidelines and related disclosure re-
quirements designed to replace TSX corporate governance guidelines.  Id. at 9–10. 
 345 The Canadian Depository for Securities Limited Homepage, http://www.cds.ca/ 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 346 Id. 
 347 Id.  See also The System for Electronic Documents Analysis and Retrieval Home-
page, http://www.sedar.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 348 Quebec’s existing SRA was combined with certain other financial sectors in Que-
bec to form a new regulator for Quebec’s financial sector, the Autorité des marchés finan-
ciers (AMF).  Autorité des marchés financiers [AMF], History, http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/ 
accueil.en.html (follow “About Us” hyperlink; then follow “History” hyperlink) (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2006). 
 349 Jean-Marie Gagnon, Do We Need a National Regulator?: No: A Single Market Um-
pire for the Whole Country Would Be More Easily “Captured” by Big Business, Argues La-
val University Professor, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 28, 2004, at A13. 
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curities professionals.350 
Quebec’s primary SRO is the Bourse de Montréal (the Mont-
real Exchange, or ME), which regulates derivative trading351 and 
investment dealers in Quebec; it offers clearing services through 
its wholly-owned corporation, Canadian Derivatives Clearing 
Corporation (CDCC).352  It also provides educational services 
about the derivatives market to both institutional and retail in-
vestors through its Derivatives Institute.353  Members of the ME 
approved demutualization on September 25, 2000, and the ME 
became a for-profit company.354  It also closed its trading floor 
and began using only an electronic trading platform, SAM, to 
trade derivatives.355 
(1) Quebec’s Approval of NASDAQ Canada Dimin-
ishes Canada’s Efforts to Compete in the Global 
Securities Market 
Canada’s inability to use selective federal preemption in its 
regulatory framework allowed Quebec to disrupt its attempt to 
reorganize its securities market to compete in the global securi-
ties market.  On November 21, 2000, Quebec began trading eq-
uity securities by allowing the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. 
(NASDAQ U.S.) to establish NASDAQ Canada.356 NASDAQ Can-
ada provides direct access to all NASDAQ U.S. listed securities, 
which means that equity trading is no longer confined to the 
province of Ontario.  Moreover, NASDAQ Canada represents a de 
 
 350 AMF, Industry Sectors, http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/accueil.en.html (follow “About 
Us” hyperlink; then follow “Industry Sectors” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 351 As part of the 1999 reorganization of Canada’s securities markets, ME, on October 
1, 2001, ceased trading junior equity listings.  See Montreal Exchange [ME], Our Mission, 
http://www.m-x.ca/ (follow “About Us—Mission” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006); 
Canada Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 5; ME, Historical Highlights, http://www.m-x.ca/ 
(follow “About Us—Historical highlights” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 352 ME, Profile Overview, http://www.m-x.ca/profil_bref_en.php (last visited Sept. 16, 
2006). The CDCC is the issuer, clearinghouse and guarantor of derivative contracts 
traded on the ME.  It also provides clearing services to other exchanges and partners.  
CDCC, a for-profit company, has provided these services since 1975.  ME, THREE-MONTH 
CANADIAN BANKERS’ ACCEPTANCE FUTURES (2001), available at http://www.m-
x.ca/f_publications_en/bax_en.pdf. 
 353 Financial Advisors Association of Canada, The Derivatives Institute, 
http://www.advocis.ca/content/education/CE-prog/CE-derivatives.html (last visited Sept. 
16, 2006).  The Derivatives Institute was established by the ME in April 2001 “to under-
stand and use derivative instruments.”  ME, About Us,  http://www.d-
x.ca/a_propos_institut_en.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2006); see also RBC Action Direct 
Inc., Seminars, http://www.actiondirect.com/RBC:RCq-SI71A8YAAlIkFOU/derivatives-
institute.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006). 
 354 ME, Historical Highlights, http://www.m-x.ca/qui_histo_en.php. 
 355 SAM (Montreal Automated System) is the ME’s electronic trading platform.  Id.  
 356 Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ Concludes Record Share and Dollar Volume 
Year Composite Index Finishes Lower (Sept. 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2001/ne_section01_022.html; see also Canada 
Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 6. 
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facto reorganization of Canada’s securities markets by Quebec 
and the U.S.  Recently, Canada’s attempts to reorganize its secu-
rities markets to compete in the global securities market were 
further diminished when British Columbia recognized NASDAQ 
Canada, again establishing equity trading within its borders. 
Quebec amended its securities act to establish NASDAQ 
Canada.357  The amendment recognized NASDAQ Canada as an 
SRO for purposes of carrying on business in Quebec; it also rec-
ognized NASDAQ Canada’s parent, NASDAQ U.S., as an SRO in 
Quebec.  This amendment effectively injected the U.S. securities 
regulatory framework into the Canadian securities regulatory 
framework because “[t]he rules of NASDAQ Canada are those of 
NASDAQ [U.S.], and are overseen by the [U.S.] Securities and 
Exchange Commission . . . . NASDAQ [U.S.] is a subsidiary of the 
NASD, a registered [SRO] in the [U.S.]” securities regulatory 
framework.358  
NASDAQ Canada began with ten securities firms participat-
ing in trading securities listed on NASDAQ U.S. (including Ca-
nadian companies) from Montreal, Quebec.  Moreover, participat-
ing investment dealers are the largest investment dealers in 
Canada’s securities industry.359  Participating investment dealers 
are able to establish affiliated, wholly-owned Delaware corpora-
tions whereby the affiliate operates in Montreal in the same 
building as its parent company and uses NASDAQ U.S. worksta-
tions.360  All affiliates are regulated under U.S. securities laws, 
which require registration with the Commission and membership 
in the NASD of affiliates as well as some of their personnel.  The 
affiliate is structured as an order entry firm and, under Quebec 
law, can have only one institutional client, its parent company.361  
Moreover, the affiliate must have dually-engaged employees, i.e., 
 
 357 New Regulatory Structure for the Quebec Financial Sector: Recent Developments—
A Supplement to the June 2002 Newsletter, INFO. (Ogilvy Renault, Quebec), Dec. 2002, at 
2, available at http://www.ogilvyrenault.com/WebControls/GetResource.aspx?id=2067.  
Quebec also offered NASDAQ U.S. an incentive package, which included a ten year tax 
holiday.  Bertrand Marotte, Nasdaq Nixes Plans for Separate Canadian Stock Exchange, 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Sept. 20, 2003, at B5. 
 358 Simon Romano, Notice and Request for Comments: NASDAQ Canada, Inc. Pro-
posal for Improved Access for B.C. Dealers, at 2 (July 24, 2004) (on file with author). 
 359 The participating investment dealers are BMO Nesbitt Burns, Canaccord, Capital 
Casgrain & Company, CIBC WorldMarkets Corp., Desjardins, NBC International Inc. 
(USA), Pictet Overseas, Scotia Capital Markets, TD Securities Inc., Yorkton Capital 
(USA).  Press Release, NASDAQ, Helen Kearns Named President of NASDAQ Canada 
(May 1, 2001), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2001/ 
ne_section01_143.html. 
 360 See id.  The NASDAQ Workstation II is a computerized trading tool that provides 
access to all NASDAQ markets for Market Makers (firms that maintain firm bid and offer 
prices in a given security by standing ready to buy or sell at publicly-quoted prices), bro-
kers, and institutions.  
 361 Romano, supra note 358, at 3. 
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employees who work at the affiliate and the parent company si-
multaneously.362  This arrangement effectively allows direct 
regulation under the U.S. securities regulatory framework and 
indirect regulation by Quebec’s securities regulatory framework.  
Quebec regulates the same employees in connection with their 
interactions with Canadian investors (institutional and retail) 
and securities markets.363 
NASDAQ Canada Broker-Dealer Model 
 
 
 
 
         
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 362 Id. at 10. 
 363 Investment dealers and their NASD affiliates must: (1) remain affiliated with a 
Quebec dealer that is an IDA member in good standing; (2) undertake to the NASD and 
the Commission that: (i) its NASD affiliate would carry on its business in compliance with 
applicable NASD requirements; (ii) its NASD affiliate would not have any clients in Que-
bec (other than its Quebec parent) and would only engage in U.S. transactions; (iii) all 
trading officers and employees of the NASD affiliate would be dually employed by both 
the parent investment dealer and its NASD affiliate; and (iv) its NASD affiliate would 
consent to jurisdiction in any action or proceeding before any court or securities regula-
tory authority in Quebec, and agree to provide access to and inspection rights to the 
Commission.  Id. at 11. 
NASD 
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Canadian In-
vestment 
Dealer (Order 
Entry Firm) 
Canadian  
Investment  
Dealer (CID) 
Québec Securities 
Commission 
(AMF/CVMQ) 
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Employees 
NASD Regulation, Inc.
Conditions 
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Only—CID 
Trades in US 
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Must Disclose To In-
vestors That NASD 
Affiliate is Regulated 
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This arrangement benefits Canadian investment dealers  
[b]y enabling Canadian dealers to set up U.S. NASD member affiliates 
on their own premises in Canada, staff them with Canadian employ-
ees, utilize existing infrastructure, and supervise them via their exist-
ing Canadian compliance operations, etc., the costs of accessing NAS-
DAQ US [sic] should be reduced from those that would apply to either 
foreign affiliate operations or third party jitney operations.364 
At its inception, NASDAQ Canada would be established in 
three phases.  Phase one included opening the NASDAQ Canada 
office in Montreal, Quebec; launching a NASDAQ Canada web-
site; creating a NASDAQ Canada Index to track the market per-
formance of Canadian issuers listed on NASDAQ U.S.; and trad-
ing of all NASDAQ-listed securities in U.S. dollars only.  Phases 
two and three were expected to follow depending on the success 
of phase one.  Phase two included participation by non-NASD 
member firms in Canada, trading in both U.S. and Canadian dol-
lars, regulatory oversight by NASD and Quebec’s SRA, and list-
ing Canadian companies exclusively on NASDAQ Canada.  Phase 
three would include linking NASDAQ Canada with NASDAQ Ja-
pan and NASDAQ Europe.  According to Frank G. Zarb, the CEO 
of NASDAQ U.S. in 2000, “Our ultimate goal is linking 
[NASDAQ] Canada to a global trading platform that will include 
[NASDAQ] markets in Asia and Europe.”365 
On September 20, 2003, NASDAQ abandoned its plans to 
start a new exchange in Canada or to trade Canadian stocks in 
Canadian dollars, effectively eliminating the possibility of a 
stand-alone Canadian securities market using NASDAQ U.S.’s 
trading platform.  NASDAQ U.S.’s global expansion strategy was 
adversely impacted by a downturn in technology stocks and the 
global economy.  According to former NASDAQ Canada president 
Helen Kearns, “[M]arket conditions have really dictated how 
quickly [NASDAQ] Canada could roll out and it’s been a difficult 
market.”366  These events, among others, resulted in losses for 
NASDAQ U.S. and the closing of other global ventures including 
NASDAQ Japan and Europe.367 
Phase one of NASDAQ Canada continues to operate in the 
provinces of Quebec and British Columbia and is NASDAQ U.S.’s 
 
 364 Id. at 6.  Jitney operations include such services as execution, clearing, and set-
tlement of trades performed by U.S. broker-dealers on behalf of Canadian investment 
dealers. 
 365 Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ Announces the Launch of NASDAQ Canada 
(Nov. 21, 2000) (on file with author). 
 366 Bertrand Marotte, Canadian Nasdaq on Hold, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Oct. 28, 
2002, at B1; see also Marotte, supra note 357, at B5. 
 367 Marotte, Canadian Nasdaq on Hold, supra note 366; Nasdaq Europe to Close, 
BBC NEWS, June 26, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3024558.stm. 
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only successful global venture using this business model.  NAS-
DAQ Canada continues to seek expansion to other Canadian 
provinces including Ontario.368 
9.  The Ontario Securities Commission Regulates Canada’s 
Premier Securities Markets 
The OSC369 administers and enforces securities laws370 in the 
province of Ontario.  Canada’s premier securities markets are 
housed within Ontario’s borders.  It is managed by a board of di-
rectors comprised of members of the OSC or commissioners.371 
Commissioners are appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council for varying terms of five years or less, but may be reap-
pointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.372  The OSC must 
have at least nine but not more than fourteen commissioners, 
who may serve on a part-time basis.373  Full-time commissioners 
are generally full-time executive managers of the OSC and fill 
the positions of Chair, CEO, and Vice-Chair.  The remaining 
commissioners are part-time and conduct their responsibilities in 
a non-executive capacity.  A quorum requires only two commis-
sioners.374  All commissioners have statutory responsibility for 
the administration of Ontario’s Securities Act.  All bylaws passed 
by the OSC must be approved by Ontario’s Minister of Fi-
nance.375 
OSC commissioners meet to address regulatory policy mat-
ters every two weeks, and at least quarterly to conduct non-
regulatory matters.  The commissioners conduct non-regulatory 
 
 368 Marotte, supra note 357, at B5. 
 369 In 1994, Ontario’s Securities Act was amended to change the OSC’s status from 
government agency to a Crown Corporation responsible to the Ontario Legislature 
through the Minister of Finance.  In 1997, the OSC was converted to a self-funded Crown 
Corporation.  Ontario Securities Commission [OSC], Governance & Accountability  
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ga_index.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).  Ac-
cording to the OSC, these changes promoted “greater autonomy and independence from 
the government.”  FIVE YEAR REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 61. 
 370 The OSC is statutorily mandated to administer Ontario’s Securities Act and its 
Commodity Futures Act in order “to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper 
or fraudulent practices and to foster fair and efficient capital markets and confidence in 
their integrity.”  Memorandum of Understanding Between the Minister of Finance of On-
tario and the OSC § 1.1.4.A.3 (May 26, 2003), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/ (fol-
low “Policy & Regulation” hyperlink; then follow “Memoranda of Understanding” hyper-
link; then follow June 6, 2003 “Memorandum of Understanding” hyperlink) [hereinafter 
MOU Minister of Finance & OSC]. 
 371 OSC, The Commission, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ga_the_ 
commission.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2006). 
 372 Id. 
 373 Id. 
 374 Id.; Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, Ch. S.5 s. 3(11) (2006) (Can.). 
 375 Ontario Securities Act § 143.3(3) requires the Minister to approve, reject or return 
the bylaw to the OSC for further consideration within sixty days of delivery.  R.S.O. 1990, 
Ch. S.5 s. 143.3(3). 
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matters through meetings of its three standing committees: Au-
dit and Finance, Corporate Governance and Nominating, and 
Compensation.376  All committee members are part-time, non-
executive commissioners;377 however, the OSC chairman is an ex 
officio, non-voting member of the Governance and Nominating 
Committee.378 
OSC regulatory activities include making policy, conducting 
investigations, and sitting as an administrative tribunal.379  The 
OSC obtained rulemaking authority as recently as 1995.380  All 
OSC rules must be submitted to the Ontario Minister of Finance 
for review and approval.381  The rule becomes effective if the Min-
ister of Finance does not reject or return the rule. 
Although non-binding, the OSC is statutorily authorized to 
make policy.  Like the OSC’s rulemaking process, proposed poli-
cies must be published for public comment.382  Although OSC 
policies may not be prohibitive or mandatory, they inform market 
participants about, among other topics, the manner in which the 
OSC may exercise its discretionary authority, the interpretation 
of Ontario securities law, and OSC practices for conducting its 
duties under the Ontario Securities Act. 
The OSC regulates marketplaces in Ontario, including ex-
changes, alternative trading systems (ATSs), quotation and trade 
reporting systems, and stock exchanges, by specifying the terms 
 
 376 OSC, The Commission, supra note 371. 
 377 Id.  Part-time members meet under the leadership of the Lead Director, who pre-
sides as chair over all meetings of part-time members charged with administering the in-
frastructure of the OSC.  The Lead Director may make recommendations but has no deci-
sion-making authority.  OSC, Lead Director of the Board of Directors Mandate, 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ga_lead_director.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 
2006). 
 378 OSC, The Commission, supra note 371.  The OSC also has an Adjudicative Com-
mittee responsible for evaluating and monitoring the OSC’s adjudicative procedures and 
practices.  The Adjudicative Committee has no decision-making authority.  See OSC, Ad-
judicative Committee, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ga_adjudicative.jsp 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2006).  The Adjudicative Committee is advised by an Independent 
Adjudicative Counsel about hearings and related matters; it provides legal research and 
drafting assistance to the Adjudicative Committee.  OSC, Independent Adjudicative 
Counsel, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ga_independent-adj-counsel.jsp (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2006). 
 379 OSC, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/AnnualRpt/2004/com.html.  However, the OSC cannot is-
sue any order under the Ontario Securities Act without a hearing.  Securities Act, 
R.S.O.1990 Ch. S.5 s. 127(4) (2006) (Can.). 
 380 OSC, Rule-Making in Ontario, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/ 
rrn_backgrounder.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).  The OSC must publish proposed rules 
for public comment for a period of at least ninety days.  Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990 Ch. 
S.5 s. 143.2(1)–(4) (2006) (Can.). 
 381 R.S.O. Ch. S.5 s. 143.3. 
 382 R.S.O. Ch. S.5 s. 143.8(2). 
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and conditions under which they can operate in Ontario.383  The 
OSC recognizes the TSX and the Canadian Trading and Quota-
tion System (CNQ).  The TSX V and the ME have received ex-
emptions from registration in Ontario.  It does not recognize 
NASDAQ Canada.  The OSC also recognizes quotation and trade 
reporting systems (QTRSs).  Such QTRSs operate facilities that 
distribute quotations for the purchase and sale of securities and 
report such transactions exclusively to registered dealers.384 
The Ontario Ministry of Finance and the Ontario Legislature 
oversee the OSC.  The Minister of Finance appoints a statutorily 
authorized, independent Five Year Review Committee to review 
securities regulation in Ontario.385   
  The need for a single securities regulator was identified by the 
Five Year Review Committee as “the most pressing securities regula-
tion issue in Ontario and across Canada.”  We believe strongly that a 
single securities regulator for Canada is essential in order to effec-
tively protect investors and foster integrity and confidence in our capi-
tal markets in an increasingly global marketplace.  A single securities 
regulator will maximize efficiency, take advantage of scale and scope, 
ensure a level national playing field, and encourage Canadian com-
petitiveness.386 
The Five Year Review Committee also recommended the de-
velopment of securities transfer legislation modeled on revised 
Article 8 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code.387  The OSC 
must enter into an MOU with the Ontario Minister of Finance 
every five years. 
The OSC also publishes an annual Statement of Priorities 
and solicits comments from market participants; the Statement 
of Priorities also compares OSC’s annual performance against 
the goals enumerated in the previous year’s Statement of Priori-
 
 383 Neil Mohindra, Securities Regulation Market in Canada, CRITICAL ISSUES BULL. 
(The Fraser Institute), 2002, at 9; National Instrument 21-101 Marketplace Operation  
(2004) (Can.), available at http://ftp.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/scripts/ssc/files/nat-inst/21-
101consolidatedmay20-04.pdf. 
 384 OSC, Exchanges and Other Marketplaces, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/ 
MarketRegulation/Marketplaces/mp_index.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2006); see also Roel 
C. Campos, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at New York 
University Stern: New Challenges in Regulating Financial Markets (Mar. 24, 2006). 
 385 OSC, supra note 379, at 1; OSC, Advisory Committee Legislative Reviews, 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/FiveYearReview/fyr_index.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 
2006). 
 386 David A. Brown, OSC, Executive Summary, Five Year Review Committee Final 
Report: Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario), at 1 (Aug. 18, 2004),  available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/FiveYearReview/fyr_20040818_fairness_exec-
sum.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2006) (citation omitted) (quoting FIVE YEAR REVIEW 
COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 29). 
 387 Id. at 4; see also MOU Minister of Finance & OSC, supra note, 370, § 1.1.4.B.10. 
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ties.388  Market participants are also surveyed to measure the 
OSC’s effectiveness in providing services and meeting obligations 
to market participants.  “The [OSC’s] regulatory and adjudicative 
decisions must be made and be seen by the public to be made in 
an independent and impartial manner.”389 
The OSC wants to facilitate “Canadian financial markets 
that are attractive to domestic and international investors, issu-
ers and intermediaries because they are cost efficient and have 
integrity.”390  It also recognizes that it must address issues in the 
global regulatory framework to compete successfully domestically 
as well as internationally; the OSC also asserts that the frag-
mentation of Canada’s securities regulatory framework adversely 
impacts the competitiveness of Canadian securities markets in 
the global marketplace: 
  Financial markets are global.  Borders no longer serve as barriers 
to capital flows.  Those seeking to invest and those seeking capital go 
where they see the opportunity for the best returns for the risks as-
sumed.  As capital flows become global, so do the market intermediar-
ies and infrastructure servicing the business.  Many of the largest in-
termediaries are global conglomerates combining banking, insurance 
and securities services in one entity.391 
Accordingly, the OSC has determined that it must maintain 
a globally competitive securities regulatory framework.392  
Mostly, the goal is reflected in the OSC’s efforts to harmonize its 
securities laws/regulations with other provinces in Canada as 
well as internationally, especially with the U.S. securities mar-
kets.  The OSC has also established an International Affairs Of-
fice to ensure that Ontario (through the OSC) is a recognized 
participant in the shaping of the international securities regula-
tory framework in an increasingly global securities market.393 
V.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Securities Regulatory Frameworks of the U.S. and Canada: A 
Comparison with the IOSCO Standard 
The securities regulatory frameworks of the U.S. and Can-
ada, to varying degrees, meet the three objectives of the IOSCO 
 
 388 See OSC, STATEMENT OF PRIORITIES 2006/2007, at 1–3, 10 (2006), available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/WhatWeDo/wwd_2006-
2007_statement_of_priorities_annual.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2006). 
 389 MOU Minister of Finance & OSC, supra note 370, § 1.1.4.B.10. 
 390 OSC, BUSINESS STRATEGY 2004–2008, at 1, available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/WhatWeDo/wwd_2004-2008_osc_business_strategy.pdf. 
 391 Id. at 2. 
 392 Id. 
 393 See OSC, International Affairs, 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/International/int_index.jsp. (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
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Standard: protecting investors; ensuring fair, efficient, and 
transparent markets; and dealing with systemic risk.394  How-
ever, the U.S. has a greater capacity to achieve the IOSCO Stan-
dard because its securities regulatory framework incorporates se-
lective federal preemption.  Moreover, Canada’s failure to use 
selective federal preemption in its securities regulatory frame-
work will significantly impair its ability to achieve the IOSCO 
Standard. 
Effective investor protection under the IOSCO Standard re-
quires disclosure of material information to both retail and insti-
tutional investors, prohibits manipulative or fraudulent practices 
in the securities markets, mandates supervision of market in-
termediaries or operators of exchanges that provide investment 
services, and prescribes minimum standards for market partici-
pants. 
1.  Investor Protection 
a.  Disclosure of Material Information 
The U.S. and Canadian395 securities regulatory frameworks 
require issuers and other market participants to disclose all ma-
terial information about the issuer’s securities in the primary 
and secondary markets.  Both regulatory frameworks are based 
on the principle of full disclosure of material information, and the 
definition of material information is substantially the same un-
der both regulatory frameworks.  The U.S. securities regulatory 
framework defines material information from the perspective of 
the investor’s decision to buy or sell the issuer’s securities; infor-
mation is material if it is required by a reasonable investor to 
make an informed investment decision.396  The province of On-
 
 394 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at i. 
 395 As noted previously, the term “Canadian securities regulatory framework” refers 
to the provinces of Ontario and Quebec only, because they are the most active in Canada 
with respect to trading volume and regulatory activity.  Describing and analyzing all thir-
teen provinces and territories would expand significantly the length and adversely impact 
the thesis of this article.   
 396 Accordingly, the disclosure of material information by an issuer accessing the 
primary market includes a description of the issuer, its organization, the terms of its par-
ticular offering, and independently audited financial statements.  Securities Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 77g(b)(1) (2000).  In the secondary market,  §§ 12–14 of the Exchange Act require 
continuous disclosure from an issuer or reporting company required to register under 
these provisions.  §§ 78l–78n.  A reporting company includes a company with a class of 
securities listed on a national securities exchange (§ 78l(b)); a company with assets in ex-
cess of $10 million and equity securities held by at least 500 persons (§ 78l(g) and Rule 
12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1(2006)); and a company with a Securities Act registration 
statement that has been declared effective by the Commission (§ 78l).  Required disclo-
sures in the secondary market include an extensive description of the reporting company’s 
business, audited financial statements for its fiscal year, management’s discussion and 
analysis of the issuer’s performance and financial position, and any material events.  See 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78j-1; 17 C.F.R. § 228.303; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
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tario’s securities regulatory framework defines material informa-
tion from the perspective of the effect of information on the value 
or price of the issuer’s securities, i.e., information is material if it 
could reasonably be expected to significantly affect the market 
price or value of the issuer’s securities.397  The province of Que-
bec’s securities regulatory framework, similar to that of the U.S., 
defines material information from the perspective of the investor; 
information is material if a reasonable investor’s decision of 
whether to buy, sell, or hold an issuer’s securities is likely to be 
influenced or changed by the information.398  Ontario, Quebec 
and the U.S. obtain the requisite disclosure, with minor differ-
ences, by requiring issuers to submit material information to a 
designated regulator.  In the U.S., material information in the 
primary market is obtained in the registration process; continu-
ing disclosure in the secondary market is submitted to the Com-
mission and stored in EDGAR.399  In Ontario and Quebec, mate-
rial information in their primary markets is obtained in their 
respective registration processes; continuing disclosure in their 
secondary markets is submitted to provincial SRAs and stored in 
SEDAR.  Information stored in EDGAR and SEDAR is made 
available to investors, generally, on the regulator-sponsored web-
sites for EDGAR and SEDAR.400 
Although full disclosure of material information is required 
in the securities regulatory frameworks of Ontario and Quebec, 
the consistency and quality of the implementation of full disclo-
sure of material information is somewhat fragmented.  There is 
no federal securities law mandating full disclosure; each province 
has its own disclosure requirements embodied in its own securi-
ties act.  The CSA has attempted to bridge this gap by drafting 
National Instrument 51-102 (NI 51-102) and MRRS.401 However, 
 
236 (1988). 
 397 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 1(1) (2006) (Can.).   
 398 Securities Act, R.S.Q. ch. V-1.1 s. 73 (2006) (Can.).   
 399 SEC, Important Information About EDGAR, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/ 
aboutedgar.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). 
 400 SEC, Filings & Forms (EDGAR), http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Oct. 
14, 2006); SEDAR, http://www.sedar.com/homepage_en.htm (Oct. 14, 2006); see also Na-
tional Instrument 13-101 System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval 
(SEDAR) (2004) (Can.), available at http://ftp.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/scripts/ssc/files/nat-inst/13-
101niamendedasof-mar30-04.pdf.  National Instrument 13-101 was adopted by all thir-
teen provinces, but with one or more changes to the original instrument in certain prov-
inces. 
 401 See, National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Oblications (2004) (Can.), 
available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulations/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_51-
102-cont-disc-ob.pdf.  MRRS designates one principal regulator to review issuer disclosure 
documents for securities offerings made in more than one province.  As previously noted, 
the provinces do not surrender their jurisdiction or discretion under MRRS and are free at 
any time to withdraw and deal directly with the issuer.  WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE, su-
pra note 31, at 17.  Notably, the chief goal of MRRS is not to facilitate uniformity, but to 
391- 500 NICHOLS.DOC 5/16/2007 1:51:13 AM 
2006] Federal Preemption in U.S. Securities Regulatory Framework 469 
compliance with NI 51-102 and MRRS is voluntary for all thir-
teen provinces.  Provinces may also adopt portions of NI 51-102 
and MRRS.  Despite the fact that these measures are designed to 
facilitate uniformity in the Canadian securities regulatory 
framework, voluntary compliance, instead of mandating compli-
ance using selective federal preemption, severely undermines 
this goal.  Voluntary compliance means that the issuer must al-
ways be prepared to deal with the regulatory framework of each 
province in which it plans to offer its securities. 
b.  Prohibition of Manipulative or Fraudulent Practices 
Investor protection under the IOSCO Standard also requires 
the prohibition of manipulative or fraudulent practices in the se-
curities market.402 In the U.S., manipulative or fraudulent 
practices are prohibited under both federal and state securities 
laws.403  The federal anti-fraud provisions include § 17(a) of the 
Securities Act, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated thereunder.404  Both provisions prohibit fraud or de-
ceit, and manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances.405  
Canada’s prohibitions against fraud and manipulation are con-
tained in National Instrument 23-101 (NI 23-101).406  However, 
because selective federal preemption is not included in Canada’s 
securities regulatory framework, making compliance with all or a 
portion of the provisions of NI 23-101 voluntary, the provinces of 
Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan have decided to re-
tain their own rules prohibiting manipulative or fraudulent prac-
tices.407  This ability to opt out adversely impacts the consistency 
required to compete successfully in the global securities market. 
In the primary market, U.S. federal anti-fraud provisions do 
not prohibit stabilization of stock prices when needed.  Regula-
tion M of the Exchange Act provides guidelines with respect to 
 
reduce cost of regulation in multi-jurisdictional offerings in Canada.  Memorandum of 
Understanding Regarding Mutual Reliance Review System Between the OSC and Mem-
bers of the Canadian Securities Administrators (Oct. 28, 1999), available at 
http://www.albertasecurities.com/dms/2984/7165/7166__1353811_v1_-_MOU-_MRRS_-
_in_word.pdf. 
 402 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 5.  
 403 This is one of the primary areas in the U.S. securities regulatory framework which 
has not been preempted under NSMIA. 
 404 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).  Other anti-fraud 
provisions under federal securities laws include § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, § 15(c)(1) of 
the Exchange Act, and § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(e), 
78o(c)(1), 80b-6 (2000). 
 405 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
 406 National Instrument 23-101 Trading Rules § 3.1 (2001) (Can.), available at 
http://www.rs.ca/en/pdf/National_Instrument_23-101.pdf; Companion Policy to National 
Instrument 23-101 Trading Rules § 3.1 (2004) (Can.), available at 
http://www.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/ssc/files/nat-inst/23-101cp-consolidated-may20-04.pdf. 
 407 National Instrument 23-101 Trading Rules, § 3.1(2). 
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when and at what price the broker-dealer may enter a stabilizing 
bid.408  However, federal securities laws do prohibit such manipu-
lative or fraudulent practices as free riding,409 insider trading,410 
parking,411 wash sales,412 false and misleading statements during 
a distribution of securities resulting in the artificial distortion of 
the market price for investors,413 and issuer repurchases de-
signed to manipulate the issuer’s stock price.414  Canada’s fraud 
and manipulation provisions also allow stabilization of stock 
prices while expressly prohibiting substantially the same type of 
fraudulent and manipulative conduct under the U.S. securities 
regulatory framework.415 
Generally, almost every state (including the District of Co-
lumbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) has broadly-
worded anti-fraud provisions that apply to all securities issued 
and/or traded within its borders.  Most states have adopted all or 
some portion of the anti-fraud provisions of the Uniform Securi-
ties Act (USA),416 but not New York and California.417  Although 
 
 408 Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.104 (2005). 
 409 Illegal free riding occurs any time a purchaser of securities does not have the 
funds to pay for the purchase but rather intends to take a free ride on the securities pur-
chased.  See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that a cus-
tomer ordered stock from his broker with the predetermination of paying for it only if the 
price increased by the settlement date). 
 410 SEC, Insider Trading, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Oct. 
21, 2006). 
  llegal insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, in 
breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while 
in possession of material, nonpublic information about the security.  Insider 
trading violations may also include “tipping” such information, securities trad-
ing by the person “tipped,” and securities trading by those who misappropriate 
such information. 
Id. 
 411 Parking consists of transferring record ownership of a security in order to hide the 
true identity of the beneficial owner of such security.  See First Montauk Securities Corp., 
Exchange Act Release No. 38,775, 64 SEC Docket 2082 (June 25, 1997). 
 412 SEC, Wash Sales, http://www.sec.gov/answers/wash.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 
2006).  Wash sales occur when you buy and sell the same security at the same time or 
within a short period of time.  “Wash sales violate the federal securities laws—Section 
9(a)(1)(A) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—if they are done to cre-
ate the false or misleading appearance of active trading in a security.”  Id.   
 413 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2000). 
 414 Id. 
 415 Companion Policy to National Instrument 23-101 Trading Rules § 3.1(1)–(4) 
(2004) (Can.), available at http://www.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/ssc/files/nat-inst/23-101cp-
consolidated-may20-04.pdf. 
 416 They are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District 
of Columbia, Guam, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvannia, Puerto Rico, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming.  LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 73–74 
n.114 (3d. ed. 1998). 
 417 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 162, 174 (4th. ed. 2006). 
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Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Wisconsin have adopted § 
101 of the USA, they have also adopted other anti-fraud provi-
sions.418  Moreover, even though Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Lou-
isiana, Texas, and Ohio have not adopted the USA, they have 
substantially adopted the anti-fraud provisions contained in 
§ 101 of the USA.419  The language of state anti-fraud provisions 
in states that have adopted the USA generally tracks the lan-
guage of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.420  Section 101 of the USA 
states that 
[i]t is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or 
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly 
  (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
  (2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not mis-
leading, or 
  (3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.421 
The USA anti-fraud provisions provide for both civil liabili-
ties and criminal penalties.  Under § 410 of the USA, there is 
civil liability for violations of its anti-fraud provisions.  However, 
civil liability is available only to buyers of securities, not sell-
ers.422  Buyers may sue under § 410 or in equity to recover con-
sideration paid plus interest, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ 
fees minus any income generated by the security.423  Criminal 
penalties may be imposed under § 409 for willful violations of the 
USA anti-fraud provisions.424 
The USA,425 a voluntary attempt by various SSRAs to 
achieve consistency in state securities regulation, has failed even 
in the one area, anti-fraud, in which state action is expressly 
permitted under selective federal preemption.  Although all 
 
 418 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 416, at 74. 
 419 Id. at 74–75 n.116. 
 420 Id. 
 421 UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 101 (1956) (current version at UNIFORM SECURITIES 
ACT § 501, 7C U.L.A. 150 (2006)). 
 422 Id. § 410 (current version at UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 509, 7C U.L.A. 162 
(2006)).  In the author’s opinion, the reason for allowing only civil liability for violation of 
the anti-fraud provisions of the USA is that in each state, both buyers and sellers may sue 
based on state common law and equitable remedies such as fraud and rescission, respec-
tively.  In other words, a statute is not needed. 
 423 Id. § 410(a) (current version at § 509(b)(1), 7C U.L.A. 163 (2006)). 
 424 Id. § 409 (current version at § 508, 7C U.L.A. 158 (2006)).  Willful is defined under 
the USA as “proof that a person acted intentionally in the sense that the person was 
aware of what he or she was doing.”  § 508 cmt. 2, 7C U.L.A. 158 (2006). 
 425 This description of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 includes the Revised Uni-
form Securities Act of 1985 and the 2005 revision. 
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SSRAs agree with the principle of uniformity as evidenced by the 
USA, they refuse to adopt voluntarily the USA as drafted even 
with respect to its anti-fraud provisions.  Voluntary compliance 
under the auspices of NASAA inevitably leads to fragmentation 
in the securities regulatory framework and its related prob-
lems—different laws in each state, different levels of enforce-
ment, varying quality of employee skills and knowledge of appli-
cable securities laws, and increases in the issuer’s cost of capital.  
The CSA, like NASAA, is attempting to achieve consistency in 
provincial regulation by promulgating a Canadian Uniform Secu-
rities Act (CUSA) along with a Securities Administration Act 
(SAA);426 the drafting of the CUSA and the SAA is the essence of 
Canada’s Uniform Securities Legislation Project (USL Project).  
However, the USL Project seems doomed to fail from the start 
because: (1) the provinces are not required to adopt, in whole or 
in part, the CUSA at its completion; (2) the CSA has already ac-
quiesced to the notion that Quebec requires special (non-uniform) 
treatment because of its “civil law regime and particular legisla-
tive drafting requirements”;427  (3) British Columbia was already 
in the process of streamlining and simplifying its own securities 
act; and (4) the USL Project allows each province to draft its own 
SAA.428 
Selective federal preemption prevents de facto policy and 
rulemaking by a single dominant state or province in the securi-
ties regulatory framework.  The state of New York houses within 
its borders, arguably, the premier market within the U.S. securi-
ties markets—the NYSE. Selective federal preemption prevents 
New York’s SSRA’s (the New York Attorney General, currently 
Eliot Spitzer)429 regulatory activities from having a dispropor-
tionate impact on regulatory framework of the U.S. securities 
markets.  This may represent de facto policy and rulemaking in 
the U.S. securities markets.  Moreover, Spitzer’s legal mandate is 
 
 426 UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR HARMONIZATION OF 
SECURITIES LAWS: CONSULTATION DRAFT (2003).  SAAs must be promulgated by all thir-
teen provinces and contain the procedural provisions for implementing the USA in each 
province.  The CSA acknowledges that it would be preferable to have uniform procedures, 
but states that this is too difficult to accomplish.  See CANADIAN SECURITIES 
ADMINISTRATION, UNIFORM SECURITIES LEGISLATION PROJECT: COMMENTARY ON 
CONSULTATION DRAFTS 14 (2003). 
 427 CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATION, supra note 426, at 13. 
 428  Id. at 14. 
 429 The New York Attorney General is elected for a term of four years and manages 
over 500 attorneys and over 1800 employees including forensic accounts and scientists.  
Office of NYS Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Tour the Attorney General’s Office, 
http:www.oag.state.ny.us/tour/tour.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).  “The Attorney Gen-
eral shall [p]rosecute and defend all actions and proceedings in which the state is inter-
ested, and have charge and control of all the legal business of the departments and bu-
reaus of the state . . . .”  N.Y. EXEC LAW § 63 (2002). 
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only to protect securities markets within New York’s borders.  
Selective federal preemption prevents domination of the U.S. se-
curities regulatory framework by a single state whose legal man-
date is only to protect securities markets within its borders, even 
if the NYSE is located within its borders.  Without the limits im-
posed by selective federal preemption in the securities regulatory 
framework, Spitzer’s regulatory activities would dominate policy 
and rulemaking, just as the OSC’s regulatory activities dominate 
policy and rulemaking in the Canadian securities regulatory 
framework. 
(1) The Spitzer Phenomenon430 
Spitzer’s recent enforcement activities, although laudable, 
could have affected adversely the competitiveness of the U.S. se-
curities markets in the global securities market.  The competi-
tiveness of the U.S. securities markets is weakened when a single 
SSRA’s enforcement activities result in policies and rules that 
change the securities regulatory framework created by Congress 
and implemented and monitored by the Commission.  In 2002, 
Spitzer entered into an agreement with Merrill Lynch (the 
Spitzer Agreement) to settle charges that its investment advice 
was tainted by conflicts of interest, i.e., securities analysts at 
Merrill Lynch were not being truthful and fair in public an-
nouncements about companies that were Merrill Lynch’s invest-
ment banking clients.431  The Spitzer Agreement, negotiated 
solely between Spitzer and Merrill Lynch, produced significant 
reforms in the way in which Merrill Lynch conducted its invest-
ment banking activities.  The Spitzer Agreement had a signifi-
 
 430 N.Y. EXEC LAW § 63 (2002) (allowing the Attorney General to prosecute violations 
of New York state laws, as well as violations of federal laws or regulations).  Any conduct 
which violates state or federal law or regulation is actionable under § 63-12.  Id. § 63-12; 
see also People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 848 (1999); New 
York v. Feldman, 210 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  Executive Law § 63-12 pro-
vides:  
  Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or 
otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, con-
ducting or transaction of business, the [A]ttorney [G]eneral may apply, in the 
name of the people of the state of New York, to the supreme court of the state 
of New York, on notice of five days, for an order enjoining the continuance of 
such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution 
and damages and, in an appropriate case, canceling any certificate filed under 
and by virtue of the provisions of section four hundred forty of the former penal 
law or section one hundred thirty of the general business law, and the court 
may award the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper.   
§ 63-12. 
 431 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer, 
Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement to Reform Investment Practices: Merrill 
Lynch to Pay $100 Million Penalty (May 21, 2002), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/may/may21a_02.html. 
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cant impact on all investment banks in the U.S. because Merrill 
Lynch is the largest securities brokerage firm in the U.S. securi-
ties markets, the state of New York, Spitzer’s jurisdiction, has 
Wall Street432 and the NYSE within its borders.  Spitzer recog-
nized that his activities resulted in de facto policy and rulemak-
ing for the U.S. securities markets.  He stated that “[t]his agree-
ment [between Merrill Lynch and the New York State Attorney 
General] changes the way Wall Street will operate [by] severing 
the compensation link between the research and banking divi-
sions [of Merrill Lynch] that tainted investment advice.”433  In 
fact, Spitzer’s settlement with Merrill Lynch was the catalyst for 
a Global Settlement addressing research analyst conflicts of in-
terest and related issues with the top ten U.S. securities firms in 
the U.S. securities markets.434  The Global Settlement, negoti-
ated by the Commission with the assistance of Spitzer, the 
NASD, NASAA, and the NYSE, resulted in, among other things, 
the promulgation of new rules for research analysts by the Com-
mission.435  However, the Global Settlement would not have oc-
curred without the Commission’s statutory power to negotiate, 
accept, implement, and monitor the Global Settlement.  Essen-
tially, the Commission has the statutory authority to impose the 
Global Settlement on all securities firms participating in the U.S. 
 
 432 Wall Street is the heart of the U.S. Financial District and was the first permanent 
location of the NYSE.  NY.com, Financial District, http://www.ny.com/sights/ 
neighborhoods/financial_district.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006); NYSE Group, Timeline, 
http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_events.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).   
 433 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, supra 
note 431.  Among other things, Merrill Lynch agreed to sever the link between compensa-
tion for analysts and investment banking, prohibit investment banking input in determin-
ing analyst compensation, “[c]reate a new investment review committee responsible for 
approving all research recommendations with strict standards and independence from 
investment banking and the analysts themselves,” “disclose in Merrill Lynch’s research 
reports whether it has received or is entitled to receive any compensation from a covered 
company over the past 12 months,” “pay a $100 million penalty,” and issue a statement of 
contrition for its failure to address conflicts of interest.  Id.   
 434 Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.; Credit Suisse First Boston LLC; Goldman, Sachs & Co.; 
J.P. Morgan Securities Inc.; Lehman Brothers Inc.; Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.; Morgan 
Stanley & Co., Inc.; Salomon Smith Barney Inc.; UBS Warburg LLC; and U.S. Bancorp 
Piper Jaffray Inc.  Collectively, these firms paid total penalties of almost $900 million dol-
lars.  Press Release, NASD et al., SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and 
State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices: $1.4 Bil-
lion Global Settlement Includes Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002),  
available at http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2002NewsReleases/ 
NASDW_002864; Press Release, SEC et al., Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle 
Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment 
Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. 
 435 The terms of the Global Settlement included a ban on spinning IPOs, an obliga-
tion to provide independent research to clients for five years by paying for independent 
research firms chosen by an independent consultant appointed by regulators, disclosure of 
analysts’ recommendations, ratings, and price target forecasts to the public, and payment 
of significant monetary penalties by each securities firm.  See Press Release, NASD et al., 
supra note 434. 
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securities markets, while Spitzer’s authority as an SSRA is only 
effective in a single state—New York.  Selective federal preemp-
tion empowers the Commission to bring all necessary parties to 
the negotiating table and to impose a consistent solution effective 
against all participants in the U.S. securities regulatory frame-
work.  The IOSCO Standard requires consistency in a country’s 
domestic securities regulatory framework to compete successfully 
in the global securities market.  The Commission’s comprehen-
sive statutory authority facilitates consistency in the U.S. securi-
ties markets and thus is critical to the competitiveness of the 
U.S. securities markets in the global securities market. 
The Office of the New York Attorney General is similar to 
the OSC in the Canadian securities regulatory framework.  Ar-
guably, Canada’s premier securities markets (e.g., the TSX) are 
located in Ontario and, therefore, are regulated by the OSC. Ac-
cordingly, the OSC’s policy and rulemaking activities, in effect, 
set policies and rules for the Canadian securities markets even 
though the OSC’s jurisdiction is confined to the province of On-
tario.  However, unlike the OSC, the impact of Spitzer’s activities 
on the U.S. securities regulatory framework is checked by selec-
tive federal preemption, which statutorily mandates that the 
Commission, a federal regulator, set policy and ensure fair and 
efficient markets in the U.S. securities regulatory framework.  
The activities of the OSC have a greater impact on the Canadian 
securities regulatory framework because its securities regulatory 
framework does not use selective federal preemption.  Unlike the 
U.S., there is no statutorily authorized federal regulator empow-
ered to set policy and ensure consistency in Canada’s securities 
regulatory framework. 
c. Supervision of Market Intermediaries that Provide 
Investment Services 
Investor protection under the IOSCO Standard also requires 
supervision of market intermediaries or operators of exchanges 
that provide investment services.  Such supervision must incor-
porate a comprehensive system of inspection and surveillance 
along with a compliance program.  This means that there must 
also be a comprehensive requirement for establishing and main-
taining appropriate records to facilitate monitoring of compli-
ance.  In the U.S. securities regulatory framework this is a 
shared responsibility between the Commission and securities in-
dustry SROs.436  The SROs represent the front line of supervision 
by ensuring regulatory compliance by their members.  Although 
 
 436 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. 
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the Commission has delegated much of its inspection and surveil-
lance activities to SROs, it conducts sufficient inspections and 
surveillance to ensure that the SROs perform their delegated 
regulatory responsibilities.437  This system of delegation allows 
the Commission, a relatively small federal agency with respect to 
human resources and budget, to regulate the largest securities 
market in the world.  If an SRO fails to perform its responsibili-
ties adequately, the Commission has statutory authority to sanc-
tion the SRO; the ultimate sanction, of course, is to revoke the 
SRO’s registration under the Exchange Act.438  Revocation of 
SRO registration means that securities firms would no longer be 
required to become members, thus eliminating the SRO’s statu-
tory authority to regulate its members. 
SROs acting as exchanges or trading systems in the OTC 
market perform their delegated regulatory responsibilities by es-
tablishing and enforcing listing standards that issuers must meet 
to trade their securities on securities exchanges or in the OTC 
securities market.  Also, they must ensure that their members 
comply with applicable securities laws.  SROs perform these re-
quirements by promulgating rules, performing inspections, inves-
tigating possible violations of applicable securities laws and SRO 
rules, and imposing sanctions against members found to have 
committed such violations.439  Although there are several ex-
changes throughout the U.S.,440 the NYSE is the largest, in part 
because of its listing requirements.441  Prior to August 31, 2006, 
the NYSE was responsible for all SRO responsibilities for ex-
changes under the Exchange Act.  Subsequently, the NYSE dele-
gated certain SRO regulatory responsibilities to the NASD, in-
cluding examining and enforcing compliance with federal 
 
 437 SEC, The Laws that Govern, supra note 124.  Section 5 of the Exchange Act re-
quires every national securities exchange to register with the Commission.  15 U.S.C. § 
78e (2000).  Section 6(b) of the Exchange Act requires every exchange to promulgate rules 
that are designed, among other things, to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and 
practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, and to provide for appropriate 
discipline of its members for any violations of the exchange’s rules and applicable securi-
ties laws.  § 78f(b). 
 438 See §§ 78f(b)(6), 78o-3(b)(7), 78s(d)(3). 
 439 Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, Exchange Act Release No. 
42,208, 71 SEC Docket 496, at IV(A) (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/concept/34-42208.htm. 
 440 There are nine securities exchanges registered with the Commission.  They are 
the American Stock Exchange, Boston Stock Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange, 
Chicago Stock Exchange, International Securities Exchange, National Stock Exchange 
(formerly the Cincinnati Stock Exchange), New York Stock Exchange, Pacific Exchange, 
and Philadelphia Stock Exchange.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Additional Guidance for Filing 
Form LM-30, http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/LM30_additional.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 22, 2006). 
 441 See generally NYSE Group, NYSE Arca Listings, http://www.nyse.com/about/ 
listed/1155031724207.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2006). 
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securities laws by common members, and enforcing and oversee-
ing NYSE Rules that are substantially similar to NASD Rules.442  
NASDAQ, the largest OTC market,443 is regulated by the NASD.  
Like the NYSE, the NASD performs the regulatory functions for 
issuers listed on NASDAQ, the operation of NASDAQ, and the 
activities of NASDAQ member securities firms.444  
SROs regulate their member securities firms primarily by 
performing inspections and surveillance.  Inspections or exami-
nations require the creation and maintenance of certain records 
by member securities firms.445  SRO rules for member firms re-
quire that they submit to inspections by the SRO; such inspec-
tions are designed to determine and to ensure that member secu-
rities firms are complying with all applicable SRO rules and 
securities laws.446  Without the creation and maintenance of such 
books and records, it would be impossible for SROs (or the Com-
mission for that matter) to perform regulatory responsibilities 
delegated by the Commission and authorized by statute.  Section 
17(a) of the Exchange Act, and rules promulgated thereunder, 
require securities firms to create and maintain records required 
for inspections conducted by SROs and the Commission.447  These 
 
 442 Program for Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities Pursuant to Rule 17d-2, No-
tice of Filing of the Plan for Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities Between NYSE 
Arca, Inc. and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release 
No. 54,224, 71 Fed. Reg. 43,823 (July 27, 2006). 
 443 NASDAQ, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT at NASDAQ’s Business in Brief (2006), available 
at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/NDAQ/92898776x0x36919/4926252F-A3F3-
446A-85D0-AEA84A42CB82/NASDAQ_2005AnnualReport.pdf. 
 444 See National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD Corporate Description: 
Building Investor Confidence Every Day, http://www.nasd.com.  The NASD also super-
vises other OTC markets, such as the OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB) and the pink sheets.  
SEC, Over-the-Counter Markets, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrotc.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2006).  The OTCBB is an electronic inter-dealer quotation system that 
displays real-time quotes, last-sale prices, and volume information for many OTC securi-
ties not quoted on NASDAQ or listed on a national securities exchange; the OTCBB is not 
a part of NASDAQ.  OTC Bulletin Board, Overview and History of the OTCBB, 
http://www.otcbb.com/aboutOTCBB/overview.stm.  The Pink Sheets is an electronic inter-
dealer quotation system that displays quotes and last-sale information for many OTC se-
curities and does not have listing requirements; securities listed in the Pink Sheets are 
generally foreign issuers and small, thinly-traded, closely held companies unable to meet 
the listing requirements of NASDAQ, OTCBB, or the NYSE.  Pink Sheets, About the Pink 
Sheets, http://www.pinksheets.com/about/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 9, 2006); Pink Sheets, 
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.pinksheets.com/faq.jsp (last visited Oct. 9, 2006). 
 445 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at i–ii; SEC, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, at 68, 74–
76 (2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep02/ar02full.pdf. 
 446 See, e.g., One Broker Gone Bad: Punishing the Criminal, Making Victims Whole: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. On Fi-
nancial Services, 107th Cong. 109–115 (2002) (testimony of Daniel M. Sibears, Senior Vice 
President, Deputy Member Regulation, NASD, Inc.). 
 447 Exchange Act 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1(a) (2006).  Rule 17a-4 allows securities firms 
to maintain records electronically if the electronic storage media meets the conditions de-
scribed in the rule.  § 240.17a-4(f).  See also Reporting Requirements for Brokers or Deal-
ers Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,  Exchange Act Release No. 38,245, 62 Fed. 
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records include financial statements prepared in accordance with 
GAAP448 and certain financial and operation reports (commonly 
known as FOCUS Reports) with the Commission.449  Section 17 of 
the Exchange Act also requires registered exchanges (e.g., the 
NYSE) to create and maintain sufficient records for effective 
oversight by the Commission.450 
Dealers are also required to create and maintain certain 
books and records to facilitate compliance with the OSA and the 
QSA451 in the Canadian securities regulatory framework.  Such 
books and records include blotters or other records of original en-
try and ledgers reflecting all liabilities, income and expenses, and 
capital accounts.452  OSA and QSA regulations also prescribe the 
content and time limits of such books and records: they must be 
maintained “in an accurate and intelligible form” so that they are 
available “to any person lawfully entitled to examine the re-
 
Reg. 6443, 6470 (Feb. 5, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(f)) (describing amend-
ment to Rule 17a-4 that will allow broker-dealers to use any electronic storage media that 
satisfies the other requirements of the Rule); TradeWeb LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 
WL 22220706, at *1 (July 22, 2003) (indicating that the SEC will not enforce any regula-
tions against TradeWeb for using electronic trade confirmation in broker deals). 
 448 Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. §240.17a-5(c)(2) (2006) (noting that portions of a manda-
tory audited statement must be “prepared in accordance with generally accepted account-
ing principles”).  GAAP is an acronym for generally accepted accounting principles.  An-
nual financial statements must be filed on a calendar or fiscal year basis and must be 
audited by an independent public accountant within sixty days after the date of the finan-
cial statement.  § 240.17a-12(b). 
 449 § 240.17a-5(c)(2).  Form X-17A-5 is more commonly known as a FOCUS report.  
Other required books and records include daily blotters; ledgers reflecting all assets and 
liabilities, income and expense and capital accounts; separate ledgers itemizing each of 
the securities firm’s customer’s accounts; ledgers reflecting all long and short positions in 
each security carried by the securities firm for its own account; a memorandum of each 
order, whether executed or not; order tickets for each purchase and sale showing price 
and time (if possible) of execution; copies of confirmations of transactions and notices of 
other debits and credits sent to the securities firm’s customers; trial balances as proof of 
money balances in all of the securities firm’s ledger accounts; questionnaires or applica-
tions for employment executed by each associated person of the securities firms with, 
among other things, a complete disciplinary history in the securities industry and any 
criminal records; and fingerprinting records of the firms associated persons.  § 240.17a-3 
(giving a complete list of records required to be made and kept.).  All records must be cre-
ated in the form prescribed by Rule 17a-3.  Id.  Records required in Rule 17a-3 must be 
kept and retained for the periods prescribed in Rule 17a-4.  § 240.17a-4(a)–(e).  Exchange 
Act Rule X-17A-5 requires registered securities firms to file FOCUS reports with the 
Commission.  Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(a)(2).  FOCUS Report is an acronym 
for Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single Report.  The depth and detail 
required in FOCUS Reports are determined by the business activities of each securities 
firm.  Documents used to prepare FOCUS Reports must be kept three years, the first two 
years in an easily accessible place.  § 240.17a-4(b)(8).  FOCUS Reports and other required 
records may be created and maintained electronically.  See Order Approving Proposed 
Rule Change by NASD Regulation, Inc. Relating to the Submission of Information in 
Electronic Form, Exchange Act Release No. 38,591, 62 Fed. Reg. 26,735, 26,842 (May 9, 
1997). 
 450 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 (2006). 
 451 Securities Act, R.S.Q., ch. V-1.1 s. 220 (2006) (Can.). 
 452 Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015, s. 113 (2006) (Can.). 
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cords.”453  Securities dealers’ books and records are used by SROs 
and SRAs to regulate the activities of securities dealers in On-
tario and Quebec. 
The Ontario Securities Act defines an SRO as an entity that 
represents registrants and is organized for the purpose of regu-
lating the operations and the standards of practice and business 
conduct of its members and their representatives with a goal of 
promoting the protection for investors and the public interest.454  
The OSC is statutorily authorized to recognize SROs.455  This 
means that recognized SROs operating within Ontario are sub-
ject to financial examination by the OSC.456  Accordingly, SROs 
in Ontario must make and keep certain financial records and 
practice and procedure documents for review by the OSC.457  If 
the OSC determines that there have been violations of the On-
tario Securities Act, the SRO may be required to provide or 
amend required disclosure documents.458  All SRO rules are sub-
ject to OSC approval prior to implementation.  However, the ab-
sence of selective federal preemption in Canada’s securities regu-
latory framework makes SRO oversight somewhat convoluted.  
For example, all RS rules must be approved by all SRAs that 
have contracted for its services—Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, Al-
berta, and British Columbia.459  The OSC is the principal regula-
tor, which means that it is responsible for coordinating the re-
view and approval process of all rules proposed by RS.  However, 
RS must file the proposed rule with all five SRAs at the same 
time and all RS rules must be approved by all five SRAs by 
agreement of the other four SRAs.460  “The [OSC] may . . . make 
any decision with respect to any by-law, rule, regulation, policy, 
procedure, interpretation or practice of a recognized self-
regulatory organization.”461  There are currently three SROs rec-
ognized by the OSC: the IDA, the MFDA, and RS.  Quebec also 
recognizes  three SROs: the IDA, the ME, and the MFDA. 
 
 453 Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015, s. 113(2)(b) (2006) (Can.). 
 454 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 21.1 (2006) (Can.). 
 455 Id.  SROs are defined as Market Participants under the Ontario Securities Act.  
R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 1. 
 456 Id. s. 12(1). 
 457 Id. ss. 19(1), 19(3), and 127; Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015, s. 113 (2006) 
(Can.). 
 458 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 127 (2006) (Can.). 
 459  Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Oversight of Market Regulation Ser-
vices Inc. Between: Alberta Securities Commission (the ASC) and British Columbia Secu-
rities Commission (the BCSC) and Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec (the 
CVMQ) and Manitoba Securities Commission (the MSC) and Ontario Securities Commis-
sion (the OSC) (also referred to collectively as the Commissions) app. A, 25 OSCB 896, 9 
(Feb. 15, 2002). 
 460 Id. 
 461 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 21.1(4) (2006) (Can.). 
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SROs will not regulate their members with a view towards 
detecting and preventing violations of applicable securities laws 
without statutory oversight from a single federal regulator.  In 
1996, the Commission was forced to institute administrative pro-
ceedings against the NASD, in part because it failed to comply 
with certain of its own rules and to enforce compliance with fed-
eral securities laws by securities firms acting as NASDAQ mar-
ket makers.462  NASDAQ market makers engaged in manipulat-
ive practices in certain securities traded on NASDAQ in order to 
increase profits by artificially widening spreads in such transac-
tions.463  Specifically, 
[NASDAQ] market makers observed an anticompetitive pricing con-
vention by which most [NASDAQ] stocks were quoted only in even 
eighths (i.e., $1/4, $1/2, $3/4, 0).  The pricing convention resulted in 
most [NASDAQ] stocks being quoted with a minimum inside spread of 
$1/4, thereby increasing the transactions [sic] costs paid by many in-
vestors when purchasing or selling those stocks.464 
This manipulative and anti-competitive pricing convention 
resulted in wider spreads and was enforced by NASDAQ market 
makers using harassment.465  In addition, the Commission de-
termined that “[t]he NASD was unduly influenced by [NASDAQ] 
market making firms with respect to rulemaking, the discipli-
 
 462 See Report Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release 
No. 37,542, 62 SEC Docket 1385  (Aug. 8, 1996); Order Instituting Public Proceedings, 
Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions Against NASD, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 37,538 (Aug. 8, 1996).  The NASD defines a market maker as 
[a] firm that maintains a firm bid and offer price in a given security by stand-
ing ready to buy or sell at publicly-quoted prices.  The [NASDAQ] Stock Mar-
ket is a decentralized network of competitive Market Makers.  Market Makers 
process orders for their own customers, and for other NASD broker/dealers; all 
NASD securities are traded through Market Maker firms.  Market Makers also 
will buy securities from issuers for resale to customers or other broker/dealers.  
About 10 percent of NASD firms are Market Makers; a broker/dealer may be-
come a Market Maker if the firm meets capitalization standards set down by 
NASD.   
NASD, Glossary of Terms: M, http://www.nasd.com/Resources/Glossary/NASDW_011116 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2006). 
 463 See Report Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release 
No. 37,542, 62 SEC Docket 1385  (Aug. 8, 1996).  “Spread” is “[t]he difference between the 
bid price at which a Market Maker will buy a security, and the ask price at which a Mar-
ket [M]aker will sell a security.”  NASD, Glossary of Terms: S, http://www.nasd.com/ 
Resources/Glossary/NASDW_011153 (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).  The “inside spread” is  
[t]he difference between the best bid and best ask among all securities is the 
highest bid and lowest offer being quoted among all of the Market Makers 
competing in a security.  Since the spread is the aggregate of individual Mar-
ket Maker spreads, it is narrower than an individual dealer spread or quote. 
NASD, Glossary of Terms: I, http://www.nasd.com/Resources/Glossary/NASDW_011041 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2006).     
 464 See Report Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release 
No. 37,542, 62 SEC Docket 1385  (Aug. 8, 1996). 
 465 See id. 
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nary process and the admission of new members.”466  The NASD 
spent more time investigating and bringing disciplinary actions 
against certain broker-dealers that were “widely disliked” by 
NASDAQ market makers.467 
From 1999 through 2003, NYSE specialists engaged in 
fraudulent and anti-competitive behavior designed to increase 
their compensation.  Specifically, all NYSE equity specialist 
firms engaged in unlawful trading ahead468 and interposition-
ing.469 
The Commission took swift and decisive action against the 
abuses uncovered at the NYSE and NASD.  It required systemic 
changes at both the NASD and the NYSE to ensure fair and 
competitive markets and to eliminate fraudulent practices that 
adversely impacted the competitiveness, efficiency, and trans-
parency of the U.S. securities markets.470  Such comprehensive 
remedial action was possible because of the existence of the use 
of selective federal preemption in the securities regulatory 
framework. 
d.  Minimum Standards for Market Participants 
The IOSCO Standard requires the authorization of market 
intermediaries to hold themselves out to the public as such.  In 
 
 466 See id. 
 467 See id. 
 468 NASD Manual Rule 2111(b) (2006).  
  A member that accepts and holds a market order of its own customer or a 
customer of another broker-dealer in a [NASDAQ] or exchange-listed security 
without immediately executing the order is prohibited from trading that secu-
rity on the same side of the market for its own account, unless it immediately 
thereafter executes the customer market order up to the size and at the same 
price at which it traded for its own account or at a better price. 
Id. 
 469 Order Instituting Public Administrative Proceedings, Making Findings, Ordering 
Compliance with Undertakings, and Imposing a Censure and a Cease-and-Desist Order, 
Exchange Act Release No. 51,524, 85 SEC Docket 517 (Apr. 12, 2005).  NASD Manual 
Rule 2320(b) (2006). 
  In any transaction for or with a customer, no member or person associated 
with a member shall interject a third party between the member and the best 
available market except in cases where the member can demonstrate that to 
his knowledge at the time of the transaction the total cost or proceeds of the 
transaction, as confirmed to the member acting for or with the customer, was 
better than the prevailing inter-dealer market for the security.  A member’s ob-
ligations to his customer are generally not fulfilled when he channels transac-
tions through another broker/dealer or some person in a similar position, 
unless he can show that by so doing, he reduced the costs of the transactions to 
the customer. 
Id.   
 470 See Order Instituting Public Administrative Proceedings, Making Findings, Or-
dering Compliance with Undertakings, and Imposing a Censure and a Cease-and-Desist 
Order, Exchange Act Release No. 51,524 (Apr. 12, 2005). 
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the U.S., this is accomplished primarily through registration of 
securities firms with the Commission.471  Registration of securi-
ties firms facilitates compliance with applicable securities laws 
by requiring securities firms to maintain an appropriate level of 
capital and to abide by a code of business conduct.472 
In Canada, the OSC and the CVMQ also monitor the activi-
ties of market participants by requiring registration of dealers, 
underwriters,473 and other market participants.  The OSA prohib-
its trading and otherwise participating in Ontario securities 
markets unless such person, dealer,474 or adviser registers with 
the OSC as a dealer or an adviser.475  Non-trading employees, 
designated by the Director of the OSC, are not required to regis-
ter.  Unlike the U.S., Ontario allows registration of all advisers 
seeking to do business within its borders, while the Commission 
only mandates registration of advisers with greater than $30 mil-
lion in assets under management; advisers with less than $30 
million in assets under management must register with the ap-
propriate SSRA.476  Similar to Ontario, Quebec requires the reg-
istration of dealers and advisers to engage in the securities busi-
ness within its borders.  The definition of dealer, however, is 
much broader than the OSA or federal securities laws.  Section 
5(2) of the QSA includes “trading in securities as principal, 
 
 471 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2000).  Brokers and dealers do-
ing business in the U.S. securities markets must register with the Commission in a proc-
ess administered by the NASD.  NASD, Glossary of Terms: N, http://www.nasd.com/ 
Resources/Glossary/NASDW_011118 (last visited Oct. 9, 2006). 
 472 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000).  Compliance is facili-
tated by requiring minimum levels of skill and knowledge, which are monitored by profi-
ciency exams.  15 U.S.C. § 78o (2000). 
 473 Quebec does not have specific registration requirements for dealers that act as 
underwriters.  See Securities Act, R.S.Q., ch. V-1.1 s. 148 (2005) (failing to list underwrit-
ers as governed by the statute). 
 474 Dealer registration is divided into ten categories: a broker (trades in the capacity 
of an agent or principal); a financial intermediary dealer (e.g., a bank, loan corporation, 
trust corporation, insurance company, credit union); a foreign dealer; an international 
dealer; an investment dealer (member of the IDA and trades in the capacity of an agent or 
principal); a limited market dealer; a mutual fund dealer (trades exclusively in shares or 
units of mutual funds); a scholarship plan dealer (trades exclusively in shares or units of 
securities of a scholarship or educational plan or trust); a securities dealer; and a security 
issuer (issuer registering as dealer to distribute its own securities exclusively for its own 
account.  This category is rarely used).  See Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015, s. 98 
(2006) (Can.).  In addition, SRO membership is required to obtain registration as a broker 
or investment dealer.  See SRO Membership—Securities Dealers and Brokers, OSC Rule 
31-507 § 1.1 (2006), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/ 
Current/Part3/rule_20000818_31-507_fr.jsp.  
 475 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5, s.25(1)(a) (2006).  This section also requires 
registration of the dealer, partners, officers, and employees that perform trading activities 
such as the purchase and sale of securities.   This allows personal liability of individuals 
for violations of the OSA. 
 476 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-1 (2006). 
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whether as his main activity or only as a secondary activity.”477  
Curiously, persons seeking to register as a dealer or adviser of a 
mutual fund, a scholarship plan, or an investment contract 
dealer (and its representative) must register with the AMF in ac-
cordance with An Act Respecting the Distribution of Financial 
Products and Services (Quebec) (FP&S Act) instead of the QSA.478 
Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1 requires securities firms to have 
specified levels of initial and ongoing capital to meet the current 
demands of their business activities and to protect customers and 
creditors from losses in the event of financial failure.479  Ade-
quate liquidity must be maintained at all times.  Accordingly, 
minimum net capital requirements vary based on the type of ac-
tivities engaged in by the securities firms.  Minimum net capital 
is determined by reducing net worth by all assets that cannot be 
readily converted into cash and by a percentage of the market 
value of securities and commodities held in the securities firms’ 
proprietary accounts to reflect market risk.480  Certain firm as-
sets are deducted in their entirety from net worth, including real 
estate, furniture and fixtures, exchange memberships, prepaid 
rent, insurance and other prepaid expenses, goodwill, and organ-
izational expenses.481  Unsecured and partly secured receivables 
and certain insurance claims must also be deducted from the 
firm’s net worth,482 along with undue concentrations of securi-
ties.483  Subordinated liabilities, however, may be added back to 
 
 477 Securities Act, R.S.Q. ch. V-1.1 s. 5(2) (2006) (Can.).  In Quebec, there are also 
categories of dealer registration with a restricted practice instead of an unrestricted prac-
tice (standard full-service securities dealers): security issuer (issuers intending to limit 
their activity to the distribution of their own securities), independent trader (members of 
recognized stock exchanges trading on their own behalf or on behalf of a dealer), dealer 
distributing Quebec business investment company (QBIC) shares, debt security dealer 
(limited to the distribution or sale of debt securities issued by the federal and provincial 
governments, municipalities and certain other public bodies), and any other category that 
may be designated by the AMF.  See R.S.Q. ch. D-9.2 s. 192. 
478 An Act Respecting the Distribution of Financial Products and Services, R.S.Q. 
ch. D-9.2 s. 72 [hereinafter FP&S Act].  However, Quebec did not decide to participate in 
the web-based National Registration database until January 2005.  Press Release, Na-
tional Registration Database Information, The Autorité des Marchés Financiers (the 
“AMF”) Has Announced Its Participation in the National Registration Database (NRD) 
(Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://www.nrd-info.ca/news/news040923.jsp. 
 479 Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2005).  The Commission is authorized to 
ensure that securities firms maintain reserves with respect to customers’ deposits or 
credit balances and establish minimum financial responsibility requirements for all bro-
kers and dealers.  15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3)(A).    
 480 Mid America Fin. Serv., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29920, at *3 (Nov. 8, 
1982).  These deductions are designated as haircuts.  Haircuts are designed to reflect the 
price volatility, liquidity, and risk inherent in the securities firms’ proprietary accounts.  
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(A)–(K). 
 481 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(A). 
 482 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(B)–(E). 
 483 An undue concentration of a single security means that the securities firm has a 
relatively large amount of the security in its proprietary account.  This circumstance 
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net worth to determine the firm’s minimum net capital require-
ments.484  Financial regulation is also supplemented by the Secu-
rities Investor Protection Act of 1970, which established the Se-
curities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC).  SIPC, funded by 
the securities industry, provides restitution to customers of firms 
that are no longer financially viable. 
The OSC and the CVMQ also require registered dealers to 
maintain sufficient capital to protect investors in the event of in-
solvency.  The OSC requires dealers to maintain certain capital 
and insurance requirements.485  In Ontario, all dealers (except 
securities issuers) must maintain minimum capital (designated 
as free capital).  The required amount of free capital is deter-
mined by identifying the maximum deductible under any bonding 
or insurance policy, plus $25,000486 of net free capital487 and a 
varying percentage of adjusted liabilities.488  In addition, all deal-
ers (except mutual fund dealers489 and security issuers) must 
have a broker’s blanket bond in the amount of $200,000, or a 
greater amount if the dealer’s directors determine that a greater 
amount is needed.490  The CVMQ requires unrestricted dealers or 
discount brokers to maintain minimum capital of $250,000; unre-
stricted dealers must also have a risk adjusted capital greater 
than $0.491  Introducing brokers must have minimum capital of 
$75,000.492  Restricted dealers must maintain minimum capital 
of $50,000 plus the amount of the deductible under their broker’s 
blanket bond or insurance policy.493  In addition, both unre-
stricted and restricted dealers must subscribe for insurance or 
bonding meeting minimum coverage requirements under the 
QSA and in accordance with applicable SROs.494  Mutual fund, 
 
means that the firm’s liquidity may be threatened if it has to liquidate a large position 
quickly because it may not be able to realize the security’s full market value. 
 484 See Mid-America Fin. Serv., Inc., 1982 WL 29920, at *3. 
 485 Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 ss. 107–112 (2006) (Can.). 
 486 R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 107.   
 487 Net free capital is defined in Ontario Securities Act R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 96.  
See also R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 107(1)(a)–(b). 
 488 Adjusted liabilities are defined in R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 96. 
 489 Mutual fund dealers must maintain at least $50,000 in bonding or insurance for 
each employee.  See  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 108(2)(a), (4). 
 490 However, the OSC Director has discretion to waive or reduce this coverage.  See 
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 108(1). 
 491 Autorité des marchés financiers [AMF] Securities Reg. § 207 (2005).  Risk ad-
justed capital is calculated according to the method prescribed by the ME.  In addition, 
the deductible under the insurance policy (blanket broker’s bond), required by AMF Secu-
rities Reg. § 213 (2005), must be included in the calculation for risk adjusted capital. 
 492 AMF Securities Reg. § 207. 
 493 Id. §§ 207–208, 213. 
 494 Minimum insurance or bonding coverage requirements for dealers registered in 
Quebec include: $500,000 for each category of risks covered for a dealer with an unre-
stricted practice or for a discount broker; $200,000 for each category of risks covered by 
the financial institution bond for an introducing broker; $100,000, plus $50,000 for each 
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scholarship plan and investment contract dealers must subscribe 
for professional liability insurance coverage in accordance with 
the provisions of the FP&S Act; the AMF will not accept a finan-
cial institution bond for these categories of dealer.495  Finally, 
like the Commission, compliance by registered dealers and their 
employees with the applicable securities laws of the OSC and the 
CVMQ is facilitated by imposing minimum levels of proficiency 
assessed by examination.496 
Business conduct rules are enforced and promulgated by 
SROs, with the approval of the Commission.  The NASD’s busi-
ness conduct rules are designed to ensure that securities firms 
and their employees “observe high standards of commercial 
honor and just and equitable principles of trade” when dealing 
with investors and other members of the securities industry.497  
These rules cover approximately five major categories concerning 
legal and appropriate business conduct by firms and their em-
ployees and associated persons in the securities industry includ-
ing general standards of commercial honor and principles of 
trade;498 communications with customers and the public;499 
transactions with customers;500 commissions, mark-ups, and 
charges;501 special accounts;502 securities distributions;503 special 
products;504 responsibilities to other brokers or dealers;505 respon-
sibilities relating to associated persons, employees, and others’ 
employees;506 and alternative dispute resolution.507  The OSC and 
the CVMQ also require dealers to supervise their registered 
salespersons, officers, and partners with a view towards ensuring 
compliance with Ontario and Quebec securities laws and the 
 
employee, for a debt security dealer or a dealer distributing QBIC shares; and $10,000 for 
securities advisers.  AMF Securities Reg. § 213.  Registration requirements for mutual 
fund, scholarship plan and investment contract dealers are set out in the regulations 
adopted under the FP&S Act.  See generally FP&S Act, supra note 478. 
 495 AMF Securities Reg. § 213. 
 496 See Proficiency Requirements for Registrants, OSC Rule 31-502 § 2.1.  These rules 
detail which industry courses must be completed and the level of previous registration or 
experience required for each type of registration.  The OSC prescribes certain time limits 
to complete the required exams and courses.  OSC Rule 31-502 § 1.2.  In addition, profes-
sional training requirements for representatives of mutual fund, scholarship plan and in-
vestment contract dealers are prescribed in FP&S Act regulations.  See generally FP&S 
Act, supra note 478. 
 497 NASD Manual Rule 2110 (2006). 
 498 NASD Manual Rule 2100 Series.  
 499 NASD Manual Rule 2200 Series. 
 500 NASD Manual Rule 2300 Series.  
 501 NASD Manual Rule 2400 Series. 
 502 NASD Manual Rule 2500 Series.  
 503 NASD Manual Rule 2700 Series.  
 504 NASD Manual Rule 2800 Series. 
 505 NASD Manual Rule 2900 Series.  
 506 NASD Manual Rule 3000 Series.  
 507 NASD Manual Rule 10300 Series.   
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terms and conditions imposed by the OSC and the CVMQ for reg-
istration in their respective jurisdictions.508  Included in the 
business conduct rules of the NASD is the “Know-Your-
Customer” rule.509  Although the Know-Your-Customer Rule is 
not codified in the Exchange Act, it is expressly stated in the 
OSA and the QSA.510 
Under OSC Rule 31-505, § 1.5 and QSA § 161 a dealer is re-
quired to comply with the Know-Your-Client Rule.511  Under this 
Rule, a dealer is required to ascertain the identity, creditworthi-
ness, and investment needs of its customer before recommending 
transactions (purchase or sale) in specific securities to the cus-
tomer.512  However, this rule is limited because the dealer only 
has to determine customer creditworthiness if it is financing the 
customer’s securities transaction.  In addition, if the customer 
has a registered adviser, the dealer is only required to determine 
the creditworthiness of the registered adviser.513  Moreover, there 
is no obligation to ensure the suitability of the trade if the ad-
viser gives the instruction to execute to the dealer.514 
Selective federal preemption facilitates consistency, and 
therefore reliability, in the securities regulatory framework.  In 
the U.S., all policy, laws, and rules must be approved by one en-
tity, the Commission.  In Canada, although the provinces of On-
tario and Quebec dominate Canada’s securities markets, the ap-
proval of policy, laws, and rules is a much more arduous process 
simply because, at least theoretically, all thirteen SRAs must 
agree.  As we have seen, complete agreement is an anomaly. 
2. Ensuring that Markets are Fair, Efficient, and 
Transparent 
Under the IOSCO Standard, ensuring fair, efficient, and 
transparent markets requires regulator approval of exchange 
and trading system operators and their trading rules.  The regu-
 
 508 Advisers must also supervise their registered officers and partners in accordance 
with Ontario and Quebec securities laws and any terms and conditions imposed by the 
OSC and the CVMQ for registration in their respective jurisdictions.  See In re Dundee 
Securities Corporation Settlement Agreement, 26 O.S.C.B. 6070, ¶ 47 (Aug. 8, 2003) 
(Can.).  
 509 NASD Manual Rule 2310 (2006). 
 510 Securities Act, R.S.Q. ch. V-1.1 s. 161 (2006) (Can.). 
 511 Id.; OSC Rule 31-505 § 1.5–1.6 (1998).  Section 4.1 of OSC Rule 31-505 permits the 
OSC Director, in his discretion, to exempt a dealer from complying with the Know-Your-
Client Rule.  See In re Fidelity Investments Canada Ltd. and Valspar Inc., 25 O.S.C.B. 
1069, app. (Feb. 12, 2002) (Can.). 
 512 OSC Rule 31-505 §§ 1.5–1.6 (1998).   
 513 However, the dealer must ascertain the creditworthiness of the customer repre-
sented by the registered adviser if payment of the account is not guaranteed by the ad-
viser.  See OSC Rule 31-505 § 1.6(1)–(2) (1998). 
 514 See OSC Rule 31-505 § 1.7 (1998). 
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latory structures for exchanges and trading systems in the U.S. 
and Canada are designed to detect, deter, and penalize market 
manipulation and other unfair trading practices.  Both countries 
have laws and require SROs to have rules that ensure transpar-
ency of trading. Under the IOSCO Standard, transparency is de-
fined “as the degree to which information about trading (both for 
pre-trade515 and post-trade516 information) is made publicly 
available on a real-time basis.”517  Also, the IOSCO Standard 
emphasizes timely access as an integral component of transpar-
ency.  “Timely access to relevant information about . . . trading 
allows investors to better look after their own interests and re-
duces the risk of manipulative or other unfair trading prac-
tices.”518  In the U.S. and Canada, registered national securities 
exchanges (including ECNs/ATSs registered as exchanges) must 
promulgate rules designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulat-
ive acts and practices.  Moreover, they must have the capacity to 
enforce compliance with the rules and regulations of applicable 
securities laws as well as the exchange’s rules.519  However, the 
absence of selective federal preemption in the Canadian securi-
ties regulatory framework makes this process less consistent and 
transparent because there is no national entity with jurisdiction 
over all thirteen provinces and territories.  For example, RS is 
the SRO responsible for regulating equities trading but is only 
authorized to regulate equity trading in five of Canada’s thirteen 
provinces.520  Finally, the admission criteria and procedures for 
exchanges and trading systems in the U.S. and Canadian securi-
ties markets do not unduly favor some market users over others. 
3.  The Reduction of Systemic Risk 
The IOSCO Standard requires merely the reduction of sys-
temic risk because systemic risk is essential to compete success-
fully in the global securities market.  Regulators must manage 
systemic risk by implementing processes and procedures de-
signed to minimize market disruptions and their impact on the 
 
 515 “Pre-trade information concerns the posting of firm bids and offers [in both quote 
and order-driven markets] as a means to enable investors to know, with some degree of 
certainty, whether and at what prices they can deal.”  IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, 
at 6.   
 516 “Post-trade information is related to the prices and the volume of all individual 
transactions actually concluded.”  Id.   
 517 Id. 
 518 Id. at 43. 
 519 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2000); Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 21 (2006); 
Quebec Securities Act, R.S.Q., ch. V-1.1, s.169 (2006); Alberta Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000, 
ch. S-4, ss. 62–63 (2006).  Transactions on unregistered exchanges are strictly prohibited 
unless specifically exempted by the Commission upon application of Exchange Act § 5.  
See § 78e. 
 520 Market Regulation Services Inc., About RS, supra note 326. 
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respective securities markets.  Such processes and procedures 
would include decreasing the risk of financial failure of market 
intermediaries and its impact on the securities markets,521 facili-
tating adequately supervised clearing and settlement procedures 
that are accurate and efficient,522 and cooperating and sharing in-
formation across jurisdictional boundaries in the global securities 
market.523 
Both the U.S. and Canada include procedures and processes 
designed to reduce systemic risk.  Both regulatory frameworks 
have systems in place that reduce the impact of financial failures 
of market intermediaries, supervised clearing and settlement 
procedures, and have entered into cooperation and information 
sharing both inside and outside their respective jurisdictions.524  
However, the use of selective federal preemption provides greater 
flexibility and efficiency with respect to decreasing systemic risk 
in the U.S. securities regulatory framework.  The author con-
cedes that the Commission must consult with various stake-
holders in the securities markets before implementing rules for 
administering federal securities laws.  However, after the consul-
tative process is complete, the Commission has the authority, in-
deed the mandate, to promulgate and to enforce the rules na-
tionwide.525  In Canada, the absence of selective federal 
preemption makes promulgating rules designed to reduce sys-
temic risk slow and unnecessarily complex.  The fragmented Ca-
nadian securities regulatory framework, at a minimum, would 
make cooperation and information sharing in the pursuit of sta-
bility more difficult.  Moreover, systemic stability cannot be pro-
tected in a system in which each SRA is autonomous and there is 
no federal regulatory authority to consistently facilitate systemic 
stability in Canada’s securities markets.  Although all of Can-
ada’s SRAs are members of the CSA, membership, and more im-
portantly adoption in whole or in part of CSA national instru-
ments designed to reduce systemic risk, is voluntary.  Without 
federal preemption, there is no single federal regulatory author-
 
 521 This means establishing systems and procedures that attempt reasonably “to iso-
late the risk to the failing institution.”  This would include specifying minimum capital 
requirements for market intermediaries and establishing and maintaining various pro-
grams for market intermediaries designed to reduce systemic risk.  IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, 
supra note 6, at 6–7.   
 522 The IOSCO Standard defines clearing and settlement systems as “systems provid-
ing the process of presenting and exchanging data or documents in order to calculate the 
obligations of the participants in the system, to allow for the settlement of these obliga-
tions, and the process of transferring funds [and/or] securities.”  Id. at 45.   
 523 Id. at 7.   
 524 See generally id. 
 525 See SEC, What We Do, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2006) (noting that the SEC works closely with many other institutions, but re-
mains the primary overseer and regulator of the U.S. securities markets). 
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ity empowered to set a coherent policy by mandating that all 
provinces adhere to national instruments promulgated by the 
CSA.  The CSA is comparable to NASAA, where member partici-
pation is voluntary and adoption of the Uniform Securities Act is 
not mandatory. 
B. The IOSCO Standard for Securities Regulator: Selective 
Federal Preemption Requires a Federal Securities Regulator 
Selective federal preemption combined with a federal securi-
ties regulator is required to meet the IOSCO Standard for securi-
ties regulator (IOSCO Standard Regulator) in the global securi-
ties market.526  Only a regulator at the federal level will have the 
requisite power to make decisions that bind all securities mar-
kets and market participants.  The IOSCO Standard Regulator: 
(1) is operationally independent because it has sufficient and sta-
ble funding; (2) is accountable based on public monitoring and 
judicial review of orders issued in connection with its regulatory 
activities; (3) is clear, consistent, transparent, and fair in the ex-
ercise of its authority and formulation of policy, and considers 
whether its regulatory activities unnecessarily burden capital 
formation; (4)  actively promotes investor and other market par-
ticipant education because it recognizes that its regulatory 
framework is based on disclosure of material facts; (5) uses the 
assistance of SROs to meet its regulatory functions and responsi-
bilities; (6) has comprehensive enforcement powers; and (7) has 
the authority to conduct cross-border activities, e.g., to obtain 
and provide information to its regulatory counterparts in other 
countries.527 
The securities regulators in the U.S. and Canada (specifi-
cally Ontario and Quebec) have many of the attributes enumer-
ated in the IOSCO Standard Regulator.  The Commission, the 
OSC, and the AMF/CVMQ have a stable and sufficient source of 
funding.  The Commission’s entire budget is funded from fee col-
lection generated by statutorily required filings by market par-
ticipants.  All fees collected are deposited in the U.S. Treasury 
except the portion used to fund the Commission’s budget.  Total 
fees collected are more than sufficient to fund the Commission’s 
budget.  In 2003, total fees collected were $1.076 billion,528 of 
 
 526 However, IOSCO contends that “[t]here need not be a single regulator, [and that] 
[i]n  many jurisdictions, the desirable attributes of the regulator . . . are in fact the shared 
responsibility of two or more government or quasi-government agencies.” IOSCO Pub. 
Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 9 n.11.   
 527 Id. at 9–16. 
 528 25% was from securities registrations, 74% was from securities transactions, and 
1% was from tender offer, merger, and other filings.  SEC, ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at 4 
(2003), available at http://sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ar03full.pdf. 
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which $716.4 million was used to fund the Commission.  The 
OSC and AMF/CVMQ are also funded from fees paid by market 
participants.  In 2004, fees collected by the OSC totaled $76.61 
million and expenses totaled $54.97 million, generating a surplus 
of $21.64 million.529  In 2004–05, AMF/CVMQ revenues totaled 
$94.7 million with a surplus of $28.7 million.530  The Commission, 
the OSC, and the AMF/CVMQ are all publicly monitored and or-
ders issued by the three regulators are subject to judicial review.  
Each of the three regulators also have education programs for 
the investing public and securities markets participants.  In ad-
dition, the Commission, the OSC, and the AMF/CVMQ delegate 
many of their regulatory functions to SROs under their jurisdic-
tions; SROs performing regulatory functions on behalf of the 
three regulators are overseen by the applicable regulator. 
The U.S., but not Canada, substantially incorporates the 
IOSCO Standard Regulator attributes of clear and consistent ex-
ercise of authority, formulation of policy, and comprehensive en-
forcement.  According to the IOSCO Standard for a securities 
regulator, these attributes in a securities regulator are required 
to compete successfully in the global securities market.531  The 
U.S. has established a regulator at the federal level using selec-
tive federal preemption to consistently exercise authority, formu-
late policy, and conduct comprehensive enforcement.  This fed-
eral regulator, the Commission, is legally authorized to represent 
and make binding decisions for the U.S. securities markets in the 
global securities market.532  Each of Canada’s thirteen regulators 
is statutorily empowered to exercise authority, formulate policy, 
and conduct comprehensive enforcement only within their respec-
tive borders.  Only the CSA purports to represent Canada’s thir-
teen SRAs at the national level, but participation, and adherence 
to CSA decisions, is purely voluntary. 
It is impossible to achieve the IOSCO Regulator Standard 
without using selective federal preemption implemented by a se-
curities regulator at the federal level.  Each of the securities 
regulators in Canada and the U.S. has substantially the same at-
tributes as those enumerated in the IOSCO Standard for a secu-
rities regulator.  However, Canada does not have a securities 
regulator at the federal level to ensure consistency in the exercise 
of authority, policymaking and enforcement in all thirteen prov-
 
 529 OSC, 2004 MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/AnnualRpt/rpt_index.jsp (follow “Management’s Discus-
sion and Analysis in PDF” hyperlink below the heading “2004”). 
 530 AMF RAPPORT ANNUEL 2004–2005, at 36 (2005) (Can.). 
 531 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at i–ii. 
 532 See SEC, What We Do, supra note 525. 
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inces.  Successfully competing in the global securities market re-
quires a regulator at the federal level using selective federal pre-
emption to regulate securities markets. The U.S. understands 
the importance of a securities regulator at the federal level to 
maintain its competitive position in the global securities market.  
Therefore, it consolidates regulatory authority in the Commis-
sion, its securities regulator at the federal level, with increasing 
use of selective federal preemption in its securities regulatory 
framework. 
1. The Absence of Selective Federal Preemption and a 
Federal Securities Regulator Adversely Impacts Canada’s 
Securities Regulatory Framework 
The absence of a federal securities regulator and selective 
federal preemption causes the location of a securities transaction 
to be unusually significant in the Canadian securities regulatory 
framework. 
This is because each province only has jurisdiction within its 
own borders.  In Ontario, jurisdiction under the OSA is deter-
mined by “whether a person has engaged in ‘trading’ in a security 
so as to give rise to the dealer registration requirement in s. 
25(1)(a).”533  Section 25(1)(1) of the OSA defines trade as “any act, 
advertisement, solicitation, conduct or negotiation directly or in-
directly in furtherance of” a sale or purchase of a security.534  
This definition is problematic because, frequently, all the compo-
nents of a securities transaction do not occur in a single province.  
This means that in each case brought by provincial securities 
regulators, jurisdiction may be raised as a first defense of the 
party being sued instead of addressing first whether there has 
been a violation of the OSA.  In addition, factors identified in 
each province to determine the location of a securities transac-
tion (and thus provincial jurisdiction) may vary considerably.  
This fact alone would cause inconsistency in the exercise of au-
thority and enforcement as well as make it more difficult to at-
tract capital to Canadian securities markets.  In a Quebec case, 
Gregory & Co. v. Quebec Securities Commission, the court deter-
mined that a promoter, doing business in Quebec was trading in 
securities in Quebec even though the promoter mailed bulletins 
to prospective investors in provinces other than Quebec.535  In  R. 
v. W. McKenzie Securities Ltd., a court in the province of Mani-
toba determined that an Ontario broker-dealer was trading in se-
 
 533 1 VICTOR P. ALBOINI, SECURITIES LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.1.5 at 11-28 (2d ed. 
1984). 
 534 The definition also includes an offer to sell.  Id.   
 535 Id. § 11.1.5 at 11-29 (citing [1961] S.C.R. 584). 
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curities in Manitoba because it mailed literature and made tele-
phone calls to Manitoba residents.536 
In Gregory, the promoter had three offices in Quebec and its 
registration as a broker in Quebec had been revoked for refusing 
to cease publishing his weekly bulletins. Subsequently, the pro-
moter alleged lack of jurisdiction in Quebec even though his ac-
tivities included: (1) preparing and printing its bulletin in Que-
bec; (2) soliciting trades in securities listed on the Montreal 
Exchange from non-Quebec residents; (3) asserting its ability to 
execute trades through the Montreal Exchange; (4) accepting 
payment for trades from non-Quebec residents in its offices in 
Quebec; and (5) maintaining its bank accounts in Quebec.537  In 
addition, the shares of companies in which the promoter solicited 
to non-Quebec residents could only be transferred in Quebec.  
Trading in securities was found by the court based on the fact 
that the shares were traded on the Montreal Exchange.  The 
court might not have reached the same result if the company’s 
shares were traded on an exchange located outside of the prov-
ince of Quebec. 
In McKenzie, the Manitoba court determined that trading oc-
curred within Manitoba’s jurisdiction even though the dealer was 
registered in Ontario because: (1) the dealer made telephone calls 
and mailed literature to a Manitoba resident for the purpose of 
soliciting orders to purchase shares in various companies and (2) 
the Manitoba resident responded to the broker-dealer’s solicita-
tions by agreeing to purchase such shares and paying for his pur-
chase with a check from his bank account maintained at a Mani-
toba bank and mailing the check to the dealer in Toronto.538  The 
Court determined that the trade took place at least in part in 
Manitoba and that 
[t]he Securities Act of Manitoba is not designed to reach out beyond 
provincial borders and to restrain conduct carried on in other parts of 
Canada or elsewhere.  Its operation is effective within Manitoba, and 
nowhere else.  For a person to become subject to its restraint he must 
trade in securities in Manitoba.  This is not to say that a non-resident 
of Manitoba can never become subject to the controls of the statute.  If 
the activities of such a non-resident can fairly and properly be con-
strued as constituting trading within the province, then they fall 
within the purview of the Act.539 
 
 536 Id. (citing [1972] S.C.R. 409). 
 537 Gregory & Co. v. Quebec Sec. Comm’n, [1961] S.C.R. 584, 586–89. 
 538 ALBOINI, supra note 533, at 11–30. 
 539 Id.  See also Midland Doherty Ltd. v. Zonailo, [1982] 36 B.C.L.R. 326, 339 (giving 
supplementary reasons for judgment); rev’d on other grounds, [1983] 43 B.C.L.R. 138 
(B.C. Ct. App.); In re a Company, June 1968 O.S.C.B. 129, 132 (“[F]urnishing the poten-
tial purchaser at his request with a prospectus and an order form” constitutes trading be-
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Moreover, to add to the lack of consistency and clarity, each 
province has discretion to provide a waiver to persons with re-
spect to determining location of trade under its securities act and 
applicable case law.  In In the Matter of a Company, the OSC de-
cided not to impose sanctions based on equitable reasons despite 
the fact that precedent indicated violations of the OSA requiring 
the imposition of sanctions.540  In Company, the OSC alleged that 
a company, through its three directors, violated the OSA by trad-
ing as an issuer and by way of primary distribution in Ontario 
without an Ontario prospectus.  The company was registered in 
British Columbia and had a British Columbia prospectus.  The 
company’s three directors were residents of British Columbia, 
but one of the directors was formerly a resident of Ontario and 
was also “known to a number of people in [Ontario] . . . to have 
brought a mine to success in each of two former ventures.  With-
out solicitation from the company or its directors these people 
and their friends . . . wrote to the company in Vancouver [British 
Columbia] requesting a prospectus.”541  Based on advice from the 
issuer’s lawyer, the issuer sent copies of its British Columbia 
prospectus and a subscription form to the people residing in On-
tario, issued shares to the Ontario residents upon receipt of their 
checks, and completed subscription forms.  The OSC determined 
that the company and its three directors violated the OSA by dis-
tributing and trading the company’s securities in Ontario with-
out an Ontario registration and prospectus.  The OSC held that 
by using the Post Office to place the British Columbia prospectus and 
the order form in the hands of the prospective purchasers in On-
tario . . . [the company and its directors had ‘traded’ in Ontario 
and] . . . [t]he fact that there was no act of solicitation and the fact 
that the final acts of sale and issue of the shares took place in British 
Columbia and not in Ontario . . . is beside the point; furnishing the po-
tential purchaser at his request with a prospectus and an order form 
were acts done in furtherance of a sale and done in Ontario.  [S]ending 
from outside Ontario and in response to a spontaneous request a pro-
spectus and an order form to a person in Ontario constitutes sufficient 
dealing in Ontario with members of the Ontario public to call for their 
protection by the supervisory devices of registration and prospectus 
filing exercised by the Ontario Securities Commission in pursuance of 
the Ontario Act.542 
In Company, the discretion exercised by the OSC in not im-
posing sanctions despite recognized violations of the OSA ad-
 
cause such activities are considered “acts done in furtherance of a sale and done in On-
tario.”). 
 540 In re a Company, June 1968 O.S.C.B. at 133. 
 541 Id. at 130–32. 
 542 Id. at 132–33. 
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versely impacts Canada’s securities regulatory framework.  Clar-
ity and consistency in enforcement of securities acts are essential 
to a globally competitive securities market.  Such uneven en-
forcement of the OSA reduces the consistency and clarity of the 
Canadian securities regulatory framework.  It also makes it more 
difficult for lawyers to advise their clients when they are unsure 
of whether a particular regulatory requirement might be waived 
by one of Canada’s thirteen provincial securities regulators.  
Lack of consistency in enforcement of provincial securities laws 
leads to increased costs to ensure compliance with applicable re-
quirements in the fragmented Canadian securities regulatory 
framework. 
a. NASDAQ Canada543 and the Renegade Province of 
Quebec 
NASDAQ Canada is an excellent example of why selective 
federal preemption implemented by a securities regulator at the 
federal level is necessary to compete successfully in the global se-
curities market.  NASDAQ Canada was established in response 
to Canada’s reorganization of its securities markets in order to 
increase its competitiveness in the global securities market. Ini-
tially, Canadian SRAs understood that consolidation was re-
quired in order to maintain the viability of Canada’s securities 
markets in the global securities market.  However, the agree-
ment brokered in 1999 to consolidate Canada’s securities market 
completely disintegrated when the province of Quebec, and sub-
sequently British Columbia, decided to withdraw from the 1999 
agreement and allow NASDAQ U.S. to establish NASDAQ Can-
ada in Montreal, Quebec.544  As a consequence, the Canadian se-
curities regulatory framework was essentially invaded by the 
U.S. securities regulatory framework.  The U.S., through NAS-
DAQ Canada, now had regulatory control over a portion of Can-
ada’s securities markets, and Quebec again had equity trading 
within the province. 
Quebec amended its laws to allow the creation of NASDAQ 
Canada and provide primary regulatory control of NASDAQ 
Canada to the U.S.  “[NASDAQ] Canada is a recognized [SRO] 
under Quebec law for purposes of carrying on business in Que-
 
 543 NASDAQ Canada was initially established to become a “standalone Canadian [se-
curities] market on the [NASDAQ] trading platform . . . . Phase 2 of [NASDAQ] Canada[] 
was to have been an ambitious attempt to create an electronic market competing directly 
with the Toronto Stock Exchange and nascent alternative trading systems.”  It was going 
to be “a new exchange in Canada . . . trad[ing] Canadian stocks in Canadian dollars.”  
Marotte, supra note 357, at B5. 
 544 NASDAQ Canada’s incentive package included a 10-year tax holiday.  Marotte, 
supra note 543.   
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bec.  NASDAQ Canada’s parent, [NASDAQ U.S.], is similarly 
recognized as an SRO under Quebec law for purposes of carrying 
on business in Quebec.”545  Moreover, “[t]he rules of NASDAQ 
Canada are those of NASDAQ [U.S.] and are overseen by the 
[U.S.] Securities and Exchange Commission . . . .”546  NASDAQ 
Canada allows the Canadian dealer to have an NASD affiliate in-
corporated in the U.S. but co-located within the Canadian 
dealer’s office in Quebec.  Dually-engaged employees are also 
permitted, “thus reducing costs and enabling better compliance 
and regulatory controls.”547  The Canadian dealer’s NASD affili-
ate must be registered with the Commission and must be a 
member of the NASD.  Accordingly, the Canadian dealer’s NASD 
affiliate is not required to become registered in Quebec nor to be-
come a member of the IDA.548  However, the Canadian dealer of 
the NASD affiliate must remain an IDA member in good stand-
ing.549  Quebec also attempts indirect regulation of the NASD af-
filiate by requiring the Canadian dealer to: (a) have dually-
engaged employees with its NASD affiliate; (b) require its NASD 
affiliate to comply with NASD rules and, therefore, with U.S. se-
curities laws, rules, and regulations; (c) require its NASD affili-
ate to have only exempt clients and to only engage in U.S. trans-
actions; and (d) require its NASD affiliate to consent to the 
jurisdiction, in any action or proceedings, of any provincial or 
provincially-recognized SRA in the province.550  Apparently, Que-
bec believes that it has maintained regulatory control by sharing 
regulatory authority with the U.S.  However, this patchwork 
regulatory framework probably makes the Canadian securities 
regulatory framework even more difficult to navigate and it may 
have an anticompetitive effect in the global securities market. 
Supporters of NASDAQ Canada contend that the primary 
benefit of NASDAQ Canada is to allow small to medium broker-
 
 545 Romano, supra note 358, at 1.  NASDAQ Canada was recognized similarly by the 
province of British Columbia.  In both provinces, registered dealers establish affiliates 
(incorporated in the U.S. but headquartered in the province), as well as the facilities, of 
the applicable Canadian dealer.  As previously discussed, this allowed such affiliates to 
trade directly through NASDAQ U.S.’s facilities.  Id. at 3. 
 546 Id. at 2.  According to Mr. Romano, prior to the establishment of NASDAQ Can-
ada, many Canadian dealers transmitted orders to NASDAQ U.S. indirectly using ECNs, 
their U.S. broker/dealer affiliates or other U.S. broker-dealers, who then transmitted such 
orders directly to [NASDAQ] U.S.  However, such indirect access methods were “adminis-
tratively cumbersome.”  Direct access would “reduce costs, enhance market visibility and 
transparency for Canadian dealers, . . . reduce customer risk, and [benefit] Canadian 
capital markets generally.”  Id. 
 547 Id. at 3. 
 548 Provided that the NASD affiliate only has clients classified as accredited investors 
and other clients who do not require Canadian registration (i.e., non-exempt clients) and 
only execute U.S. transactions.  Id. 
 549 Id. 
 550 Id. at 3–4. 
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dealers to directly, and therefore less expensively, access U.S. 
capital markets.551  Unfortunately (or fortunately, according to 
one’s perspective), the Canadian securities marketplace operates 
next to the largest securities marketplace in the world, therefore 
making it vulnerable to being gobbled up by the U.S. securities 
markets, or at least becoming a “branch investment banking” se-
curities market for the U.S. securities markets. 
NASDAQ Canada may be the first step in diminishing the 
relevance of the Canadian securities markets in the global secu-
rities market.  This diminution of importance would lead to Can-
ada taking a “back seat” on the bus of meaningful participation 
in shaping the regulatory structure of the global securities mar-
ket. 
C. Selective Federal Preemption Implemented by a Federal 
Securities Regulator—Lesson Learned 
The U.S. and Canada are quite similar in their approaches to 
the framework for securities regulation; the primary difference is 
that the U.S. has a single federal regulatory authority, the Com-
mission, to guide policy and to ensure consistency both domesti-
cally and in the global securities marketplace.  The U.S.’s under-
standing of the importance of a single federal regulatory 
authority is reflected in the steady increase in federal preemption 
in its securities regulatory framework.  Given the experiences of 
our neighbor to the north, increasing federal preemption in the 
U.S. securities regulatory framework is the better strategy for at 
least maintaining the competitiveness of securities markets in 
the global securities marketplace; regulatory power selectively 
consolidated in a federal regulator, the Commission, enables the 
U.S. to speak with one voice in the global securities marketplace, 
craft a coherent policy, and provide consistent enforcement of its 
securities regulatory framework.  This is important from a global 
perspective because regulatory authorities in the global securi-
ties market only need to negotiate with one entity when dealing 
with the U.S. securities markets.  In Canada, they must negoti-
ate with thirteen provinces if they wish to access all Canadian 
securities markets. This is the primary reason that the Commis-
sion reacted so strongly to the actions of New York Attorney 
General Spitzer.  Given the importance of the NYSE, domiciled 
in Spitzer’s jurisdiction, in the overall U.S. securities regulatory 
framework, actions taken in the state of New York have policy 
implications for all U.S. securities markets.  Although Spitzer is 
to be applauded for his excellent work, it is not in the best inter-
 
 551 Id. at 3. 
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ests of U.S. securities markets to allow one state—New York—to 
set policies for all U.S. securities markets.552  Moreover, market 
participants, especially issuers, should not be held to a higher 
standard in one state despite its preeminence in the U.S. securi-
ties markets.  A domestically and globally competitive securities 
market must treat substantially similar conduct equally.  This 
means that Spitzer, and any other SSRA, must consult with the 
Commission to ensure that the U.S. securities markets continue 
to “speak with one voice” and therefore remain competitive in the 
global securities market. 
Lest I offend my brethren to the north, they, too, realize the 
importance of selective federal preemption implemented by a 
federal securities regulator. The Canadian federal government 
(Ottawa), along with market participants and issuers, recognizes 
the need for a single federal regulator to compete successfully in 
the global securities market.  Ottawa realizes that Canada’s 
fragmented securities regulatory framework causes significant 
transaction delays and the imposition of onerous costs because 
market participants must deal with thirteen SRAs.  Moreover, a 
senior securities counsel in Canada asserted that “[a]ll other 
problems pale in comparison to the lack of harmonization” be-
tween Canada’s thirteen provinces.553  Moreover,  
at the end of the day, [Canada] will still have 13 securities regulators 
instead of one.  International investors, and indeed Canadians, will 
still be drawn to the clarity of the U.S. regime, over the relative com-
plexity of [Canada’s].  And Canadian public companies will continue to 
overwhelmingly call for more dramatic reform, to no avail.  Only in 
Canada.554   
“[I]t is simply not credible to argue that the involvement of mul-
tiple regulators that exists [sic] within the CSA can achieve the 
efficiency of a national securities regulator.”555  Under Canada’s 
securities regulatory framework, “it is not entirely clear who, if 
anyone, speaks for Canada.”556  Moreover, Barbara Stymiest, the 
CEO of the TSX, echoing the sentiments of the Ontario’s Minister 
 
 552 Note that New York, like Ontario, houses the largest and most powerful securities 
markets and exchanges in the nation’s securities markets.  See NYC.com, Financial Dis-
trict (Lower Manhattan), http://www.nyc.com/visitor_guide/Financial_District_ 
Lower_Manhattan.75852/editorial.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (noting that New York 
“houses some great economic powerhouses, including the headquarters of major banks, 
the New York Stock Exchange, [and] the World Financial Center”). 
 553 REGULATORY BURDEN TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE ONTARIO SECURITIES 
COMMISSION 10 (2003), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ 
Accountability/ga_20031212_rbtf-rpt.pdf. 
 554 Michael Den Tandt, Charest Won’t Want Single Regulator, GLOBE AND MAIL 
(Can.), Apr. 17, 2003, at B2. 
 555 FIVE YEAR REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 37 (quoting  
comment letter on the Issues List of Torys LLP). 
 556 Id. 
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of Finance, stated that 
the current system, fractured as it is, burdens companies with dupli-
cative costs and impairs Canada’s stature on the world stage. . . . 
  . . . . 
  [Moreover,] Canada must “get its act together” and begin speaking 
with a unified voice.  The U.K. securities watchdog, for instance, re-
fuses to open up trading on its exchanges to Canadian brokerages on a 
province-by-province basis, while China’s regulator has expressed its 
displeasure at having to negotiate a recent deal with four separate 
provinces . . . .557 
The author of this article would extend this sentiment one 
step further.  Most likely, Canadian companies would also by-
pass Canadian capital markets given the proximity of the U.S. 
securities markets if their securities could be traded in both Ca-
nadian and U.S. dollars.  In fact, Level II of NASDAQ Canada in-
cluded allowing users to trade in Canadian companies listed on 
NASDAQ Canada from either the U.S. or Canada simultaneously 
in either Canadian or U.S. dollars.558  If this were to occur, Cana-
dian issuers would probably be sorely tempted to bypass Cana-
dian capital markets altogether. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal preemption should be crafted to “clear away some of the regu-
latory underbrush that adds to the cost of capital[,] without compro-
mising investor protections.”559 
Selective federal preemption administered by a federal secu-
rities regulator is the better regulatory model for competing suc-
cessfully in the global securities market.  Congress apparently 
understands this, based on the trend of increasing selective fed-
eral preemption in the securities regulatory framework of the 
U.S. securities markets.  State authority to bring securities fraud 
cases should be preserved in the delicate balance of selective fed-
eral preemption because state securities regulators have a strong 
interest in putting away “the bad guys” within their jurisdictions.  
“Bringing suit for common law fraud in no way interferes with 
the regulatory mandates of the [federal government] . . . . [T]he 
purpose underlying state common law fraud actions—to deter 
fraudulent practices—is consistent with federal securities 
 
 557 Sinclair Stewart & Heather Scoffield, Ottowa to “Act Quickly” to Pave Way for Na-
tional Securities Watchdog, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Mar. 24, 2004, at B12. 
 558 Press Release, NASDAQ, Helen Kearns Named President of NASDAQ Canada 
(May 1, 2001), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2001/ 
ne_section01_143.html. 
 559 Rachel Witmer, Legislation: Congress Passes Major Securities Bill; Clinton Ex-
pected to Sign It OMB Says, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1211, 1212 (1996). 
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law . . . as both seek to deter fraud.”560  Federal preemption must 
be carefully used to “‘maintain uniformity and certainty’ in U.S. 
securities markets so that they may remain ahead of markets ‘in 
London, Frankfurt, Tokyo or Hong Kong.’”561  Moreover, allowing 
the Commission to operate exclusively in certain areas in which 
it previously shared regulatory authority with state SRAs led to 
a reduction in cost, complexity, and redundancy. 
Federal preemption also supports the flexibility required to 
compete successfully in the global securities marketplace.  En-
ron, Worldcom, Adelphia, and their ilk dealt a severe blow to in-
vestor confidence and the perceived transparency and fairness of 
U.S. securities markets.  Without a regulatory framework incor-
porating selective federal preemption and a federal securities 
regulator, the necessarily rapid regulatory response to shore up 
investor confidence and the perceived fairness and transparency 
of U.S. securities markets would likely not have occurred.  A 
swift response was necessary to ensure that U.S. securities mar-
kets remain the premier markets in the world.  A tarnished U.S. 
securities marketplace could result in foreign investors less likely 
to invest in U.S. issuers, depriving issuers of an important source 
of capital.  In turn, investors would have less investment oppor-
tunities because issuers would be less willing to access capital 
markets perceived as lacking fairness and transparency. 
It is obvious that the principle of cooperation or harmoniza-
tion of securities laws between state or provincial securities regu-
lators is not feasible.  The primary problem is that none of the 
members of the CSA or NASAA are required to adopt uniform se-
curities laws and regulations that have not been adopted by their 
legislators.  Also, wholesale adoption of the provisions of uniform 
laws is simply not the norm. 
The consequence of not “speaking with one voice” is, at best, 
becoming irrelevant in setting policy in the regulatory framework 
for the global securities market. 
 
 560 Common Law Fraud Claims Not Preempted By Federal Securities Law, Court 
Concludes, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1634, 1635 (2001). 
 561 Witmer, Litigation Reform, supra note 3, at 1402. 
